Fateful Triangle. Tanvi Madan

American assessment that the Kashmir dispute was one of the key threats to that stability—and required greater US involvement—came to be a major source of tension between the US and India.⁷⁸ Second, even though India was the bigger prize in most American policymakers’ eyes, as NSC 48 outlined, it also became important to prevent Pakistan from falling to communism. And, in spring 1950, Pakistani prime minister Liaquat Ali Khan made clear that, while India might resist playing a role in the American script for Asia, his country was ready for a role.⁷⁹

      There was one area of US-India agreement on China, but it did not lead to convergence because of differences over means. The New York Times reported that one aspect of Nehru’s prescription—pursuing a wedge strategy—had impressed the State Department.⁸⁰ Even before his visit, China watchers at State had argued against assuming Soviet control of the Chinese communists and stressed that Mao could act independently. Like Nehru, the American embassy in Moscow thought that US recognition of the communist Chinese government could help create a wedge between Beijing and Moscow. Acheson, in turn, believed that attempting to detach China from the Soviet Union would not constitute appeasement.

      By the end of 1949, NSC 48/2 endorsed the idea of exploiting “rifts” between the communist giants.⁸¹ But, while this US objective was defined, the means to achieve it were not as clear. Kennan recommended a hands-off American policy. Truman and Acheson, on the other hand, contemplated cautiously detaching Beijing from Moscow, but not until the Chinese communists stopped “active abuse of us.”⁸²

      This question of whether China or the US should take the first step would become a continuing point of difference with India. Furthermore, the Truman administration publicly continued to treat and condemn international communism as a monolith. To Nehru, as he had told the American leadership, this approach was counterproductive to the objective of facilitating a Sino-Soviet split.

      To Recognize or Not to Recognize

      Nehru was willing to take the first step with China by offering to recognize the People’s Republic in late December 1949. Through most of that year, the Indian prime minister had been in “no hurry” to recognize communist China.⁸³ He had wanted to “wait and watch developments” in China before India took such a step.⁸⁴ Nehru had also not wanted “too abrupt a break” with Jiang.⁸⁵ The communist Chinese had not been friendly, and throughout that year, their news outlets had continued to condemn his government as being a “lackey” of Western “imperialists.”⁸⁶ He also wanted to communicate and coordinate with other countries like Britain and the US, though Indian representative in China K. M. Panikkar advised against this.⁸⁷ Finally, there was no consensus in India about recognition.

      There had been a lively debate in India among the press and politicians of all stripes about whether to recognize communist China. Some supported recognition on idealistic or pragmatic bases; some opposed it as disloyal to Jiang or on the grounds that it would divide the US and India. Yet others called for conditional recognition, seeking guarantees from China in return. Within the government, Panikkar, foreign secretary Kumara Padma Sivasankara (K. P. S.) Menon (former Indian agent general in China), and high commissioner in London Krishna Menon argued in favor of recognition. Others such as Governor-General Chakravarti Rajagopalachari, Deputy Prime Minister Patel, and some diplomats advocated a “go slow” approach.⁸⁸ Some, like the political officer in Sikkim, suggested that India should state that any recognition was “without prejudice” to India’s rights and commitments vis-à-vis Tibet. Bajpai, who did not believe India could help Tibet militarily, similarly argued for using the recognition negotiations to protect India’s rights there.⁸⁹

      Washington followed this debate closely. Other countries, including American allies like Britain, had made clear that they would soon recognize the communist Chinese government. But US policymakers and legislators watched India’s decision closely because Nehru was thought to have broader influence, especially among other developing countries and with the Commonwealth.⁹⁰ Chairman Tom Connally’s first question to Acheson at a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing ahead of the Indian prime minister’s visit to Washington had been whether India was favoring recognition.⁹¹

      Administration officials were aware that Nehru’s government was leaning toward recognition. In May 1949, the US ambassador to China had conveyed rumors that India would recognize the communist government “fairly promptly after [a] ‘decent interval.’”⁹² American officials had subsequently sought assurances from the Indian government that it would coordinate or at least consult with the US or Commonwealth states on the matter of recognition.⁹³ By September, it had been evident that it was just a matter of time before India recognized Mao’s regime.⁹⁴ In Delhi, the Indian foreign secretary had remarked to the US chargé that, while there was “no reason for haste,” recognition was “inevitable.”⁹⁵

      Nehru had not decided on the how and when of recognition on the eve of his visit to the US.⁹⁶ In public in the US, he avoided direct answers but made clear that recognition was in the offing.⁹⁷ The prime minister subscribed to scholar-diplomat Panikkar’s view that recognition would put India in a “better position to protect [its] interests” vis-à-vis China than isolating it.⁹⁸ He wanted to discuss Indian interests in Tibet, which Chinese premier Zhou Enlai had told Panikkar would be safeguarded, and the India-Tibet boundary with Chinese officials.⁹⁹ Moreover, he believed that indefinite delay or conditional recognition would likely push China and the Soviet Union together and strengthen the hands of those in Beijing pushing for such a communist alliance.¹⁰⁰ Bajpai outlined another reason to Henderson: India’s role in Asia would be adversely affected if other Asian countries recognized China and Delhi did not.¹⁰¹

      Patel would later tell the American ambassador that Nehru’s decision was also hurried along by indications that Britain and the US were just waiting for a good time to recognize China. Nehru wanted to pre-empt them so that Beijing would see him as a leader rather than a follower.¹⁰² The deputy prime minister had conversely suggested to Nehru that there was little benefit to being in the lead, and it would be better if India were “somewhat late in the company of others.”¹⁰³ But even he thought that recognition was inevitable.¹⁰⁴

      American officials in Britain, China, India, and the US tried to delay Indian recognition.¹⁰⁵ London persuaded Delhi to delay by two weeks, but on December 10, K. P. S. Menon informed Henderson that Delhi was likely to recognize the communist regime toward the end of the month. On December 19, mentioning the British intention to recognize, he confirmed that India would recognize Mao’s government on December 30.¹⁰⁶ On that day, India made a public announcement that it would be willing to recognize the communist Chinese government.

      Even at that point, Delhi and Washington were not on entirely different pages when it came to China. Like Indian officials, Acheson believed that the communists controlled the mainland and that Mao was not a “true satellite” of the Soviets. Meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in late December, he questioned whether the effort to delay the fall of Taiwan was worth it. He said the US should instead focus on strengthening China’s neighbors by building their stability and prosperity, and on supporting nationalist movements in the region—a strategy with which Nehru would have concurred.¹⁰⁷

      But there was no concurrence on recognition. Acheson told his British and French counterparts that recognition would serve no purpose and would only worry American partners in Asia. Many US allies leaned toward recognition, but the administration agreed with members of Congress that the US should not recognize Mao’s regime. Chinese mistreatment of US nationals, including diplomats,¹⁰⁸ reinforced this view.¹⁰⁹ From Delhi, Henderson, while noting that the Indian leadership would vociferously criticize the US for not recognizing China, asserted that the US should not do so. He believed it would adversely affect American credibility because countries in the region would see it as a sign of weakness.¹¹⁰

      China hawks in the US gave the administration little credit for not recognizing the Chinese communist regime. Senator Knowland moreover criticized it for not doing enough to stop or at least