Fateful Triangle. Tanvi Madan

India had to seek a little (military and economic) help from its friends. Autonomy could not be the primary goal, and at times the two more important objectives—security and prosperity—even meant seeking alignment.

      India tilted twice during the period this book covers: 1962–1963, when India sought American aid against China, and the two countries signed an air defense agreement that called for mutual consultations in the event of a Chinese attack against India; and 1971, when, with a looming China-Pakistan threat, India signed a treaty with the Soviet Union that envisioned mutual consultations if either country was attacked. These Indian alignments took place when five elements coincided: an imminent threat; India’s inability to deal with the challenge on its own; a willing partner; the lack of other partners (thwarting India’s desire to diversify); and sufficient political will and capacity to undertake a tilt.

      In both cases, it was China that represented that threat and drove India toward alignment. Even in the US-India case, that alignment was not just momentary. It might not have constituted a full-blown alliance, but before and after 1962, it facilitated close cooperation in the military, intelligence, and economic spheres. This was a period when each country showed a greater tolerance toward the other’s approach toward partnerships. But there were also missed opportunities that are worth heeding today.

      This book details those missed opportunities, and aims to offer a broader set of insights for present and future policymakers about the US-India-China triangle—an even more fateful one with regional and global implications. It provides historical context for many of the challenges and opportunities related to the bilateral and trilateral relationships facing Indian and US policymakers today. And it offers lessons—of possibilities, limitations, and caution—from past experience that can inform current and future policies.

      A few notes on what this book is not: it is not a study of China as an actor in the US-India relationship, but of when and how China was a factor shaping the relationship; whether, why, and how Chinese policymakers actively sought to shape US-India relations merits further study, but it is beyond the scope of this book. Also, while it includes information on public opinion where available, it is a book about high (geo)politics, not a view from below. Finally, the book does not seek to be the final word on the subject—as more information becomes available, there will no doubt be additional aspects and interpretations that come to light.

      This book builds on existing scholarship of the relationships between these three countries. It also uses primary sources. In the US, these include official papers available through the presidential libraries, the National Archives, and document collections such as the Foreign Relations of the United States series. In India, sources include the official documents and private papers of senior policymakers accessible at the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, the more limited Ministry of External Affairs papers available at the National Archives of India, and documents in the Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru series. There remain gaps in the availability of documents, but the papers that are available allow a better reconstruction of the Indian perspective than has been possible in the past. Oral histories and newspaper accounts also helped with triangulation.

      The book takes a chronological approach. It is organized into parts to reflect the different states of the Indian and the US relationships with China over time, and to explore their impact on the US-India relationship in each period. The parts cover when (1) Sino-Indian relations were neutral to positive while Sino-US relations were negative; (2) both Sino-Indian and Sino-US relations were negative; (3) Sino-Indian relations were strained, while Sino-US relations improved; and (4) both Sino-Indian and Sino-US relations were thawing.

      Part I (Divergence) covers chapters 1 and 2, titled as all the chapters are, using Economist article titles from the time. It focuses on the period from 1949 to 1956, when Indian and US perceptions of and policies toward China cast a relatively dark shadow on the US-India relationship. Part II (Convergence), with chapters 3 and 4, examines shifting Indian and US attitudes and actions toward China between 1956 and 1962, which drove the two countries together. Part III (Dependence and Disillusionment), covering chapters 5 and 6, considers the period from 1963 to 1968, when Delhi and Washington’s perception of China as a major threat held the US and India together, but their different views of the right approach limited their partnership. Part IV (Disengagement) includes chapters 7 and 8. The former examines the impact of the shift in US and Indian perceptions of and policy toward China on the US-India relationship between 1969 and 1972, when India found itself with a G-2 problem. Chapter 8 covers the period between 1973 and 1979, a time of developing détente between each of the countries in the triangle. The conclusion brings the story up to the present day, with a view of the impact of China on the US-India relationship in the last four decades, and offers some insights of relevance to current and future policymakers.

PART I

      1

      The Orientation in the Orient (1949–1952)

       Divergences between United States and Indian views toward China and Indochina are serious foreign policy conflicts blocking closer understanding with India.

      —Department of State policy statement, December 1, 1950¹

      On October 11, 1949, at 4:40 p.m., Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru stepped off US president Harry Truman’s plane Independence onto the tarmac at Washington’s National Airport. Time called it “one of the century’s most important visits of state.”² It was Nehru’s first visit to the United States and the first summit level meeting between the American and Indian heads of government. Truman, along with three cabinet ministers and a 19-gun salute, greeted Nehru at the airport. The skies were cloudless; from Truman’s perspective, however, the state of the world was not. Just ten days earlier, Chinese Communist Party chairman Mao Zedong had announced the establishment of the People’s Republic of China. This “loss” of China shaped the welcome Nehru received in the US, put the subject on the Truman-Nehru agenda and affected how India and her prime minister were seen in the US.

      Despite the sunny beginning that day, China cast a dark shadow on the US-India relationship in the few years after the Truman-Nehru meeting. From 1949 to 1956, American and Indian policymakers differed over the nature of the China threat, its urgency, and how to deal with it—and this posed a major challenge for US-India relations. American officials saw China as hostile and sought to contain it. The dominant view in India, however, was that China did not pose an external threat in the short to medium term; Delhi consequently sought to engage Beijing.

      This US-India difference had an impact on their bilateral relationship because each country came to see the other’s China stance as, at best, hindering or, at worst, harming its own strategic priorities. Moreover, as the US focused more on Asia, and India played a larger role on the global—and especially Asian—stage, the two countries crossed paths frequently on the China question. Simultaneously, however, each country’s strategic framework, including vis-à-vis China, envisioned a role for the other. This perception prevented a complete US-India breakdown.

      From the American perspective, China had two key effects on the US-India relationship. On the one hand, communist China’s emergence made India a bigger blip on Washington’s radar—one that stood out because of its size and potential as well as its noncommunist and democratic character. On the other hand, Delhi’s disagreement