Fateful Triangle. Tanvi Madan

solution; his government had to show results. Patel, too, stressed the importance of India preventing its own China-like situation from developing.⁵⁰

      Nehru and Patel realized that their government could not deliver alone. Rapid and efficient development required foreign assistance, which the government welcomed despite some domestic opposition.⁵¹ For this, Patel thought one country was key, saying to Nehru, “we have to depend on the USA for our progress.” The prime minister thought developments vis-à-vis Britain, the Soviet Union, and the US would be crucial. He agreed that the latter was “of course, most important.” India needed to “take full advantage of [its] friendship” with the US both for economic assistance and to develop India’s military-industrial base.⁵² Given global uncertainty, he told Pandit that India needed this base and military equipment, and therefore needed cooperation with others to ensure that India did not “remain weak.” And the only countries that could help at the time were the US and UK.⁵³ Close confidant V. K. Krishna Menon later recalled him saying, “Why not align with the United States somewhat and build up our economic and military strength?”⁵⁴

      In 1948, Indian policymakers used China to elicit support for aid to India. Chaos in China had created an opportunity. Nehru told Patel that because China would be unlikely to “play an effective part for a long time,” many countries would recognize that India was “the only other country” in Asia able to do so, and they would thus want to cultivate a relationship with it.⁵⁵ An Indian diplomat, Rajeshwar Dayal, outlined for Delhi a way to capitalize on developments in China: “The China situation will alter the balance in Asia and it seems to me that this is a good time to take up seriously the question of opening trade talks with the USSR. One result will be to stir up the Ang[l]o-Americans who have been treating our requests for capital goods rather cavalierly.”⁵⁶

      The use of this tactic could be quite blatant. For example, in a pitch to Secretary of State George Marshall, Nehru noted that “in working for itself India was working for all of Asia, especially in view of the tragic course in China.” India’s UN representative implied to Commerce Secretary Charles Sawyer that developments in China had increased concerns about the potential spread of communism in India, and only economic development could stem its appeal. Bajpai indicated to American interlocutors that “following the collapse of China,” US aid was indispensable to maintain India as the “chief stabilizing influence in Asia.” Using similar logic, he had also broached the subject of military assistance with the acting secretary of state Robert Lovett.⁵⁷

      American aid was crucial both because the US had the technical and financial ability to help India’s development plans and because the Soviet Union was not an available source.⁵⁸ In the initial years of Indian independence, Nehru had reached out to Moscow, seeking to diversify India’s relationships—and thus any potential dependence—and maximize the country’s aid options.⁵⁹ But, although there was a debate in Moscow about India policy, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin saw India as an Anglo-American stooge, which Nehru resented. There were other irritants as well. The Indian prime minister believed Moscow was guiding the Indian communist party’s increasingly hostile approach.⁶⁰ Nehru was also critical of “Russia’s active expansionism” and “apparent lack of any sense of ethics in international affairs.”⁶¹ In addition, Soviet offers and terms of assistance had fallen short.⁶² It was also harder to deal with differences since Indian policymakers had few avenues to communicate with officials from the Soviet Union or its satellites.⁶³ It was in this context that Delhi looked to Washington, and Nehru traveled to the US in October 1949.

      Colliding Positions (1949–1952)

      The Indian prime minister’s visit would reveal crucial differences between India and the US on communism, the Soviet Union, and China. These disagreements would only intensify, with crucial implications for US-India relations over the rest of Truman’s term and even beyond it.

      Red China or New China? Comparing Notes (1949–1950)

      China was a key subject of discussion between American and Indian policymakers during Nehru’s visit. He outlined both his perception of and his preferred policy toward China. He felt Guomindang mismanagement had created the space for the communists. Communism, he believed, was “alien to the Chinese mind.” “Foreign domination” would be disliked, and nationalism, growing everywhere in Asia, would eventually return as the “governing force” in China—and, meanwhile, serve to limit Sino-Soviet cooperation. Nehru gave Acheson the impression that India was “leaning toward early recognition,” explaining that “India’s proximity to China” made it view this issue differently.⁶⁴ Acheson did not believe that early recognition would give India any advantage. Moreover, it was not clear that the communists controlled all of China or that they had the backing of the Chinese people—both necessary elements before the US would even consider recognition. Furthermore, he worried about the impact of recognition on those still resisting the communists. Finally, he felt the Chinese government needed to outline its “international obligations” before expecting recognition.⁶⁵

      American policymakers had been aware of Nehru’s attitude toward China and the gap between US and Indian perceptions. Even before the visit, some voices within the administration had noted, “There is little hope that Nehru will dramatically announce that he has seen the light.”⁶⁶ Henderson had noted that a survey of elite Indian opinion on China had shown that the majority of the leadership shared the prime minister’s views.⁶⁷ Furthermore, reports from American diplomats in Delhi and Nanking had made evident that American and Indian attitudes toward the Chinese communists did not fully overlap.⁶⁸

      Nehru’s visit, with public hints that Delhi was close to recognizing the communist regime in China,⁶⁹ made clear to the American public what had been apparent to some observers within the administration: the US might have assigned India a role in its strategic script, but India was not willing to play that role in the way the US wanted.⁷⁰ As the British ambassador in Washington noted, the visit “made abundantly clear to the American public that they could not look to India as a ready-made replacement for China [in] the cold war against Communism.”⁷¹ Speaking to the US Congress, Nehru had asserted, “Where freedom is menaced … or where aggression takes place, we cannot and shall not be neutral.”⁷² But as the New York Times lamented, Nehru “declined to encourage the slightest hope” that the US would have an ally in India.⁷³ The “fall” of China had created a constituency for India in Washington among the public and Congress; Nehru’s visit limited its hopes and size.

      Within the administration, the visit cemented the view that India was not necessarily the answer to its China problem—certainly not one that would justify half a billion dollars of aid at a time when resources were limited, congressional support was uncertain, and the Truman administration’s focus and the public’s attention remained on Europe.⁷⁴ There was also a developing change in emphasis in US policy from economic to military assistance. Thus, in the week after Nehru’s visit, Henderson’s proposal for a large aid package to India was set aside.⁷⁵

      Overall, Nehru’s visit limited the US view of India’s importance. The shift in the administration’s attitude was evident in the National Security Council staff’s December 1949 draft position paper on Asia policy (NSC 48/1). It stressed that since communism was global, rather than regional or local, the solution was not necessarily regional or local. Thus it would be “unwise” for the US to look toward India as a bulwark against communism in Asia.⁷⁶ At a meeting of US chiefs of mission in East Asia, officials also expressed doubts about the desirability and feasibility of building up Japan or India as dominant powers to counter China and the Soviet Union. India had not shown “constructive leadership,” and it was preoccupied with internal matters. Moreover, any such assigned leadership would stir up countries like Pakistan or Sri Lanka.⁷⁷

      The evolving American strategic framework did, nonetheless, have a place for South Asia more broadly. This affected US policy in two ways that led to disagreements with Delhi. First, American policymakers put an even higher