Fateful Triangle. Tanvi Madan

and integrate India’s northeast. After China’s initial invasion of Tibet, a defense committee assessed the impact of losing the buffer state. It recommended strengthening border posts and infrastructure for transport and communications as well as alleviating the neglect of the area and its residents. But there were limits, Bajpai stressed to Henderson, to what India could do militarily.¹⁸⁷ Therefore, to key decisionmakers in Delhi, the missing buffer made it more necessary to keep China in good humor.¹⁸⁸

      The American embassy in Delhi remained concerned that Tibet would be “lost by default,” and that China could “constantly menace” India from there.¹⁸⁹ The chargé argued that the US should convince India that the Sino-Tibetan treaty was not in its interests and that Delhi should encourage the Dalai Lama to reject it and flee to India.¹⁹⁰

      But, while Washington was willing to encourage Tibet’s leaders and its autonomy in spirit, it was unwilling to act alone to provide military or financial assistance or appoint official representatives to Tibet. Acheson maintained that India had the primary responsibility to help Tibet.¹⁹¹ In addition, the US had no desire to upset Jiang by announcing support for Tibetan sovereignty.¹⁹² Furthermore, like Britain and India, the US was concerned about any spillover impact on the Korean situation—the reason why it would not promise a specific response to a potential Tibetan appeal to the UN.¹⁹³ Finally, any unilateral American action in Tibet would only serve to push India toward China; instead there was hope that Indian resentment would grow as the Chinese consolidated their hold over Tibet.¹⁹⁴

      By the fall of 1951, the Truman administration accepted that Tibetan officials were unlikely to reject the Sino-Tibetan agreement. The Far East Asia desk at the State Department advocated using “Tibet as a weapon for alerting GOI to the danger of attempting to appease any Communist Govt and, specifically, for maneuvering GOI into a position where it will voluntarily adopt a policy of firmly resisting Chinese Communist pressure in south and east Asia.”¹⁹⁵ There were still some attempts to get India to assure the Dalai Lama that he would be given asylum. But with Delhi unwilling to take the initiative and a new US ambassador in Delhi—Chester Bowles—who was less enthusiastic about pressuring India on this issue, such efforts faded. So did hope that India would change its China policy.

      Chinese Intervention in the Korean War: The Blame Game (1950–1951)

      In the fall of 1950, Acheson had told members of Congress that the Chinese going into Tibet made Delhi realize that the “force that is loose in China is a pretty difficult one to handle.”¹⁹⁶ The American hope that India would recognize Mao’s aggressive intentions in Asia only escalated when the Chinese subsequently intervened in the Korean War.

      Even though its efforts in summer and early fall 1950 had met with little success, the Indian role as intermediary between China and the US had continued. Washington usually considered India’s nonalignment and its relations with China a liability, but, along with Panikkar’s access to Chinese officials, these were seen as assets when the US needed a channel to China. Britain also had a presence in Beijing. But American officials thought Nehru and India had more credibility in Asia and the nonaligned world, and India had been willing to take on this role. From the start of the war, Indian officials had briefed American officials on the messages they received from Panikkar.¹⁹⁷ In turn, India had passed on American messages to China, including warnings intended to deter Beijing.¹⁹⁸ But some US policymakers doubted India’s role as an honest broker. India was not an ally, and it followed an independent China policy that they believed was primarily designed to avoid provoking Beijing. This added to the strain in the US-India relationship.

      American doubts about the messenger were partly responsible for skepticism about Chinese signals via Delhi in September and October that it would intervene directly in the war if UN forces crossed the 38th parallel dividing North and South Korea.¹⁹⁹ Some policymakers saw the accompanying Indian warning as driven by Nehru wanting peace at any cost. Skepticism of Panikkar affected others’ views.²⁰⁰ American officials thought he was not objective about the Chinese—a concern that Indian officials like Bajpai and Pandit shared.²⁰¹ Yet others, including Truman, believed that China was trying to influence a vote pending at the UN, and that the messages were either just Chinese propaganda or “a bald attempt to blackmail the UN.” Moreover, MacArthur had assured the president that China was unlikely to intervene.²⁰²

      Allies, as well as some in American military and political circles, worried about potential Chinese escalation if the 38th parallel was crossed. But Truman was even more concerned about global and domestic credibility, and military demands.²⁰³ Thus, despite India’s and others’ warnings, he did not rescind his approval to cross the parallel. On October 7, US forces crossed the parallel. Twelve days later, Chinese troops started moving into Korea.

      Expectations in Washington that the Chinese entry into the war would lead India to see the light assumed that Delhi would share Washington’s interpretation of Chinese actions. Instead, it increased Nehru’s frustration with the US rather than with China. Indian officials believed MacArthur’s move had provoked China into retaliation. This heightened the prospect of a larger war, which Nehru—dreading that India would be dragged into war at a time when it needed peace—had been trying to prevent.²⁰⁴ To avert even further escalation, India sponsored a UN resolution in January 1951, backed by Britain, that called for a ceasefire and negotiations. The US grudgingly supported the resolution, with Acheson hoping that China would reject it.²⁰⁵

      Beijing did exactly that, leading to criticism in Indian newspapers and disappointment in the government.²⁰⁶ An Indian diplomat in Moscow reported back that Chinese “intransigence” was following “the Soviet line,” and Delhi should thus curtail hopes of an “Asiatic Tito” (i.e., a Mao willing to buck that line).²⁰⁷ But, publicly, the Indian government asserted that the Chinese reply was not an “outright rejection.”²⁰⁸

      Parallel American efforts toward a General Assembly resolution blaming China as the aggressor proved to be another source of tension between the US and India. Nehru vociferously criticized it as another example of the US not facing facts. He argued that rather than Chinese aggression being responsible, “All the troubles in the Far East arise from the failure of the rest of the world to adjust itself to the changes which have taken place in Asia.”²⁰⁹ For Nehru, the US had erred in crossing the 38th parallel despite Chinese (and Indian) warnings, and “further complications ensued.”²¹⁰ With the resolution, it was only shutting the door to negotiations and compounding its mistakes.²¹¹

      Truman disagreed, and bluntly and publicly said, “I believe in calling an aggressor an aggressor.”²¹² American commentators dismissed Nehru’s assertion that the isolation of China, rather than Chinese aggression, had led to the situation in Korea. Worse, he was playing into Chinese hands by “sowing confusion and mistrust.”²¹³ Beijing did not want a settlement, as Delhi and London believed. Rather, Chinese actions were designed to divide the noncommunist countries.²¹⁴

      Once again, the different lessons learned from the Second World War played a role in shaping US and Indian views of the best approach. Henderson told Bajpai that collective failure to combat aggression would only lead to more belligerence, eventually resulting in a larger war.²¹⁵ A frustrated Acheson could not understand “what means India would propose [to] use to check aggression” instead.²¹⁶ Bajpai contended that the means would “depend upon form and character of aggression and upon effect which such means might have upon world peace.”²¹⁷

      The differences over means, including the right balance between the use of force and diplomacy, were broader. NSC-68 and subsequent American policy reflected the belief that the need to counter an existential threat did not just make “all interests vital”; it also made “all means affordable, all methods justifiable.” But for Nehru, as the Australian high commissioner to India put it, “the end rarely justified the means.” In the US, moreover, the Korean War had only strengthened the view expressed in NSC-68 that active military resistance was more appropriate than passively waiting for the emergence of nationalist resistance—as Nehru