Fateful Triangle. Tanvi Madan

and, especially, the negativity or indifference India faced in the US Congress between 1949 and 1956.

      China also shaped the US-India relationship in two key ways from India’s perspective. Differences on China led key Indian policymakers to see the US more as part of the problem in Asia than as part of the solution. Nehru thought the American attitude and actions toward China were destabilizing Asia. The resultant insecurity would require higher Indian defense expenditures and disrupt development, which was a key priority for his fledgling government. Simultaneously, however, Delhi saw the US as indispensable to facilitating Indian economic development—which Nehru believed was essential for India’s long-term security, including against China.

      This chapter looks at the first phase of this period of divergence, that is, until 1952. It briefly considers how Washington viewed China and India in the period between the latter’s independence in 1947 and the communist takeover of China in 1949, and it outlines the link between those perceptions. It then considers Delhi’s views of a transitioning China and the US in the same period. The next section explores the differences that developed between the US and India on China after Mao came to power. Subsections consider India’s unwillingness to serve as a bulwark against China, US-India disagreement about recognizing communist China in 1949, their differences on the Chinese role in the onset of the Korean War in 1950, Beijing’s takeover of Tibet, American and Indian reactions to direct Chinese intervention in the Korean War, and the frustrations that developed as India served as an intermediary between China and the US during that war. The chapter ends with a look at how the differences that had developed on China affected American perceptions of—and willingness to aid—India.

      China and India: The View from Washington (1947–1949)

      In 1947, while the elements of containment were falling into place in the US, the Truman administration was preoccupied with Europe. Asia was generally an afterthought. The idea of strongpoint defense—“concentration on the defense of particular regions and means of access to them”—prevailed. Most policymakers did not believe that the loss of Asian territory to communism would make the US insecure. Besides, as Under Secretary of State Robert Lovett argued, the US did not have the means available to “underwrit[e] the security of the whole world.”³

      Officials such as George Kennan, director of policy planning in the State Department, stressed the need for the US to distinguish between vital and peripheral interests. Kennan and Secretary of State Dean Acheson judged a country’s value in terms of possession of “skilled manpower and industrial potential capable of significantly altering the balance of world power.” If the Soviet Union directly or indirectly took over countries that were valuable according to these criteria, it would adversely affect US interests. In Asia, Japan met these criteria; China and India did not.⁴

      The administration considered India to be even less vital than China. A CIA report in September 1947 placed it among the least important countries for the US. India had neither industrial-military capacity nor skilled manpower, and its resources were not indispensable. The State Department’s Policy Planning Staff agreed.

      Given the looming Soviet threat, military and intelligence assessments identified neighboring Pakistan as the South Asian country with more apparent value. It was also nearer to the critical oil-rich Middle East. Therefore, American and British diplomats sought stability in the region. But the belief that a Kashmir settlement was necessary to achieve that objective would cause serious differences with India.⁵

      At that stage, India’s fledgling democratic experiment gave it only minimal symbolic value in the US strategic framework. The nature of a country’s government was not on the list of characteristics that made a country important to the US. Officials such as Kennan believed that the type of government within states was not necessarily relevant in determining the US relationship with them. It was in American interests to have at least some nations remain democratic, but the US itself could serve to demonstrate the benefits of democracy. Economic recovery in the democratic countries of Western Europe could further serve to prove that democracy and economic progress could coexist.⁶

      The lack of interest in India came with a relative lack of concern about its foreign policy, even what George Marshall, secretary of state in 1947, called its “intention to pursue an independent but cooperative policy.” There was also little apprehension that communists would gain much ground within India. Thus most American policymakers, lacking the time, expertise, and interest, were satisfied with Britain taking the lead in shaping Anglo-American policy toward India.⁷

      Developments in 1949, however, would bring Asia, in general, and India, in particular, to Washington’s attention. Two events—the Soviet nuclear test in August and the Chinese Communist Party’s establishment of the People’s Republic in October—shook the faith that strongpoint defense would be sufficient to ensure American security. The weakening of the American nuclear deterrent and China going communist would make not just Europe but also Asia seem more vulnerable. And with the perception of a shift in the power balance, Kennan’s view that China was not vital would became less resonant.

      Initially in 1949, as the Guomindang (GMD) regime in China, led by Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek), was collapsing under the weight of the Chinese Communist Party’s onslaught, Truman and Acheson perceived no good options. They supported Jieshi’s regime, but they believed it was partly responsible for the situation and the GMD’s imminent collapse. And they had no desire to increase aid that was unlikely to help. In July 1949, summarizing the administration’s China White Paper, Acheson asserted, “It is abundantly clear that we must face the situation as it exists in fact. We will not help the Chinese or ourselves by basing our policy on wishful thinking.”⁸ While there was public opposition to recognizing the communists as China’s leaders, there was little pushback to this cautious policy.⁹ That also gave Acheson the space to consider fostering a wedge between Moscow and the Chinese communists, including by continuing contacts with the latter.¹⁰

      This approach was complicated, however, by growing congressional opposition to the administration’s China policy in the summer and fall of 1949. Members of the China bloc in Congress, part of a China lobby consisting of academics, businesspersons, diplomats, labor, media persons, and military officials, strongly advocated for support and aid to the GMD, and even direct US military intervention. Their views, however, did not gain traction at that stage.¹¹

      But India did gain traction as China seemed to be “falling” to communism. Rhetoric from both conservatives and liberals linked China and India. GMD supporters, including Senator William Knowland (R-CA), Representative Walter Judd (R-MN), former diplomat William Bullitt, and retired general Claire Lee Chennault, who had served in the China-Burma-India theater, warned that if China fell, then all of Asia, even India, would fall to communism.¹² Among others, the idea of India as part of the solution to the Asia problem took hold, with some suggesting that the US not only increase aid to the GMD but also offer military assistance to countries like Burma and India. Yet others argued that rather than providing more aid to the GMD, the administration should consider other approaches in Asia that included India, such as a Pacific Pact, or increased economic assistance to India, where communists were “pressing hard.”¹³ Senator Hubert Humphrey (D-MN) noted that democratic India was “the logical choice” for a “new start” in Asia.¹⁴ Some advocates of economic aid to India also used the fall of China to push their cause.¹⁵ Life magazine hailed Nehru as “Asia’s greatest statesman.… If we can find the right formula for joining our strength with his, the future of Asia and the world will become much brighter.”¹⁶ By September, The Economist was commenting on the increased American commentary about “India as a bulwark against Asiatic Communism.”¹⁷

      There was also a change in attitude toward India within the administration, which was reluctant to prop up Jiang, whose loss seemed imminent. At the end of August, Truman noted that India had now become “key to the whole Asian situation.” Two years after the CIA report had put India in the least-important category, reports in September 1949 from the agency and State Department intelligence highlighted India’s importance as the only potential competitor to China