Fateful Triangle. Tanvi Madan

whether India and the US can and will ally or partner against China, given converging concerns about its rise, intentions, and actions.

      This book shows that China’s centrality to US-India relations is not a recent phenomenon; it dates back to the beginning of the two democracies’ relations. Indeed, the story of that relationship and its ups and downs cannot be adequately told without systematically considering the China effect.

      This book explores and disentangles how American and Indian perceptions of and policy toward China shaped US-India relations during a formative period: 1949–1979. Why these three decades? The onset of this period was when the Chinese Communist Party–led People’s Republic of China came into existence. It was also a crucial time in the development of US perceptions of newly independent India and vice versa. Over the next three decades and multiple American and Indian administrations, in direct and indirect ways, Delhi and Washington’s perceptions of Beijing affected how they saw and behaved toward each other. In 1978–1979 the ascension of Deng Xiaoping and the onset of reform constituted a turning point for China. It marked the formal US recognition of China, and a key milestone in the normalization of India’s relations with China after the 1962 Sino-Indian war. Developments then set the stage for the US-China-India triangle of today, a topic deserving of its own book.

      It was China, and not Pakistan’s military alliance with the US, as is commonly understood, that brought the Cold War to India’s doorstep. And between 1949 and 1956, China was a key driver of US-India divergence. It did not have to be that way—after communists took over China, the Truman administration indeed hoped that India would play a critical role in the US strategic script as a geopolitical counterbalance and ideological democratic contrast to the Soviet Union’s Asian ally. However, the Indian government, led by Jawaharlal Nehru, had a different perspective and would not play the role that the US envisioned for it. Delhi worried about development competition with communist China, but believed that any geopolitical threat was years away. And it thought that engaging China and encouraging it to be a responsible stakeholder in the international community would be the best way to delay, mitigate, or eliminate that threat.

      During this period, both India and the US under Truman and then Eisenhower came to see the other’s attitude and actions toward China as, at best, hindering or, at worst, harming their broader strategies. Those attitudes were shaped by their different priorities, geographies, histories, capabilities, commitments, and experiences with China, as well as their differing views of the importance of ideology in shaping Chinese policymakers’ decisionmaking. The two countries’ differences over perception and approach were evident on questions such as the recognition of China, in the discussions over what to do about Tibet, and in the debate over China’s role in the Korean War.

      From 1956 to 1962, broad agreement on China was a significant reason for US-India engagement. There was a convergence in the two countries’ views on the nature and urgency of the China threat, as well as on the ways and means of dealing with it. Eisenhower in his second term and the Kennedy administration came to see China not just as a direct security threat but also as a symbolic and ideological threat to American interests if it won the development competition. And assertive Chinese behavior caused Indian leaders, like their American counterparts, to see China as a geopolitical threat. The two democracies also agreed on what was required to meet such a threat: close partnership with each other, and the strengthening of India’s military and economic capabilities.

      During the subsequent phase from 1963 to 1968, American and Indian threat perceptions of China were largely similar, but the two countries’ assessment of the ways and means required to tackle the threat once again diverged. Their common interest in containing China kept their disillusionment from resulting in complete disengagement. But while the countries’ agreement on ends laid the basis for cooperation, their disagreement on the ways and means to contain China stalled their alignment.

      The two countries disagreed about the optimum balance of resources that should be devoted toward Indian development versus defense to strengthen the country against China. In a role reversal, the US, led by Lyndon Johnson, believed that the China threat called for more Indian investment in its economy, and more American aid to India’s development rather than to its defense effort. On its part, the Indian government, first led by Lal Bahadur Shastri and then by Indira Gandhi, envisioned significantly more defense expenditure than before. Furthermore, the US believed that with China as the primary threat, India should seek a rapprochement with Pakistan. India, however, believed Pakistan was part of its China problem rather than a means to solving it. Finally, India’s preferred strategy of diversifying its dependence with a partnership with the Soviet Union proved to be an obstacle to deeper US-India relations.

      Between 1969 and 1972, the changing US attitude toward China became a major source of tension in the US-India relationship. Initially, this tension was caused by a divergence in threat perception. On the US side, China started sliding down the threat list, whereas it remained the major challenge on India’s horizon. With the reduced need to counter China, India’s importance to the US decreased. The US moreover came to see India as hindering Sino-US rapprochement. On India’s end, its efforts to normalize relations with China had preceded those of the US but had not borne fruit. When Sino-US rapprochement did succeed in the midst of the 1971 Bangladesh crisis, policymakers saw what would today be called a G-2 problem (i.e., the US ranged with China [and Pakistan] against India). With its American insurance policy against China expiring, Delhi instead sought to tackle the threat from China through an alignment with the Soviet Union.

      After Sino-US rapprochement, between 1973 and 1979, the US framework for Asia reduced, if not eliminated, the US desire and need to seek an Indian role as a counterweight or contrasting model to China. And wariness of overdependence on the Soviet Union caused India to seek to improve its relations with China, while the Indian leadership simultaneously pursued a nuclear weapons program to ensure an independent deterrent. The US and India also sought to reestablish and maintain a working relationship to limit or balance the Soviet role in India, but, with China no longer looming as large, the US and India slid down each others’ priority list for the remainder of the Cold War.

      This book does not argue that China was the only factor that mattered in the US-India relationship, but it demonstrates that China’s role in the US-India script was as a leading actor and not in the form of a cameo or guest appearance. American and Indian perceptions of and policies toward China shaped the US-India relationship in significant ways. And this impact was neither simple nor episodic.

      Divergence on China was a key source of friction in the bilateral relationship. This divergence was not, as is sometimes argued, because the two countries lacked an understanding of the other’s perspective. Rather, one side sometimes simply believed the other was wrong.

      On the other hand, convergence on China could drive the two countries together. The shared perception of an external threat was a necessary condition of a China-driven US-India alignment. But that alone was an insufficient condition. The US and India pursued such an alignment only when they agreed on the nature of the threat that China posed, the urgency of that threat, and how to address the threat. Thus, when it came to partnering to balance China, it was necessary for the two countries to agree on both the diagnosis and the prescription.

      Key elements in the US-Indian debate about the right prescription included whether engagement or containment was the best strategy toward China. Relatedly, was the use of force or diplomacy—and in what proportion—most appropriate? Also, was Pakistan a part of the China problem or part of the solution? Furthermore, how should resources best be distributed between defense and development, based on assessments of whether internal or external balancing was the best approach? Finally, was collective security—through alliances or alignments—or a diversified and wide-ranging set of partnerships the best way to deal with a China challenge?

      In order to assess whether or not the US and India can and will ally or partner in the context of a China challenge, it is key to understand this need for agreement on both ends and means. In recent years, some, like former US ambassador to India Robert Blackwill, have argued that a China-driven US-India partnership is inevitable. They see shared anxiety about China as naturally leading to US-India alignment. Others, like former prime minister Manmohan Singh, have suggested that a China-driven