The Faith of Islam. Edward Sell

of the 'obscure' passages (Mutashábih), to discriminate between the literal and the allegorical, the universal and the particular.

      2. He must know the Qurán by heart with all the Traditions and explanations.

      3. He must have a perfect knowledge of the Traditions, or at least of three thousand of them.

      He must know their source, history, object and their connection with the laws of the Qurán. He should know by heart the most important Traditions.

      4. A pious and austere life.

      5. A profound knowledge of all the sciences of the Law.

      Should any one now aspire to such a degree another condition would be added, viz:—

      6. A complete knowledge of the four schools of jurisprudence.

      The obstacles, then, are almost insurmountable. On the one hand, there is the severity of the 'Ulamá, which requires from the candidate things almost impossible; on the other, there is the attachment of the 'Ulamá to their own Imáms, for should such a man arise no one is bound now to listen to him. Imám Hanbal said:—"Draw your knowledge from whence the Imáms drew theirs, and do not content yourself with following others for that is certainly blindness of sight". Thus the schools of the four Imáms remain intact after a thousand years have passed, and so the 'Ulamá recognise since the time of these Imáms no Mujtahíd of the first degree. Ibn Hanbal was the last.

      The rights of the man who attained to this degree were very important. He was not bound to be a disciple of another, he was a mediator between the Law and his followers, for whom he established a system of legislation, without any one having the right to make any objection. He had the right to explain the Qurán, the Sunnat and the Ijmá' according as he understood them. He used the Prophet's words, whilst his disciples only used his. Should a disciple find some discrepancy between a decision of his own Imám and the Qurán or Traditions, he must abide by the decision of the Imám. The Law does not permit him to interpret after his own fashion. When once the disciple has entered the sect of one Imám he cannot leave it and join another. He loses the right of private judgment, for only a Mujtahid of the first class can dispute the decision of one of the Imáms. Theoretically such Mujtahidín may still arise; but, as we have already shown, practically they do not.

      THE SECOND DEGREE OF IJTIHÁD.

      This degree has been granted to the immediate disciples of the great Imáms who have elaborated the systems of their masters. They enjoyed the special consideration of the contemporary 'Ulamá, and of their respective Imáms who in some cases have allowed them to retain their own opinion.' The most famous of these men are the two disciples of Abu Hanífa, Abu Yúsuf and Muhammad bin al Hasan. In a secondary matter their opinion carries great weight. It is laid down as a rule that a Muftí may follow the unanimous opinion of these two even when it goes against that of Abu Hanífa.

      THE THIRD DEGREE OF IJTIHÁD.

      This is the degree of special independence. The candidates for it should have a perfect knowledge of all the branches of jurisprudence according to the four schools of the Arabic language and literature. They can solve cases which come before them, giving reasons for their judgment, or decide on cases which have not been settled by previous Mujtahidín; but in either case their decisions must always be in absolute accordance with the opinions of the Mujtahidín of the first and second classes, and with the principles which guided them. Many of these men attained great celebrity during their lifetime, but to most of them this rank is not accorded till after their death. Since Imám Qází Khán died (A.H. 592), no one has been recognised by the Sunnís as a Mujtahid even of the third class.

      There are three other inferior classes of jurists, called Muqallidín, or followers of the Mujtahidín; but all that the highest in rank amongst them can do is to explain obscure passages in the writings of the older jurisconsults. By some of the 'Ulamá they are considered to be equal to the Mujtahidín of the third class. If there are several conflicting legal opinions on any point, they can select one opinion on which to base their decision. This a mere Qází cannot do. In such a case he would have to refer to those men, or to their writings for guidance. They seem to have written commentaries on the legal systems without originating anything new. The author of the Hidáyah, who lived at the end of the sixth century, was a Muqallid.

      Such is Mirza Kázim Beg's account. The whole article, of which I have only given the main points, is worthy of the closest study. It shows how "the system, as a whole, rejects experience as a guide to deeper insight or wider knowledge; tramples upon the teaching of the past; pays no heed to differences of climate, character, or history; but regards itself as a body of absolute truth, one jot or tittle of which cannot be rejected without incurring the everlasting wrath of God."^[40]

CHAPTER II.

       Table of Contents

EXEGESIS OF THE QURÁN AND THE TRADITIONS.

       Table of Contents

      The following account of this branch of Muslim theology, technically called 'Ilm-i-Usúl, may be introduced by a few remarks on the nature of inspiration according to Islám, though that is not strictly speaking a portion of this study.

      There are two terms used to express different degrees of inspiration, Wahí and Ilhám. Wahí is the term applied to the inspiration of the Qurán, and implies that the very words are the words of God. It is divided into Wahí Záhir (external inspiration), and Wahí Bátin (internal inspiration). The whole book was prepared in heaven. Muhammad, instructed by Gabriel, is simply the medium through which the revelation of Wahí Záhir reaches man. The Wahí Qurán, i.e., the highest form of inspiration, always came to the ear of the Prophet through the instrumentality of Gabriel. In Muhammadan theology, this is the special work of Gabriel. Thus in the Traditions it is related that he appeared to Adam twelve times, to Enoch four, to Noah fifty, to Abraham forty-two, to Moses four hundred, to Jesus ten times, to Muhammad twenty-four thousand times.

      Ilhám means the inspiration given to a saint or to a prophet when he, though rightly guided, delivers the subject matter out of his own mind, and is not a mere machine to reproduce the messages of Gabriel. There is a lower form of Wahí Záhir, which is called Ishárat-ul-Malak (literally, "sign of the Angel.") This expresses what Muhammad meant when he said: "The Holy Ghost has entered into my heart." In other words, he received the inspiration through Gabriel, but not by word of mouth. This form of inspiration is higher than that possessed by saints, and is usually applied to the inspiration of the Traditions. This is denied by some, who say that except when delivering the Qurán Muhammad spoke by Ilhám and not by Wahí. The practical belief is, however, that the Traditions were Wahí inspiration, and thus they come to be as authoritative as the Qurán. Sharastani speaks of "the signs (sayings) of the Prophet which have the marks of Wahí."^[41] This opinion is said by some Muslim theologians to be supported by the first verse of the fifty-third Súra, entitled the Star. "By the Star when it setteth; your companion Muhammad erreth not, nor is he led astray, neither doth he speak of his own will. It is none other than a revelation which hath been revealed to him." In any case the inspiration of Muhammad is something quite different from the Christian idea of inspiration, which is to Musalmáns a very imperfect mode of transmitting a revelation of God's will.

      That there should be a human as well as a divine side to inspiration is an idea not only foreign, but absolutely repugnant to Muhammadans. The Qurán is not a book of principles. It is a book of directions. The Qurán describes the revelation given to Moses thus:—"We wrote for him upon the tables a monition concerning every matter and said: 'Receive them thyself with steadfastness, and command thy people to receive them for the observance of its most goodly precepts.'" (Súra vii. 142). It is such an inspiration as this the Qurán claims for itself. Muhammad's idea was that it should be a complete and final code of directions in every matter for all mankind. It is not