The Faith of Islam. Edward Sell

a subject we shall discuss a little later on. At first sight it would seem that if there can be Mujtahidín who are now able to give authoritative opinions, there may be some hope of enlightened progress amongst Shía'h people—the Persians for example. There is doubtless amongst them more religious unrest, more mysticism, more heresy, but they are no further on the road of progress than their neighbours; and the apparent advantage of the presence of a Mujtahid is quite nullified by the fact that all his decisions must be strictly in accordance with the Qurán and the Sunnat, or rather with what to the Shía'h stands in the place of the Sunnat. The Shía'h, as well as the Sunní, must base all legislation on the fossilized system of the past, not on the living needs of the present. Precedent rules both with an iron sway. The Wahhábís reject all Ijmá' except that of the Companions, but that they accept; so when they are called the Puritans of Islám, it must be remembered that they accept as a rule of faith not only the Qurán, but the Sunnat, and some Ijmá'.

      In order to make Ijmá' binding, it is necessary that the Mujtahidín should have been unanimous in their opinion or in their practice.

      The whole subject of Ijtihád is one of the most important in connection with the possibility of reforms in a Muslim state. A modern Muhammadan writer^[31] seeking to show that Islám does possess a capacity for progress and that so far from being a hard and fast system, it is able to adapt itself to new circumstances, because the Prophet ushered in "an age of active principles," uses the story I have already related when describing the origin of Ijtihád (Ante. p. 17) to prove the accuracy of his statement. He makes Mu'áz to say:—"I will look first to the Qurán, then to precedents of the Prophet, and lastly rely upon my own judgment." It is true that Ijtihád literally means 'great effort,' it is true that the Companions and Mujtahidín of the first class had the power of exercising their judgment in doubtful cases, and of deciding them according to their sense of the fitness of things, provided always, that their decision contravened no law of the Qurán or the Sunnat; but this in no way proves that Islám has any capacity for progress, or that "an age of active principles" was ushered in by Muhammad, or that his "words breathe energy and force, and infuse new life into the dormant heart of humanity." For, though the term Ijtihád might, in reference to the men I have mentioned, be somewhat freely translated as "one's own judgment," it can have no such meaning now. It is a purely technical term, and its use and only use now is to express the "referring of a difficult case to some analogy drawn from the Qurán and the Sunnat." But even were the meaning not thus restricted, even though it meant now as it sometimes meant at first, "one's own judgment;" still Syed Amír 'Alí's position would remain to be proved for, since the days of the four Imáms, the orthodox believe that there has been no Mujtahid of the first class, and to none but men of this rank has such power ever been accorded. Thus granting, for the sake of argument merely, that the Syed's translation is grammatically and technically correct, all that results from it is that the "age of active principles" lasted only for two centuries. I do not admit that there ever was such an age in Islám, and certainly neither its theological development, nor its political growth negative the opposite assertion, viz., that Muhammad gave precepts rather than principles. The Turks are included in "the dormant heart of humanity," but it is difficult to see what "energy and force" is breathed, what "new life is infused" into them by the "wonderful words" of the Prophet, or what lasting good the "age of active principles" has produced.

      4. Qíás is the fourth foundation of Islám. The word literally means reasoning, comparing. It is in common use in Hindustani and Persian in the sense of guessing, considering, &c. Technically, it means the analogical reasoning of the learned with regard to the teaching of the Qurán, the Sunnat and the Ijmá'. For example, the Qurán says:—"Honour thy father and thy mother and be not a cause of displeasure to them." It is evident from this that disobedience to parents is prohibited, and prohibition implies punishment if the order is disobeyed. Again, if the Qurán and the Sunnat hold children responsible, according to their means, for the debts of their father, does it not follow that the elder ones ought to fulfil for their parents all those obligations which for some reason or other the parents may not be able to perform, such as the pilgrimage to Mecca, &c. A Tradition said to come from the Companions runs thus:—"One day, a woman came to the Prophet and said, 'my father died without making the Pilgrimage.' The Prophet said, 'If thy father had left a debt what wouldest thou do,' 'I would pay the debt.' 'Good, then pay this debt also.'" The Qurán forbids the use of Khamar, an intoxicating substance, and so it is argued that wine and opium are unlawful, though not forbidden by name. The Wahhábís would extend the prohibition to the use of tobacco.

      From cases such as these, many jurisconsults hold that the Mujtahidín of the earliest age established this fourth foundation of the faith which they call Qíás. It is also called I'tibár-ul-Amsál, or "imitation of an example." The idea is taken from the verse: "Profit by this example, ye who are men of insight" (Súra lix. 2). There are strict rules laid down which regulate Qíás, of which the most important is, that in all cases it must be based on the Qurán, the Sunnat, and the Ijmá'. In fact, the fundamental idea of Islám is that a perfect law has been given, even unto details, of social and political life. The teaching of Muhammad contains the solution of every difficulty that can arise. Every law not provided by the Prophet must be deduced analogically. This produces uniformity after a fashion, but only because intellectual activity in higher pursuits ceases and moral stagnation follows. Thus all who come within the range of this system are bound down to political servitude. Whatever in feeling or conviction goes beyond the limits of an out-worn set of laws is swept away. There is a wonderful family likeness in the decay of all Musalmán States, which seems to point to a common cause. All first principles are contained in the Qurán and the Sunnat; all that does not coincide with them must be wrong. They are above all criticism.

      Qíás, then, affords no hope of enlightened progress, removes no fetter of the past, for in it there must be no divergence in principle from a legislation imperfect in its relation to modern life and stationary in its essence.^[32] In the Niháyat-ul-Murád it is written:—"We are shut up to following the four Imáms." In the Tafsír-i-Ahmadí we read:—"To follow any other than the four Imáms is unlawful." An objector may say that such respect is like the reverence the heathen pay to their ancestors. To this an answer is given in the preface to the Tarjuma-i-Sharh-i-Waqáyah. The writer there says that it is nothing of the kind. "The Mujtahidín are not the source of the orders of the Law, but they are the medium by which we obtain the Law. Thus Imám Abu Hanífa said: 'We select first from the Qurán, then from the Traditions, then from the decrees of the Companions; we act on what the Companions agreed upon; where they doubt, we doubt.' The Commentator Jelál-ud-dín Mahlí says, 'The common people and others who have not reached the rank of a Mujtahid, must follow one of the four Imáms.' Then when he enters one Mazhab (sect) he must not change. Again, it may be objected that God gave no order about the appointment of four Imáms. Now, it is recorded in a Tradition that the Prophet said, 'Follow the way of the great company; whosoever departs from it will enter hell.' The Followers of the Imáms are a great company." It is moreover the unanimous opinion, the "Ijmá'-i-Ummat," that the Imáms rightly occupy the position accorded to them. It is a great blessing, as we read in the Tafsír-i-Ahmadí: "It is of the grace of God, that we are shut up to these four Imáms. God approves of this, and into this matter proofs and explanations do not enter." Should any one further object that, in the days of the Prophet, there were no Mujtahidín, that each man acted on a "saying" as he heard it, that he did not confine his belief or conduct to the deductions made by some "appointed Companion," he may be answered thus:—"For a long time after the death of the Prophet many Companions were alive, and consequently the Traditions then current were trustworthy; but now it is not so, hence the need for the Imáms and their systems."

      These four foundations—the Qurán, the Sunnat, Ijmá' and Qíás—form in orthodox Muslim opinion and belief a perfect basis of a perfect religion and polity. They secure the permanence of the system, but they repress an intelligent growth. The bearing of all this on modern politics is very plain. Take again the case of Turkey. The constitution of the Government is theocratic. The germs of freedom are wanting there as they have never been wanting in any other country in Europe. The ruling power desires no change; originality of thought, independence