The topos of Divine Testimony in Luke-Acts. James R. McConnell

Theon’s use of the term topos correctly, the context in which Theon uses the term is extremely significant. For Theon, a topos can be a formal exercise in which a person is blamed (or less often, praised) for a particular moral choice. This exercise requires a fairly rigid structure, which Theon describes. He also, however, uses the term topos in a manner similar to Cicero; namely, a topos can be the source of a line of argumentation, used in support of any of a number of preliminary exercises. These topoi are many and varied, one of which is the testimony of others.

      Topos in other Rhetorical Treatises

Theon’s view, namely that a topos is a form of proof that provides the content of epicheiremes, is echoed in the treatise by Anonymous Seguerianus. The writer of ΤΕΧΝΗ ΤΟΥ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΥ ΛΟΓΟΥ, a document most likely written around the beginning of the third century,140 discusses topoi in the section of the treatise entitled ΠΕΡΙ ΠΙΣΤΕΩΝ. The author makes the same distinction between artistic and non-artistic proofs141 that we have seen in other ancient rhetoricians. It is in the subsection describing the artistic proofs (that is, the proofs that are composed by the orator) that the author describes the topos. For this author, the topoi represent those proofs from which one composes epicheiremes.

A second treatise written at approximately the same time as Art of Political Speech and entitled Art of Rhetoric is attributed to Apsines of Gadara.142 In this treatise, the author also discusses the concept of topos. In the first section in which the author treats the prooemium, he lists several θεωρήματα out of which one can compose the prooemium. The way in which these are described is similar to the lists of topoi/loci seen in Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian, as the author provides various arguments that can be used within the prooemium to address a specific situation within the speech.143 For example, the author suggests that the θεώρημα of “from what follows” is an appropriate argument when the judge has made a previous judgment on a case from which the current case is derived. Thus these themes suggest possible arguments of which the orator can take advantage in the prooemium of the speech.

Later in the work the term τόπος is explicitly used in several contexts. The refutation “by reversal is supported from the following topics [ἐκ τόπων τούτων]” (Apsines, Art of Rhetoric 5.1). What follows is a listing of possible proofs, both artistic and inartistic, that will assist the orator in refuting the claims of the opponent through the negation of the charges. In the chapter entitled ΠΕΡΙ ΤΗΣ ΤΩΝ ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΩΝ ΚΑΤΑΣΚΕΨΗΣ, Apsines writes: “[N]ow let us look at the most important headings, considering from what topics they are composed [ἐκ τοίων τόπων σύγκειται] and by what kind of arguments they are confirmed, and first let us speak about final headings” (Art of Rhetoric, 9.1). Here, one sees that each heading144 can be elaborated through the use of various topoi; in each case the topoi are suggested arguments one can employ to demonstrate the legality, rightness, advantage, etc. of one’s case.

Finally, in the section on epilogues, topoi are mentioned once again. Here, the concept of topos has the widest range of meanings in the treatise. For example, the author claims that the epilogue itself is a topos (“The epilogue is a topic in three parts [Ὁ ἐπίλογος τόπος τριμερής ἐστιν]” [Apsines, Art of Rhetoric 10.1]). The epilogue has three subdivisions: “recapitulation [ἀνάμνησις],” “pity [ἔλεος],” and “indignation [δείνωσις]” (Apsines, Art of Rhetoric 10.1). However, of these three, both recapitulation and pity are called topoi.145 And in the section in which the author discusses pity, he mentions the “common topic from judgment and actions of the past [ἀπὸ κρίσεως καὶ ἀπὸ ἔργων γεγενημένων τὸν κοινὸν τόπον τοῦτον]” (Art of Rhetoric, 10.16). Therefore, for this author, a topos is a major part of the speech (the epilogue), which is subdivided into topoi, and each of these topoi can be supported through other (common) topoi!

      This survey of the ancient rhetoricians’ views of topos/locus has demonstrated that this concept enjoyed a rather wide range of meaning. For Aristotle, the topos represented a source of logical argumentation, the topos serving as the structure of the argument. For Cicero and Quintilian, a locus was the place in which the orator would find a source of arguments from which the orator would select the ones appropriate for arguing the case at hand. But Cicero and Quintilian both differentiate between loci as sources of arguments and loci communes, which were stock, self-contained arguments useful for any case. Also, Cicero demonstrates that he is familiar with the locus being used as a theme or example to which the orator refers in the course of the speech.

      Theon and other rhetoricians show that they are familiar with this range of meanings as well. Theon describes the preliminary exercise of topos, in which the student is instructed to blame, or praise, a person or thing through the use of a specified, structured argument. But he also uses the term topos more in line with Cicero and Quintilian’s predominant use of locus, that of a source of possible arguments. These uses (and others) are also found in later treatises authored by Anonymous Seguerianus and Apsines. Given the rather wide semantic range for the term topos among the ancient rhetoricians, it is not surprising that a multiplicity of meanings for the term topos can be found in modern NT scholarship, as was demonstrated earlier.

      Above, in my review of J. Thom’s investigation of topos, I noted that his study did not include Cicero’s concept(s) of loci. From the analysis of Cicero’s treatment of loci in Topica, one sees that his complete concept of locus does not perfectly fit any single criterion within Thom’s schema. Internal loci, those which are inherent to the subject of the argument, line up with Thom’s first category, the strategic, or rhetorical topoi. However, Cicero’s external loci, those arguments that are drawn from outside of the subject, are more difficult to categorize. They do not seem to fit any of the types that Thom suggests. The external loci as envisioned by Cicero are not literary themes which are rehearsed over and over (Thom’s second type), nor are they moral topoi (the third type). One can say that the external topoi are strategic or rhetorical in that they are employed to persuade an audience or jury; but, given Thom’s example of his first type of topos (arguing from the greater to the lesser), the external loci do not exactly fit this category either. Therefore, I propose that Thom’s continuum should be extended to include Cicero’s external loci; I will demonstrate that these external loci focus on witnesses and testimony.

To summarize the findings of this analysis to this point, I am arguing that the current understanding in NT scholarship of the term topos should be expanded to include what Cicero calls external arguments or proofs and what Quintilian labels inartificial proofs.146 Arguments drawn from these loci focus on documents, oaths, witnesses, and testimony. These loci are more substantive than formal in nature, as they represent the content of the argument selected by the orator rather than the form of the argument. Also, especially in Cicero and Quintilian, the loci are used to facilitate the development of arguments in legal cases; there is a strong emphasis on the outcome of the speech, namely the goal of persuading a judge of the validity of one’s case. I will now investigate a particular aspect of the external loci, specifically that of divine testimony.

      The topos of Divine Testimony

In Topica, when introducing the external arguments, Cicero states, “External arguments depend principally on authority” (Top. 4.24). He then gives a more detailed explanation of the external loci later in his treatise. After a short introduction to those loci which “are extrinsic or brought in from without” (Top. 19.72),147 he writes:

      This