The topos of Divine Testimony in Luke-Acts. James R. McConnell

from loci (storehouses for arguments; cf. Inst. 5.10.20) indicates that he is reflecting the breadth of understanding in the ancient world concerning the topos.

In defining the topos, Thom argues first that topos is clearly used in a different manner by modern literary theorists than what was meant by the term in antiquity. Second, Thom recognizes that even in antiquity the term had a relatively wide semantic range, and that the meanings within this range were “culturally determined.” However, the foundation of these meanings is a “notion of an ordered cognitive space.”98 In other words, while the concept of topos in antiquity is better viewed on the basis of a spectrum or continuum (and where one finds oneself on this continuum is somewhat dependant on culture), all the possible meanings are grounded in a common idea.

Thom does not concretely flesh out this common ground; he does, however, offer three different categories or types of topoi. The first he calls the “logical or rhetorical topos,” which represents a certain method of argumentation.99 The second is the “literary topos”; topoi of this type “consist of literary themes or motifs that are used over and over again, often only as an allusion, and not in a worked out form.”100 However, Thom maintains that because of the “non-literary nature of most NT texts,” this category is “not that well-represented in the NT.”101 Finally, the third type proposed by Thom is the “moral or philosophical topos.” This type is much like the literary topos; the difference is, however, that there are extended treatments of these topoi in Hellenistic moral writings.102

Through his survey of primary and secondary sources, Thom’s work has extreme value in the study of ancient topoi. There are, however, areas of his work which can be improved. One of these areas would be a more precise reading of Theon, especially in taking into account all of Theon’s preliminary exercises and not only the exercise of “commonplace.”103 As I will show, by carefully considering the contexts in which Theon uses the word τόπος and its derivatives, one notices that Theon acknowledges that a topos can be either a complete, structured argument or a source of arguments particular to a certain case.104 Secondly, Thom’s analysis could be augmented profitably through the inclusion of Cicero’s work on topoi; Cicero is not mentioned in Thom’s essay.

      Given this understanding of the concept of topos in current NT scholarship and those aspects thereof found to be deficient or incomplete, I will now survey the ancient rhetoricians’ ideas concerning rhetorical topoi. From this analysis, a definition of topos will emerge that will require the current definitions of topos in NT circles to be expanded to include a topos as a source of proofs which includes documents, oaths, witnesses, and testimony.

      Definition of topos

      Topos in Aristotle

Although the concept of a rhetorical topos predates Aristotle,105 his works are a convenient starting place for an attempt to wrap one’s mind around the ancient rhetoricians’ conception of a topos. The two main works in which Aristotle discusses topoi are his Topica and Rhetorica.

      In his work Topica, Aristotle asserts his purpose in the opening statement of the document: “The purpose of the present treatise is to discover a method by which we shall be able to reason from generally accepted opinions about any problem set before us and shall ourselves, when sustaining an argument, avoid saying anything contradictory” (1.1.18). He continues by providing a definition of “reasoning” (συλλογισμός):

      Reasoning is a discussion in which, certain things having been laid down, something other than these things necessarily results through them. Reasoning is demonstration (ἀπόδειξις) when it proceeds from premises which are true and primary or of such a kind that we have derived our original knowledge of them through premises which are primary and true. Reasoning is dialectical which reasons from generally accepted opinions. (1.1.25–31; emphasis in original)

      Thus, from this purpose statement it is clear that Aristotle is dealing with dialectic, rather than rhetoric. What he has to say concerning dialectical argumentation does, however, help one to understand the ancient concept of a topos.

      In Book I of Topica, Aristotle explores the various ways one can argue a dialectical problem and concludes with this statement: “Such then are the means by which reasonings are carried out. The commonplaces [τόποι] for the application of which the said means are useful are our next subject” (1.18.33–35). What follows in Books II-VII is a description of various τόποι and how one is to apply each of them when formulating a dialectical argument. For example, Aristotle writes, “One commonplace [τόπος] is to look whether our opponent has assigned as an accident something which belongs in some other way” (2.2.34–36). A second example is found in his discussion of a polyvalent term which is used in a certain way. Aristotle advises that one “ought to demonstrate one of the several meanings if it is impossible to demonstrate both.” He continues by adding, “This commonplace [τόπος] is convertible for both constructive and destructive purposes” (2.3.29–30). These examples are indicative of Aristotle’s usage of the term τόπος throughout Books II-VII of the treatise, and demonstrate that Aristotle, in this treatise, considered a τόπος to be a method of dialectical argumentation.

In Rhetorica, Aristotle provides his definition of rhetoric, stating that “Rhetoric then may be defined as the faculty of discovering the possible means of persuasion in reference to any subject whatever . . . But Rhetoric, so to say, appears to be able to discover the means of persuasion in reference to any given subject” (Rhet. 1.2.1). In discussing the methods of actually being persuasive, Aristotle lists two. Inartificial proofs are those not “furnished by ourselves but were already in existence, such as witnesses, tortures, contracts, and the like.”106 Artificial proofs are those “that can be constructed by system and by our own efforts. Thus we have only to make use of the former [inartificial], whereas we must invent the latter [artificial]” (Rhet. 1.2.2). These proofs fall under three categories, those of ἦθος, πάθος, and λόγος (1.2.3–6), and can be generated, according to Aristotle, by one of two methods, either inductively (primarily through the use of examples) or logically, by employing enthymemes (1.2.8–9). Aristotle then begins his discussion of topoi, which he describes in this way: “I mean by dialectical and rhetorical syllogisms those which are concerned with what we call ‘topics’” (1.2.21). Aristotle distinguishes between general/universal topoi which can be applied to argumentation within any subject matter, and specific topoi, which are “the propositions peculiar to each class of things” (1.2.21–22).

Later in the treatise, after a discussion of the three types of rhetoric (forensic, deliberative, and epideictic), Aristotle specifically mentions twenty-eight different topoi which are available to the rhetor for the construction of enthymemes. Examples of the topoi found in this list include those arguments which are generated from opposites, the more and the less, the definition of terms, and induction (2.23.1–29). As was seen in Aristotle’s Topica, these topoi represent methods of rhetorical argumentation, rather than the content of the arguments themselves.107

As I have previously stated, the concept of the topos was already familiar to the Greeks of his day; therefore, this list represents Aristotle’s attempt to systematically categorize topoi. Aristotle’s contribution to this aspect of rhetoric was to classify and generalize the use of the various topoi.108

For the purposes of the present