The topos of Divine Testimony in Luke-Acts. James R. McConnell

Lycurgus cites examples from the past of brave Athenians in order to contrast them with Leocrates’s behavior. One such example is that of Codrus, who was obedient to an oracle received by the Peloponnesians, who were marching on Athens. The oracle, as told to the Peloponnesians, stated that they would be successful in their attack on Athens as long as the king of Athens was spared. When Codrus was informed of the oracle, he disguised himself as a simple peasant and went outside the city walls, where he was killed by the Peloponnesians, thus sacrificing himself in order to save the city. Lycurgus, therefore, casts aspersions on his opponent by comparing him to this virtuous Athenian who, in obedience to an oracle, did not leave the city and even sacrificed himself in order to save the city (Lycurgus, Against Leocrates 83–89).

A second example is found in Dio Chrysostom’s oration concerning his exile in Athens. Chrysostom justifies his banishment through the use of oracles as evidence of his innocence, both indirectly and directly. First, he cites the example of Croesus, king of the Lydians, who received an oracle from Apollo which told him to leave his kingdom. In addition, Croesus should leave without feeling shame (37.6).160 Chrysostom uses this example to draw a parallel to his own situation; he, too, is in exile and feels no shame. He goes on to explain that he also received an oracle, which told him “to keep doing with all zeal the very thing wherein [he was] engaged, as being a most honourable and useful activity” (37.9). Thus, Chrysostom defends his exile by citing the example of another who was in exile in obedience to an oracle, and, in addition, directly citing an oracle that he himself received and to which he was obedient.

Aristides, in his In Defense of Oratory, also employs the topos of divine testimony by referencing oracles. In this treatise, Aristides argues against Plato’s statement in Gorgias (463a-465c) that the practice of oratory does not require art.161 In order to refute this claim, Aristides states, “I invoke [καλῶ δ’] Hermes, God of Oratory, Apollo, Leader of the Muses, and all the Muses, to be my guides” (In Defense of Oratory 19), thus summoning the gods as witnesses. He does so “because of the two following circumstances: we argue neither against the meanest of the Greeks nor in defence of the meanest of subjects [οὒτε γὰρ πρὸς τὸν φαυλότατον τῶν Ἑλλήνων οὔθ’ ὑπερ τῶν φαυλοτάτων οἱ λόγοι]” (In Defense of Oratory 19). Because of the stature of his opponent, Aristides feels impelled to marshal the most significant of witnesses.

Aristides uses the witness of the gods through oracles in several ways in his defense of the practice of oratory.162 First, he argues that Greek statesmen such as Lycurgus163 and even Plato himself164 consulted the oracle at Delphi in crafting legislation for the state (In Defense of Oratory 23–41); this is evidence of the value of the gods’ testimony through oracles,165 which, he further argues, is not provided through any type of “art.” Therefore, how can Plato argue that oratory is worthless because it also does not depend on art?166 Second, he argues that Plato considers inspired prophecy and poetry to be the result of madness [μανία], but madness of divine origin,167 which is capable of resulting in much good. Therefore, Aristides argues, if madness is an outlet for divine inspiration (and is artless) and is therefore a source of worth, then why should all forms of artless activities be censured? (see In Defense of Oratory, 50–57). Finally (see 78–83), Aristides introduces the Delphic oracle which proclaimed Socrates to be the wisest of all humans. He states that Socrates claimed to know nothing, yet the oracle proclaimed him to be the wisest person alive. Assuming both to be true, Aristides harmonizes the two statements by arguing that Socrates “did not know anything through an art [τὸ μὴ τέχνη]” (In Defense of Oratory 81). He then summarizes this part of the argument with the following statement:

      [A]nd through Socrates the God has borne witness [καὶ διὰ τοῦ Σωκράτους ὁ θεὸς μεμαρτύρηκεν] about both points [that Socrates was not ashamed to be “artless,” and that he did not know anything through art], when he gave the oracle that Socrates was the wisest of men. Therefore he confirms with his own testimony that twofold testimony of Socrates [ὥστε διπλῆν οὖσαν τὴν τοῦ Σωκράτους μαρτυρίαν ἑτέρᾳ κυρίᾳ τῇ παρ’ αὐτοῦ βεβαιοῖ]. (In Defense of Oratory 81)

      Therefore, in Aristides one finds an extended example of the use of oracles being considered as the testimony of the gods and being used as supporting evidence in the defense of the practice of oratory.

A final example168 is found in the lesser declamations of Quintilian, considered to be school exercises through which students practiced declamation. In this clearly fictitious case,169 a priest is accused of aiding and abetting Alexander and his army by dedicating a temple. In the narrative within the declamation, one learns that Alexander’s campaign was successful until he burned down a particular temple. Once he did, a plague swept through his army. In order to stop the plague, Alexander sought an oracle, which told him he must rebuild the temple that he destroyed. When Alexander requested that the priest dedicate the newly built temple, the priest agreed on the condition that Alexander would withdraw from the city. In his defense against the charges of aiding the enemy, the priest cites the oracle to Alexander; he claims that both he and Alexander were obedient to the oracle, Alexander in building the temple and he in dedicating it.

      Before moving on to other forms of divine testimony found in ancient speeches and treatises, it is appropriate to mention one other aspect which relates to oracles as forms of proof. Very often in ancient writings poets and other famous figures are cited and their words given the significance of oracles. For example, the Elder Seneca writes to his sons, who are aspiring orators, and urges them not to use their contemporaries as role models. He describes the younger generation thusly: “they are lazy, their intellects asleep; no-one can stay awake to take pains over a single honest pursuit. Sleep, torpor and a perseverance in evil that is more shameful than either have seized hold of their minds” (Seneca the Elder, Controversiae 1. pref. 8). He then cites Marcus Cato’s statement that “an orator, son Marcus, is a good man skilled in speaking” (Controversiae 1. pref. 9). But he prefaces this remark by stating:

      That well-known saying of Cato was really an oracle . . . for surely an oracle is the divine will given human expression; and what high priest could the gods have found more holy than Marcus Cato, not so much to teach mankind as to scold it. (Controversiae 1. pref. 9)

In this passage, one notices that the Elder Seneca is citing a human authority (a widespread topos among the ancient rhetoricians), but also seeks to add significance to that authority through the claim that the source of the speaker’s words is the gods themselves. This is a common methodology that was often practiced in antiquity.170

      Divine Testimony through Deeds and Other Means

Other forms of divine testimony (as described by Cicero in Top. 20.76–77) are found in ancient speeches and treatises as well. Quintilian, in mentioning divine testimony as a form of proof, cites Cicero’s speech against Catiline as an example.171 In this speech, which Cicero delivers to the people of Rome and not the Senate,172 Cicero describes to the people how he was able to thwart Catiline’s plot to take over the Republic. Cicero explains his ability