The topos of Divine Testimony in Luke-Acts. James R. McConnell

might refer while giving a speech. In De or. he writes,

      And indeed when, while a man is speaking—as often happens—such commonplaces [loci] have cropped up as demand some mention of the immortal gods, of dutifulness, harmony, or friendship, of the rights shared by citizens, by men in general, and by nations, of fair-dealing, moderation or greatness of soul, or virtue of any and every kind. (De or. 1.13.56)

      Later in De or., Crassus encourages Antonius to go beyond what seems to be the current understanding of locus, saying,

      [R]ather please omit that part of your programme which none of our friends here wants, touching the commonplaces [locis] which supply us with what we have to say in our cases: although you discuss these things with brilliant originality, they are for all that really rather easy and widely current in maxims. Produce for us the sources of what you so often handle and always in inspired fashion. (De or. 2.29.127)

      Here, at the very least, Cicero provides evidence that he is familiar with an understanding of a locus as a proverb or maxim, or perhaps (as seen above) a stock theme, exemplary model, or pattern to which orators often refer.

      A second, slightly different view of locus is found in Inv. Here, Cicero describes a “common” locus, “common” distinguishing an argument that can be used in multiple cases. It is, therefore, an argument of a more general nature. Cicero writes,

      In every case some of the arguments are related only to the case that is being pleaded, and are so dependent on it that they cannot advantageously be separated from it and transferred to other cases, while others are of a more general nature, and adaptable to all or most cases of the same kind. These arguments which can be transferred to many cases, we call common topics [locos communes]. A common topic either contains an amplification of an undisputed statement . . . or of a doubtful statement against which there are also plausible lines of argument . . . A speech, however, is occasionally rendered distinguished or brilliant by introducing common topics and some topic [locis communibus et aliquo loco] backed up by arguments when the audience is already convinced. (Inv. 2.14.47–15.48)

In this passage, what Cicero infers through the phrase locis communibus et aliquo loco is that there are “common” loci (as described above) and simply loci; the difference between the two is that common loci are arguments applicable to any case, while loci are particular to the case being argued.130 Also, Cicero argues that the common loci are to be carefully constructed and embellished (note in the quote above he calls for them to include “an amplification”), which provides the impression they are arguments in a more complete form than simple loci.131

      Locus in Ad Herennium

      I will now explore the concept of locus as described in other Latin and Greek authors, beginning with the rhetorical treatise Ad Herennium. In Rhet. Her., in the author’s discussion of amplification, he lists ten areas from which to draw loci in support of summarizing statements (epilogoi) found in the speech. The author writes:

      Amplification is the principle of using Commonplaces [per locum communem] to stir the hearers. To amplify an accusation it will be most advantageous to draw commonplaces from ten formulae. (Rhet. Her. 2.30.47)

The greater context of this statement is the description of the summarization that a rhetor is to do periodically within the speech.132 These summaries have a threefold purpose: summarizing the previous points, reinforcing and building on what has been stated (“Amplification”), and inciting the emotions of the audience (Rhet. Her. 2.30.47).

      Locus in Quintilian

In Quintilian’s Institutio oratoria one finds a similar perception of locus. Quintilian discusses the locus in the context of the part of the speech he calls the proof, and which he considers the most significant.133 Quintilian makes the same distinction as was seen in Aristotle and Cicero, categorizing proofs as either “nontechnical” or “technical,” corresponding to Aristotle’s “inartificial” and “artificial” proofs.134 The sources for the inartificial proofs include judgments rendered in previous cases, rumors, statements made by those being tortured, documents, oaths, and the testimony of witnesses. After discussing these forms of proof in some detail, Quintilian turns his attention to the “technical” proofs, those invented by the orator.

Quintilian categorizes technical proofs into “signs,” arguments, or examples (Inst. 5.9.1). He discusses loci in the context of arguments. For Quintilian, loci are “Places where Arguments are found,” and are not “what are nowadays commonly meant by loci, namely set pieces against luxury, adultery, and the like, but the area in which Arguments lurk and from which they have to be draw out” (Inst. 5.10.20–21). Three things are significant here. First, Quintilian, like Cicero, argues that the loci represent sources of arguments from which the orator must select in order to argue the case at hand (“so every Argument is not found everywhere, and we have therefore to be selective in our search” [Inst. 5.10.22]). Second, Quintilian, again in a similar fashion to Cicero, albeit more explicitly, distinguishes his definition of locus from (what Cicero termed) the common loci, which Quintilian describes as stock arguments against (or, presumably, for) certain familiar themes.135 The third point comes from the greater context. Quintilian, in this case unlike Cicero, does not call the inartificial proofs “loci”; he restricts loci to those proofs inherent to the case which must be discovered and selected by the orator.

      Topos in Theon

      Theon, in the Progymnasmata, provides evidence of a similar distinction between two concepts of locus/topos already seen in Cicero and Quintilian. Within the Progymnasmata there is an exercise entitled ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΠΟΥ. Within this exercise Theon defines what he means by τόπος:

Topos (topos)136 is language amplifying something that is acknowledged to be either a fault or a brave deed. It is of two kinds: one is an attack on those who have done evil deeds, . . . the other in favor of those who have done something good . . . It is called a topos because starting from it as a “place” we easily find arguments (epkheiroumen) against those not admitting that they are in the wrong. For this reason some define it as a starting point for epicheiremes. (Theon, Progymnasmata 106 [Kennedy, ed. and trans., 42])

      A commonplace is therefore a source of a formal argument directed at one who has made a particularly bad (or good) moral decision. It is ‘formal’ in that Theon suggests a specific structure for a commonplace (see Theon, Progymnasmata 107 [Kennedy, ed. and trans., 44]). In this passage one sees the structure which Theon proposes, as well as suggestions for the proofs. Although he does not specifically use the term topos, the language that Theon utilizes concerning the selection of proofs sounds much like the description of a topos that I have been considering.

      In the descriptions of other preliminary exercises, however, Theon does use the term topos in the sense of a particular theme or motif used within an argument. For example, in his discussion of refutation and confirmation (found within the section on narrative in Kennedy’s edition of the Progymnasmata), Theon states:

As for refutation and proof, we said that the same topics [οἱ αὐτοὶ τόποι]137 are useful in fables, but in narratives the topics of the false and impossible [ἀπὸ τοῦ ψεύδους καὶ ἀδυνάτου τόποι]138 are also fitting. (Theon, Progymnasmata 93 [Kennedy, ed. and trans., 40])

Theon’s use of the term topos is certainly different here than in the section on commonplace. Here, rather than being a complete formal argument, the topoi constitute the subject matter