Some Account of the Public Life of the Late Lieutenant-General Sir George Prevost, Bart. E. B. Brenton

and that the season was fast approaching, when all offensive operations must cease, the American commanders urged the troops on that line, to that ill-concerted expedition, which ended in the battle of Queenstown, and which, though attended with the irreparable loss to the British forces of their gallant Commander, terminated in the disgrace and defeat of the American army; and was thus the means of preserving, at least for that campaign, the Province of Upper Canada. Brilliant as had been the success of our arms at the battle of Queenstown, and complete as had been the overthrow of the enemy, they still remained in sufficient force on the opposite territory, to make an immediate attack upon their frontier, notwithstanding the dismay with which the critic seems to think the Americans were filled,[30] something more than hazardous. Out of the small force of less than 900 regular troops which we had on the field that day, nearly 100 of them were killed or wounded, and many were necessarily engaged in guarding the prisoners, whose numbers amounted to more than our own regular force. The enemy had received reinforcements in their line during the day of the action, and others were constantly arriving. Under these circumstances is it to be wondered at, that Major-General Sheaffe should not have listened to the suggestions of any of his officers, if such were made, and the fact is more than doubtful, to cross over immediately after the action, when according to the Reviewer's sagacious opinion, "Fort Niagara might have been taken, and the whole of the Niagara line cleared of the American troops!"

      Such an attempt might indeed have averted the insinuation levelled by the critic against General Sheaffe and Sir George Prevost as lovers of armistices, but would have evinced great want of military judgment and prudence in General Sheaffe, and have hazarded all the advantages gained by the gallant and able conduct of his lamented predecessor, and strengthened and confirmed at Queenstown by himself. General Sheaffe was, therefore, wisely contented with having foiled a second attempt of a superior force to invade the Province; and, anxious to secure its future preservation, he willingly acceded to a proposal for an armistice, which he knew, under the circumstances of his situation, would be of incalculably more benefit to himself than to the enemy. It must be evident to every one at all conversant with military subjects, that to those who are carrying on a defensive warfare, which their inferiority of force and means of every description has obliged them to adopt, a suspension of hostilities must be infinitely more beneficial than to the opposite party. General Sheaffe was fully aware of the importance of this measure to the safety of the province, which on the death of General Brock was entrusted to him, since he was in daily expectation of receiving supplies of clothing, and other articles which were indispensable for the militia, who had become much dissatisfied from the want of those articles. Reinforcements of troops were also on their way to him; and, in fact, these supplies and reinforcements did arrive during the continuance of the armistice, and materially contributed to foil the further efforts of the enemy to invade the Province. It may also be added, that the armistice was further expedient in the first instance, when its duration was limited to three days, for the purpose of affording time for carrying into effect the proposed exchange of prisoners, the removal of those that were wounded, and the passing over to the enemy's side the militia paroles. Some portion of time was also necessary for performing, without any hostile interruption, the last tribute of respect to the memory of the gallant Commander who had then lately fallen. The subsequent prolongation of the armistice to an indefinite period, although it was in the power of either party to terminate the same by thirty hours notice, perfectly coincided with Major-General Sheaffe's system of defensive warfare, and permitted him to leave Fort George for a short time, and proceed to York, where his presence was indispensable for the purpose of being sworn in, and assuming the civil government.

      It has been thought necessary to say thus much in vindication of this measure, from a sense of justice to a gallant and meritorious officer, although it was adopted without any reference to, and without the consent or approbation of Sir George Prevost. The Reviewer has indeed thought fit to characterize the armistice[31] as one for which no reason, civil or military, was ever assigned; whereas it was notorious to the army employed on the Niagara line that General Sheaffe was influenced in this step by the motives and circumstances already stated, all of which were immediately communicated by him to Sir George Prevost. If any thing further were necessary to be adduced in vindication of the policy of the defensive system, of which these armistices formed a part, and which the Reviewer has thought fit so groundlessly to denominate short-sighted and ill-judged, although attended with results so favourable to the safety of both Provinces, it will be found in the complete approbation expressed by his Majesty's Government. In Lord Bathurst's despatch to Sir George Prevost, of the 4th July, 1812, written before the intelligence of the declaration of war, by America, had reached England, his Lordship says, "The instructions given by you to Major-General Brock and Sir John Sherbrooke, cautioning them against any premature measures of hostility, or any deviation from a line of conduct strictly defensive, meets with the full approbation of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent."

      In a subsequent despatch of the 10th Aug., Lord Bathurst approves of the general principles upon which Sir George Prevost intended to conduct the operations of the war, by making the defence of Quebec paramount to every other consideration, in the event of invasion. In a later despatch of the date of the 1st October, 1812, his Lordship says, "I have it in command from his Royal Highness the Prince Regent, to convey to you his most unqualified approbation of the measures which you have adopted for defending the Provinces under your charge, and of those to which you have had recourse for deferring, if not altogether preventing, any resort to actual hostility." On the subject of the armistice, he adds, "The desire which you have unceasingly manifested to avoid hostilities, with the subjects of the United States, is not more in conformity with your own feelings, than with the wishes and intentions of his Majesty's Government, and therefore your correspondence with General Dearborn cannot fail to receive their cordial concurrence."

      In a further despatch from Lord Bathurst, dated the 10th October, 1812, acknowledging the receipt of the letter from Sir George Prevost, which announced the surrender of General Hull, with his army, to General Brock, and communicating his Royal Highness the Prince Regent's approbation of the conduct of General Brock, his officers and troops, on that occasion, his Lordship adds—"I am further commanded by his Royal Highness to say, that in giving every credit to Major-General Brock, and the army under his command, he is fully sensible how much your exertions and arrangements have contributed to the fortunate conclusion of the campaign in Upper Canada." In Lord Bathurst's despatch of the 16th November following, he says, "The measures which you have taken for obstructing the navigation of the Richelieu, by the erection of works on the Isle Aux Noix, appear well calculated to impede the advance of the enemy in that quarter."

      Testimonials like these, so highly honorable to the zeal and ability displayed by Sir George Prevost, are sufficient of themselves to afford a complete answer to the Reviewer's assertions. That writer's remark, with regard to "the practical illustration of the tendency"[32] of Sir George Prevost's defensive system, is directly in opposition to the facts, both as respects the conduct of Colonel Procter, in consequence of his orders, and the effect produced by that conduct upon the minds of the Indians. In proof of this assertion, it is only necessary to advert to the two expeditions, of Captain Muir to Fort Wayne, in September, 1812, and of Lieutenant Dewar to the Fort of the Rapids of the Miami, in October following. The former of these expeditions tended, for some time at least, to retard the preparations which the enemy were making for their second advance to the Detroit frontier, which terminated in the defeat and capture of General Winchester and his army, while both expeditions afforded to the Indians a strong proof of our desire to co-operate with them, as far as was consistent with the security of our own Provinces, and of the Michigan territory. Neither of these expeditions would have been undertaken, had not Colonel Procter's orders been discretionary instead of positive. It is certainly true, that Sir George Prevost did wish to discourage the employment of the regular troops under Colonel Procter, in offensive operations jointly with the Indians; because such a course of proceeding was neither consistent with the instructions he had received from his Majesty's Government, nor compatible with the military resources of his command. At the same time he merely recommended to Colonel Procter a cautious line of conduct, chiefly directed to the preservation of the district committed to his charge; and it is evident that Colonel Procter's use of the discretion thus entrusted to him, had the effect of retaining the willing services of the Indians during the whole period of our remaining in possession of