Some Account of the Public Life of the Late Lieutenant-General Sir George Prevost, Bart. E. B. Brenton

that province.

      Intelligence of the conclusion of the armistice was despatched to General Brock on the 12th August, by Brigade-Major Sheckleton, and must have reached him at Amherstburg before he left that place for Fort George, where he arrived the 6th September; but, whatever may have been General Brock's opinion of the policy of the measure, we do not find in his letter of the 7th September to Sir George Prevost, that the receipt of that intelligence had at all interfered with any intention he had previously entertained of "sweeping" (according to the Reviewer's assertion) "the Niagara line of the American garrisons, which he knew were then unprepared for vigorous resistance."[29] In fact, as that letter states, the armistice was to terminate the next day; and so far was General Brock from being in a situation to act offensively, that he states his expectation of an almost immediate attack, and of his having sent to Amherstburg to Colonel Proctor, as well as to Colonel Vincent at Kingston, for reinforcements, to enable him to meet it; expressing at the same time his hope, that if he could continue to maintain his position for six weeks longer, the campaign would terminate in a manner little expected in the United States.

      Upon the expiration of the armistice, Sir George Prevost resolved to continue, for a time at least, and until his resources would better enable him to pursue a contrary line of conduct, the same defensive system which he had previously determined upon; and which he had been originally induced to adopt, in consequence of the peculiar circumstances in which he was placed at the commencement of hostilities, and of the war having been undertaken, on the part of the United States, so much in opposition to the opinions and wishes of a considerable portion of its population. In a private letter from Sir George Prevost to General Brock, of the 2d August, 1812, upon the subject of the proposed armistice, he particularly refers to the opinion of Mr. Foster, respecting the policy of the defensive system. "Mr. Foster," he says, "submits the propriety of our abstaining from an invasion of the United States' territory, as only in such event could the American government be empowered to order the militia out of the States." As a further ground for this line of conduct, and a confirmation of the propriety of his own opinion in adopting it, he quotes in a subsequent communication to General Brock, of 30th August, 1812, the opinion of his Majesty's Government on the subject. "The King's Government having most unequivocally expressed to me their desire to preserve peace with the United States, that they might uninterruptedly pursue, with the whole disposeable force of the country, the great interests committed to them in Europe, I have endeavoured to be instrumental in the accomplishment of those views; but I consider it most fortunate to have been enabled to do so without interfering with your operations on the Detroit. I have sent you men, money, and stores of every kind." It cannot be matter of surprise that Sir George Prevost should persevere in his defensive system, even after the termination of the armistice, and when from the manner in which the Government of the United States had received the communication of the repeal of the Orders in Council, it was evident that they meant to continue the war for other objects; for it ought to be considered, that up to that period, the only reinforcements of troops received by him were the 103d, nearly a boy-regiment, and the first battalion of the Royals from the West Indies, the latter incomplete, from the capture of part of their numbers, on board of one of the transports, by an American frigate. In consequence, however, of this addition to the force in the Lower Province, Sir George Prevost was enabled immediately to strengthen the army in Upper Canada, by detachments from the 49th regiment, Royal Newfoundland Fencibles, and Royal Veterans; but it must be evident that the total accession of strength in both Provinces was not sufficient to warrant a departure from a system, which had been adopted after the fullest deliberation, and upon a just calculation of the means necessary to meet the American warfare. The grounds of Sir George Prevost's opinion on this head had been stated to General Brock, in his letters to him of the 7th and 10th July, before referred to; and as a further confirmation of the necessity of adhering to it, in his communication to General Brock, of the 17th September, Sir George Prevost acquaints him, that in his last despatches from Lord Bathurst, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated 4th July, 1812, he is told by him, "That his Majesty's Government trusts he will be enabled to suspend, with perfect safety, all extraordinary preparations for defence, which he may have been induced to make, in consequence of the precarious state of the relations between Great Britain and the United States."—As this opinion of the British Government was evidently founded upon their belief, that the revocation of the Orders in Council would either prevent war, if not declared, or lead to an immediate peace, had hostilities commenced, it was plain that no further reinforcements could be expected to be even ordered from England, until accounts should arrive there of the reception which the intelligence of the revocation of the Orders in Council had met with from the Government of the United States. As this could not well be before the end of September, there was not the slightest prospect of any addition being afforded to the force in the Canadas before the ensuing year; and it was therefore certain, that the Commander of the forces would until that period be completely left to his own resources for the defence of those Provinces.

      To husband those resources became, under these circumstances, his imperious duty. The posture of affairs in Lower Canada, as he had stated to General Brock, in his letter of the 17th September, particularly on the frontier of Montreal, required every soldier in that Province, and no further reinforcements could be sent by him to the other. Not aware of any advantage which could arise from offensive operations against America, to compensate for the loss they might occasion, and for the consequent insecurity to the Provinces which he was defending, Sir George Prevost continued to urge upon General Brock, and after his death, upon his successor, General Sheaffe, the necessity of adhering to a defensive system; nor does it appear from any part of the correspondence between these officers and Sir George Prevost, that they had any particular object in view, which that policy restrained them from pursuing. Previous to the armistice, and to the capture of Hull's army at Detroit, General Brock had in his letters of 3d and 26th July, 1812, before referred to, given his reasons, which were evidently independent of the consideration of any instructions from Sir George Prevost, why he did not meditate offensive operations against the American frontier; and subsequent to the capture of Detroit, and after his arrival at Fort George in September, it has been clearly shewn, that his situation and means precluded him from such measures, except at a great risk, and for the accomplishment of inadequate objects.

      The correctness of this statement appears from a letter addressed by General Brock, to Sir George Prevost, on the 13th September, 1812, from Fort George; in which he says, "that although he had learnt from deserters, (but which information he had reason afterwards to think, as he acknowledged, was not altogether correct), that great dissatisfaction prevailed amongst the American troops on the Niagara frontier, and that therefore much might be effected against such a body at that moment; that keeping in mind his excellency's instructions, and aware of the policy of permitting such a force to dwindle away by it's own inefficient means, he did not contemplate any immediate attack." Two strong inferences naturally arise from this letter—the one, that General Brock must have considered the instructions received from Sir George Prevost, as to defensive measures not positive, as the Reviewer has thought fit to state them to have been, but discretionary; the other, that General Brock himself, was convinced of the policy of abstaining from offensive operations against an enemy circumstanced as the Americans then were. That this policy was a wise one, was manifest from the result. Had any attack been made on Fort Niagara, or had that general sweeping of the American garrisons on the frontier, (which the critic seems to think so easy an achievement) been attempted, there cannot be a doubt but that this invasion of the American territory, before the enemy had made an attack upon our own frontier, would have united the whole population, not only of the states bordering upon that line, but of every other part of the union, in the prosecution of the war. The militia already assembled upon that frontier, and who were known to be dissatisfied, and anxious to return to their homes, would in the event of an attack upon their territory, not only have cheerfully remained to repel the aggression, but would have been further obliged to pass the frontier, for the invasion of Canada; which, without such an attack on our part, they could not have been compelled to do. Aware of this circumstance, it was the policy of the American Government, to hold out lures to our officers, commanding on the frontiers, to induce them to commence an offensive warfare. Sir George Prevost, however, saw through their design, and fortunately disappointed it. The consequence was, that finding their militia could no longer be kept together,