Some Account of the Public Life of the Late Lieutenant-General Sir George Prevost, Bart. E. B. Brenton

Government. Another schooner was directed to be built, to increase our marine on Lake Erie. Captain Gray, Deputy Assistant-Quarter-Master-General, was despatched to the Upper Province, in order to assist in forwarding these defensive preparations; and Captain Dixon, of the Royal Engineers, was directed to proceed to Amherstburgh, to inspect the works of that fort, which the Commander of the forces had ordered to be put in a tenable state. The propriety of strengthening and fortifying York was submitted to Government; and the commanding engineer was directed to make the repairs, which his report on the different forts and posts in Upper Canada, had stated to be necessary. In addition to these measures, a reinforcement from the 41st regiment, and five companies of the Newfoundland Fencibles, left Quebec in the month of May for the Upper Province.

      On the 31st March, Sir George Prevost addressed a private and confidential letter to Major-General Brock, in which his sentiments respecting the approaching war, and the policy to be adopted in meeting it, were clearly detailed. One passage in this letter merits a more particular notice, since it is highly important, not only as repelling the accusation of the Reviewer respecting the want of preparation for the war, but also as containing an answer to another charge, which will afterwards be noticed. The paragraph in the letter is as follows: "You are nevertheless to persevere in your preparations for defence, and in such arrangements as may, upon a change in the state of affairs, enable you to employ any disposeable part of your force offensively against the common enemy."

      Independently of all these various communications with the officer commanding in Upper Canada, respecting the measures to be pursued in the event of war, and of the supplies of men, arms, money, stores, and provisions, which, with a view to that event, had been afforded to Upper Canada; much correspondence had previously taken place, and many difficulties had been removed with regard to the supply and transport of the Indian presents to the Upper Province, upon the due furnishing of which very materially depended the support which we might expect to receive from the Indians, in case of a rupture with America.

      From this statement, drawn from the original correspondence, and from official documents, it is evident, that even in contemplation of hostilities, an event by no means certain, and which the British Government were so far from thinking probable, that they discouraged any measure of extraordinary expense to meet it, the Commander of the forces did, as far as rested with him, during the winter of 1811 and 1812, and for months prior to the declaration of war, make every preparation for defence, consistent with the means which he possessed. All the requisitions of Major-General Brock which the Commander of the forces had the power to grant, were promptly complied with; nor was the slightest intimation ever given by that invaluable officer, that any measure, either suggested by himself or which ought to have occurred to the Commander of the forces, for the preservation of the Upper Province, in the event of its being attacked, had been overlooked or neglected. The same vigilant foresight will be found to mark the conduct of Sir George Prevost in the Lower Province. One of the first measures of his government, in contemplation of war, was an application to the legislature of Lower Canada, in February, 1812, for an act to new model the militia laws, and which might enable him to call forth a proportion of the population into active service. Averse as the Canadians had hitherto been to grant any power of this description to former Governors, and repugnant as many of the clauses which it was intended to introduce into the bill, were to the habits and feelings of the people, such was the deserved popularity acquired by Sir George Prevost, from the conciliatory policy, which, as before stated, he had adopted towards the Canadians, immediately upon his arrival amongst them, that he obtained from the Legislature nearly all that he had required. Before the end of May, 1812, a sum exceeding 60,000l. was placed at his disposal for the militia service; and he was authorized to embody 2,000 Bachelors, between the age of eighteen and twenty-five years, for three months in the year; and in case of invasion, or imminent danger of it, to retain them for a year. In case of war, he was empowered to embody if necessary, the whole militia of the Province. Under that law, a force of 2,000 men, from the finest and most efficient class of the militia, was embodied on the 13th May, so to remain for three months, unless the then state of affairs should render it expedient to retain them longer. A corps of Canadian voltigeurs, under the command of Major De Salaberry, of the 60th regiment, consisting of between 300 and 400 men, had likewise, been raised and disciplined; and 400 recruits for the Glengarry Fencibles, had, before the 1st June, been assembled at Three Rivers, in Lower Canada. The advantages arising from thus embodying the militia prior to the war, were incalculable, and it may be confidently asserted, materially contributed to the preservation of the Canadas.

      The American Government, deceived by the erroneous information which they had received respecting the disaffection of the Canadian population to Great Britain, had calculated upon meeting with considerable support from the people in their invasion of the Province. They had been told, and they believed, that the militia would not serve, or, if embodied, would be worse than useless. The embodying, arming, and training of 2,000 of the most active portion of the population, for several weeks before the war was declared, was a severe disappointment to the American Government; and was one of the causes of that determined resistance, which they afterwards experienced in every attempt to penetrate into that Province. This militia force also enabled the Commander of the forces to detach a larger portion of the regular troops, than he could otherwise have been justified in parting with, to the Upper Province; while, at the same time, it afforded him the means, on the breaking out of the war, of guarding the different passes and roads into Lower Canada, with a description of men perfectly well acquainted with the nature of the country, and with the mode of warfare necessary for its defence. The line of frontier in the Lower Province was thus most effectually guarded by Sir George Prevost's able disposition of this new force, together with the assistance of the regular troops; and every prudent precaution consistent with his means, and with the instructions he was constantly receiving from England, to avoid all unnecessary expense, was taken. The precautionary measures which were pursued upon this occasion, by the Commander of the forces, met with the full approbation of His Majesty's Government, expressed in a despatch from Lord Bathurst, of the 6th November, 1812, in which his Lordship informed Sir George Prevost, that "the preparations for defence which he had made upon the first intimation of eventual hostility with America, and which he had since so vigorously continued, had met with the Prince Regent's entire approbation."

      After charging Sir George Prevost with negligence, in not preparing to meet the threatened hostilities, the Reviewer proceeds to hazard an opinion, that the occupation and fortifying of Coteau du Lac, and Isle aux Noix, which he terms the keys of Lower Canada, was a measure which Sir George Prevost ought to have adopted, in preference to all others; but which he entirely overlooked and neglected.[23] The fact is, that the occupation of Coteau du Lac, as is well known to every military man acquainted with the Canadas, could only be useful as against the enemy advancing from Lake Ontario, or the shores of the St. Lawrence, above Montreal. No such force could be expected to descend the river from the lake, so long as we had the command of it, as we undoubtedly had, not only at the commencement of the war, but for several months afterwards; and as little was it to be apprehended as collecting on the shores of the river. The information which the Commander of the forces was constantly receiving of the intended movements of the enemy, and of the real and immediate object of their attack, was too correct to leave him in any doubt as to their attempting the Lower Province in that direction, or to induce him to diminish the small means he possessed, for the defence of more important points, by the occupation of posts which at that period could afford him no additional security. Coteau du Lac, was not therefore occupied as a post, either before the war or for several months afterwards, but its real importance was neither overlooked nor disregarded, as the Reviewer has stated. It was examined and reported upon by different officers, sent to inspect the line of frontier extending from Lower Canada to Lake Ontario, immediately after the declaration of war, and particularly by Colonel Lethbridge, who was afterwards in command there. In possession of Kingston, and commanding the waters of the lake, and with the knowledge possessed by Sir George Prevost, of the force and designs of the enemy, no military man in the Canadas, would have thought it necessary, in the then state of affairs, that Coteau du Lac should be occupied. When subsequent events clearly shewed the intentions of the enemy to invade Lower Canada from Lake Ontario, and when the means of Sir George Prevost were better adapted for defending the whole line of that frontier, Coteau du Lac was occupied and fortified; and had it not