Some Account of the Public Life of the Late Lieutenant-General Sir George Prevost, Bart. E. B. Brenton

the earliest intelligence of the actual declaration of war, an immediate further communication of his sentiments was unnecessary. On the day, however, on which the intelligence of that event reached Quebec, the 25th June, 1812, a letter was despatched to Major-General Brock from the Adjutant-General, communicating the information; and as soon as the important arrangements respecting the Lower Province, and particularly those for the defence of Quebec had been completed, Sir George Prevost proceeded to Montreal. Upon his receiving at that place a despatch from Mr. Foster, our late minister at Washington, with an official notification of the war, he immediately afterwards, (on 7th July,) and within a fortnight after the first intelligence of it had reached him at Quebec, sent off his first despatch to Major-General Brock. This was followed by another on the 10th of the same month by Colonel Lethbridge, who was sent to take the command at Kingston; and in both these letters every instruction and information which Sir George Prevost's situation afforded, or enabled him to give, were sent to the Major-General. That these despatches did not reach General Brock until the 29th of the month was owing to circumstances over which Sir George Prevost had no control. It must be observed, however, that General Brock received the despatches several days before he set off to join the army opposed to General Hull, although the Reviewer[26] gives his readers to understand that it did not arrive until after General Hull's capture.

      The above statement will afford a full and satisfactory answer to the misrepresentations of the Quarterly Reviewer,[27] and to the unwarrantable insinuation by which they are accompanied, if indeed any answer were wanting to assertions in which the writer has directly contradicted himself. The Reviewer states, "that Sir George Prevost sent no instructions whatever to General Brock for some weeks after he received intimation of the war:"—and further, "that he, General Brock, was only restrained from the measure of attacking Fort Niagara, by the perplexity of his situation, in being left without orders." It is singular that the writer should have forgotten, that only five pages before, he had stated[28] that "on the receipt of the intelligence of the American declaration of war, Major-General Brock, who commanded the troops in the Upper Province immediately despatched discretionary orders to the British officer in charge of Fort St. Joseph's, to act either offensively or otherwise against the enemy at Michilimachinac, as he should find advisable." If General Brock was justified in giving these discretionary orders to act offensively as circumstances might require, it follows that he must have considered a similar line of conduct open to himself; and yet, in the face of this statement, the Reviewer gravely endeavours to persuade his readers, that General Brock was in perplexity with regard to the measures which he should pursue.

      The Reviewer's insinuation, that Sir G. Prevost sent no instructions to General Brock for some weeks after he received intimation of the war, with the intention of leaving that officer to act on his own responsibility, cannot be passed over in silence. It has been already proved, by incontrovertible facts, that the contemptible motives thus attributed to the Commander of the forces, could not possibly have existed in his mind; and the attempt to impute to him a conduct so dishonorable ought therefore to be marked with the severest reprobation. No two persons could more sincerely respect and esteem each other than these gallant and high-minded individuals. Sir George Prevost had early evinced his opinion of General Brock's merits and talents, in a private communication to him of the 22d Jan. 1812, several months before the war; and the reply of General Brock to that communication, was sufficient evidence of the sentiments he entertained towards the Commander, under whom he expressed himself to be so desirous of serving. Indeed, the utmost confidence and cordiality prevailed between these officers, as is amply manifested in the correspondence before referred to; and wherever a difference of opinion did exist, General Brock never hesitated to yield to what he expressed and considered the superior knowledge and experience of the Commander in Chief.

      The conduct of Sir George Prevost in his communications with General Brock, after receiving intelligence of the war, was not attended with any of those consequences which the Reviewer has asserted. Upon this head General Brock's correspondence with the Commander of the forces is conclusive.

      The first letter from that officer, after the receipt of the intelligence of the war, is dated the 3d July, at Fort George; the extract from which, already given, is a convincing proof, that whatever might have been his intention in moving from York to Fort George, he was not restrained from the measure of attacking Fort Niagara by any deficiency of instructions from the Commander of the Forces.

      The next letter from General Brock is from Fort George, dated 12th July, and states that the enemy were constructing batteries at the different points of the frontier; that he was making exertions to counteract their views; and that the arrival, that morning, of the Royal George and the vessels under convoy, bringing various pieces of ordnance, would give him a decided superiority. Not a single word is said in this despatch of any wish or intention on the part of the Major-General to invade the American territory. Major-General Brock's next letter of the 20th July states, that the enemy had evidently diminished his force, and appeared to have no intention of making an immediate attack. This letter also communicated the intelligence of General Hull's invasion of the Province. It likewise contained details of General Brock's means of defensive warfare, and expressed some apprehension for the fate of the troops under his command, should the communication be cut off between Kingston and Montreal; which apprehension was entertained by him on the supposition, as he stated, that "the slender means possessed by Sir G. Prevost would not admit of diminution, and consequently that he could not look for reinforcements." The same letter acknowledged the receipt of the Adjutant General's communication from Quebec, of 25th June, of the declaration of war. In the succeeding despatch from General Brock to Sir G. Prevost, dated 26th July, from Fort George, that officer writes as follows: "I have not deemed it of sufficient importance to commence active operations on this line by an attack on Fort Niagara; it can be demolished, when found necessary, in half an hour, and there my means of annoyance would cease. To enable the militia to acquire some degree of discipline, without interruption, is of far greater consequence than such a conquest."

      The next letter from the Major-General, dated from York, the 28th July, principally relates to the approaching meeting of the legislature, and mentions his intention of detaching a force for the relief of Amherstburg. A letter from the same place, written on the following day, communicates the surrender of Michilimachinac, and particularly acknowledges the receipt of Sir George Prevost's despatches of the 7th and 10th July, written after the declaration of war, and before alluded to. General Brock also states his intention of embarking immediately in the Prince Regent, (the vessel which had been built and equipped since the month of March preceding), for Fort George, from whence he should speedily return to York. On the 4th August, a short letter was addressed by General Brock to Sir G. Prevost, from York, principally upon the proceeding of the legislature, regarding the militia laws, and on the following day he set off for Amherstburg, from whence he did not return until after the glorious termination of Hull's invasion. It was, therefore, from a consideration of the nature of his resources, and of the necessity of maturing and husbanding them, and from a conviction that Niagara would easily fall whenever he should be inclined to attack it, and not from any doubt arising from want of instructions, that General Brock abandoned the attempt.

      It was in further pursuance of the line of policy adopted at the commencement of the war, that Sir George Prevost, upon the receipt of despatches from Mr. Foster, acquainting him with the proposed repeal of the Orders in Council by the British Government, immediately opened a communication with Major-General Dearborn, commanding the American forces on the frontier of Lower Canada, for the purpose of concluding an armistice, until the Congress should determine upon the proposals transmitted to them by Mr. Foster. An armistice of about three weeks did accordingly take place; and whatever might be the advantage arising from it to the American commanders and their troops, from the time and opportunity it afforded them of increasing their means of attacking the Canadas, it is obvious that the cessation of hostilities was of far more importance to Sir George Prevost, by enabling him to mature his preparations for defence. In fact, at the very time the armistice was negotiating, a regiment had arrived in the river from the West Indies; and after the conclusion, and during the continuance of it, considerable reinforcements of men and supplies were forwarded to Upper Canada, where they armed before the resuming of hostilities, and materially contributed towards defeating the attempts which the enemy afterwards made to invade