Historia de la estrategia militar. Jeremy Black

Leiden, 2000, pp. 77–105; D. TWITCHETT, “Tibet in Tang Grand Strategy”, ibid., pp. 106–79; P.C. PERDUE, “Culture, History, and Imperial Chinese Strategy: Legacies of the Qing conquests”, ibid., pp. 252–87.

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      [36] El clásico de E.N. LUTTWAK, The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century AD to the Third. Baltimore, MD, 1976, es criticado en B. ISAAC, The Limits of Empire: The Roman Army in the East. 2.ª ed., Oxford, 1992, pp. 372–418, y, por el contrario, es apoyado por E. L. WHEELER, “Methodological Limits and the Mirage of Roman Strategy”, Journal of Military History, 57 (1993), pp. 7–41, 215–40; E. L. WHEELER, “Rome’s Dacian Wars: Domitian, Trajan, and Strategy on the Danube”, Journal of Military History, 74 (2010), pp. 1185–1227, 75 (2011), pp. 191–219; M. PAVKOVIC, “Roman Grand Strategy”, Military Chronicles, 1 (2005), pp. 14–30; y K. KAGAN, “Redefining Roman Grand Strategy”, Journal of Military History, 70 (2006), pp. 333–62. Véase el más reciente texto de Y. LE BOHEC, La Guerre romaine: 58 avant J.-C.–235 après J.-C. Paris, 2014; G. TRAINA, “La Tête et la main droite de Crassus: quelques remarques supplémentaires”. En A. ALLÉLY (ed.), Corps au supplice et violences de guerre dans l’Antiquité. Bordeaux, 2014, pp. 95–8.

      [37] L. LORETO, La grande strategia di Roma nell’età della prima guerra punica (ca.273–ca.229 a. C.): l’inizio di un paradosso. Nápoles, 2007. En cuanto a la situación previa en el mundo griego, véase P.A. BRUNT, “The Aims of Alexander”. Greece and Rome, 12 (1965), pp. 205–15; P. A. BRUNT, “Spartan Policy and Strategy in the Archidamian War”. Phoenix, 19 (1965), pp. 255–80; J. K. ANDERSON, Military Theory and Practices in the Age of Xenophon. Berkeley, CA, 1970. Para profundizar en estos factores culturales, véase J. LENDON, Soldiers and Ghosts: A History of Battle in Classical Antiquity. New Haven, CT, 2005.

      [38] R. J. BREWER (ed.), Roman Fortresses and Their Legions. London, 2000; D. GRAF, “Rome and China: Some Frontier Comparisons”. En Z. VISY (ed.), Limes XIX: Proceedings of the XIXth International Congress of Roman Frontier Studies. Pécs, 2005, pp. 157–66; E. HAMMER, “Highland Fortress-Polities and Their Settlement Systems in the Southern Caucasus”. Antiquity, 88 (2014), pp. 757–74.

      [39] Véase también A. ECKSTEIN, Rome Enters the Greek East: From Anarchy to Hierarchy in the Hellenistic Mediterranean, 230–170 BC. Malden, MA, 2008.

      [40] S. P. MATTERN, Rome and the Enemy: Imperial Strategy in the Principate. Berkeley, CA, 1999.

      [41] N. TACKETT, “The Great Wall and Conceptualizations of the Border under the Northern Song”, Journal of Song-Yuan Studies, 38 (2008), pp. 99–138.

      [42] J. HALDON, Warfare, State and Society in the Byzantine World, 565–1204, London, 1999; J. SHEPARD (ed.), The Cambridge History of the Byzantine Empire. Cambridge, 2008; E.N. LUTTWAK, The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire. Cambridge, MA, 2009; D.A. GRAFF, The Eurasian Way of War: Military Practice in Seventh-Century China and Byzantium, Abingdon, 2016.

      [43] J. F. VERBRUGGEN, The Art of Warfare in Western Europe during the Middle Ages. Oxford, 1977, pp. 249–300; P. Contamine, La Guerre au Moyen âge, 4.ª ed. París, 1994, pp. 365–79 (versión inglesa, War in the Middle Ages, Oxford, 1986, pp. 219–28); M. PRESTWICH, Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages: The English Experience. New Haven, CT, 1996; F. Garcia Fitz, “¿Hubo estrategia en la Edad Media? A propósito de las relaciones castellano-musulmanas durante la segunda mitad del siglo XIII”. Revista da Faculdade de Letras: História, series 2, vol. 15 (1998), pp. 837–54; B.S. BACHRACH, Early Carolingian Warfare: Prelude to Empire. Philadelphia, PA, 2001, pp. 202–42; J. W. HONIG, “Reappraising Late Medieval Strategy: The Example of the 1415 Agincourt Campaign”. War in History, 19 (2012), pp. 123–51; J. B. GILLINGHAM, “A Strategy of Total War? Henry of Livonia and the Conquest of Estonia, 1208–1227”. Journal of Medieval Military History, 15 (2017). Sobre el número especial de Medieval Military History en el que se trata la importancia de la estrategia, véase el volumen 15 (2017). Sobre Pere, véase J. BLACK, Geopolitics and the Quest for Dominance. Bloomington, IN, 2016, pp. 38–9.

      [44] G. A. LOUD, “Some Reflections on the Failure of the Second Crusade”. Crusades, 4 (2005), pp. 10–14.

      [45] C. J. ROGERS, War Cruel and Sharp: English Strategy under Edward III, 1327–1360. Woodbridge, Suffolk, 2000; C. J. ROGERS, Essays on Medieval Military History: Strategy, Military Revolutions, and the Hundred Years War. Farnham, 2010; C. J. ROGERS, “Medieval Strategy and the Economics of Conquest”. Journal of Military History, 82 (2018), pp. 709–38.

      [46] J. J. L. GOMMANS, The Rise of the Indo-Afghan Empire, c.1710–1780. Leiden, 1995, pp. 136–42.

      [47] J. WATERSON, The Knights of Islam: The Wars of the Mamluks. St Paul, MN, 2007.

      [48] J. E. HERMAN, Amid the Clouds and Mist: China’s Colonization of Guizhou, 1200–1700. Cambridge, MA, 2005.

      [49] T. May, The Mongol Art of War: Chinggis Khan and the Mongol Military System. Yardley, PA, 2007.

      [50] B. F. MANZ, The Rise and Rule of Tamerlane. Cambridge, 1989.

      [51] K. CHASE, Firearms: A Global History to 1700. Cambridge, 2003, p. 51; E.L. DREYER, Zheng He: China and the Oceans in the Early Ming Dynasty, 1405–1433. New York, 2007.

      [52] B. HEUSER, The Strategy Makers: Thoughts on War and Society from Machiavelli to Clausewitz. Santa Barbara, CA, 2010; B. HEUSER, The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present. Cambridge, 2010.

      [53] G. PARKER, The Grand Strategy of Philip II. New Haven, CT, 1998.

      [54] M. RIZZO, “Sticks, Carrots, and All the Rest: Lombardy and the Spanish Strategy in Northern Italy between Europe and the Mediterranean (1550–1600)”. Cahiers de la Méditerranée, 71 (2005), pp. 146–84.

      [55] E. TENACE, “A Strategy of Reaction: The Armadas of 1596 and 1597 and the Spanish Struggle for European Hegemony”. English Historical Review, 118 (2003), pp. 855–82. Véase también E. RINGMAR, Identity, Interest and Action: A Cultural Explanation of Sweden’s Intervention in the Thirty Years War. Cambridge, 1996.

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