Historia de la estrategia militar. Jeremy Black

hay escasos signos de que la palabra recién llegada alterase la práctica o el pensamiento en este periodo, o que ni siquiera fuese tenida en cuenta a este respecto. Con todo, como se ha dicho, eso no significaba que no existiese una dimensión estratégica de la actividad militar[71].

      [1] Véase, por ejemplo, A. J. ECHEVARRIA, Military Strategy: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford, 2017.

      [2] G. J. BRYANT, The Emergence of British Power in India, 1600–1784: A Grand Strategic Interpretation. Woodbridge, Suffolk, 2013, p. 321. En cuanto a una definición y un papel distintos para la «gran estrategia», véase P.D. MILLER, “On Strategy, Grand and Mundane”, Orbis, 60 (2016), pp. 237–47.

      [3] W. E. LEE, Waging War: Conflict, Culture, and Innovation in World History, Oxford, 2016, p. 407.

      [4] T. KANE y D. LONSDALE, Understanding Contemporary Strategy. Abingdon, 2012, p. 26.

      [5] Citado en I. POPESCU, Emergent Strategy and Grand Strategy: How American Presidents Succeed in Foreign Policy. Baltimore, MD, 2017, p. 1.

      [6] J. M. DUBIK, Just War Reconsidered: Strategy, Ethics, and Theory. Lexington, KY, 2016.

      [7] P. CRIMMIN, “The Channel’s Strategic Significance: Invasion Threat, Line of Defence, Prison Wall, Escape Route”. Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century, 292 (1991), pp. 67–79; L. WHITE, “Strategic Geography and the Spanish Habsburg Monarchy’s Failure to Recover Portugal, 1640–1668”. Journal of Military History, 71 (2007), pp. 373–410.

      [8] A. J. STRAVERS, “Partisan Conflict over Grand Strategy in Eastern Europe, 2014–2017”. Orbis, 62 (2018), pp. 541–56; N.D.F. Allen, “Assessing a Decade of US Military Strategy in Africa”, ibid., pp. 655–69, cita en la p. 657.

      [9] Brian COLLIER a Black, 23 de julio de 2009, email.

      [10] The Economist, 30 de noviembre de 2018, p. 29.

      [11] The Times, 3 de diciembre de 2018.

      [12] J. A. Downie, “Polemical Strategy and Swift’s The Conduct of the Allies”, Prose Studies, 4 (1981), pp. 134–45.

      [13] Wall Street Journal, 19 de octubre de 2018.

      [14] M. T. Owens, “Editor’s Corner”, Orbis, 58 (2014), p. 162.

      [15] L. SONDHAUS, Strategic Culture and Ways of War. London, 2006; S. POORE, “What is the Context? A Reply to the Gray-Johnston Debate on Strategic Culture”, Review of International Studies, 29 (2003), pp. 279–84; D.P. ADAMSKY, American Strategic Culture and the US Revolution in Military Affairs, Oslo, 2008.

      [16] S. W. KHAN, Haunted by Chaos: China’s Grand Strategy from Mao Zedong to Xi Jinping. Cambridge, MA, 2018, p. 251; A. M. TABATABAI, No Conquest, No Defeat: Iran’s National Security Strategy. London, 2019.

      [17] J. SNYDER, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations. Santa Monica, CA, 1977.

      [18] T. H. ETZOLD y J.L. GADDIS (eds.), Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945–1950. New York, 1978, pp. 84–90; J.L. GADDIS, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1947. New York, 1972; J.L. GADDIS, George F. Kennan: An American Life. New York, 2011.

      [19] A. WENDT, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics”, International Organization, 46 (1992), pp. 391–425.

      [20] K. BOOTH, Strategy and Ethnocentrism. London, 1979; C.G. REYNOLDS, “Reconsidering American Strategic History and Doctrines”. En History of the Sea: Essays on Maritime Strategies. Columbia, SC, 1989; C.S. GRAY, “Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back”. Review of International Studies, 25 (1999), pp. 49–70; R.W. BARNETT, Navy Strategic Culture: Why the Navy Thinks Differently. Annapolis, MD, 2009, p. 130.

      [21] H. A. SIMON, Models of Bounded Rationality. Cambridge, MA, 1982; H. CROWTHER-HEYCK, Herbert A. Simon: The Bounds of Reason in America. Baltimore, MD, 2005.

      [22] J. P. CLARK, Preparing for War: The Emergence of the Modern US Army, 1815–1917. Cambridge, MA, 2017.

      [23] A. FORREST, The Legacy of the French Revolutionary Wars: The Nation-in-Arms in French Republican Memory. Cambridge, 2009.

      [24] R. I. FROST, análisis de J.P. LEDONNE, The Grand Strategy of the Russian Empire, 1650–1831. Oxford, 2004, English Historical Review, 121 (2006), p. 850.

      [25] LEDONNE, The Grand Strategy of the Russian Empire, pp. vii–viii.

      [26] A. JOHNSTON, “Thinking about Strategic Culture”. International Security, 19 (1995), p. 35.

      [27] W. MARTEL, Grand Strategy in Theory and Practice: The Need for an Effective American Foreign Policy. New York, 2015.

      [28] P.H. Wilson, “Strategy and the Conduct of War”. En O. ASBACH y P. SCHRÖDER (eds.). Ashgate Research Companion to the Thirty Years’ War, Farnham, 2013, p. 277.

      [29] E. A. LUND, War for the Every Day: Generals, Knowledge, and Warfare in Early Modern Europe, 1680–1740. Westport, CT, 1999. T.C.W. BLANNING, Frederick the Great: King of Prussia. London, 2015, p. 226, escribe con toda franqueza: «Se creó un equipo del general».

      [30] P. J. SPEELMAN (ed.), Henry Lloyd and the Military Enlightenment: The Works of General Lloyd. Westport, CT, 2005, p. 13.

      [31] Sobre la «naturaleza mimética de la Guerra», véase R. Girard, R. P. HARRISON y C. HAVEN, “Shakespeare: Mimesis and Desire”. Standpoint, Dec. 2018–Jan. 2019, p. 63.

      [32] K. M. SWOPE, “Manifesting Awe: Grand Strategy and Imperial Leadership in the Ming Dynasty”. Journal of Military History, 79 (2015), p. 605.

      [33]