PLATO. Hoshang Khambatta

but in the process of reasoning about things. Therefore, knowledge and perception can not be the same. Socrates reminds Theaetetus that they did not start the discussion to find out the negative, what knowledge is not, but rather to determine what it is.

      Socrates says it may be necessary to look for knowledge in what we have called activity of the soul. Theaetetus replies that such an insight might be theirs’ and others’ own judgment. To this explanation, Socrates says that if such were the case they would have to start the inquiry all over again. Theaetetus tries to clarify his statement that it is not possible to say judgment in general, as there is both true and false judgment, but knowledge is true judgment. Socrates says that he has some difficulty with the experience of judging that is false. Socrates claims that false judgment can occur. One man judges falsely, while another judges truly. One either knows something or does not know it. When a man judges, he does so about something that he knows or something that he does not know. When a man judges falsely is he thinking that what he knows is not these things but other things, or is he ignorant of both? A man can not think that things he knows are things he does not know. So how can false judgment be possible? If everything is either something we know or do not know, false judgment is impossible.

      At this point Socrates suggests that they take up a different line of inquiry. Instead of knowing and not knowing, he proposes that perhaps they should move to being and not being. Theaetetus asks for further clarification of this distinction. Socrates says that when a man judges things that are not there, then he is judging falsely. As an example, a man sees something, yet sees nothing. Theaetetus questions the meaning of that statement. Socrates answers that a man who is seeing anything is seeing something that is. Theaetetus agrees. Socrates goes through similar examples of hearing, touching, etcetera and concludes that a man who is judging one thing is judging something that is, therefore, he is not judging nothing. However, a man who is judging nothing is not judging anything at all. Therefore, it is not possible to judge what is not, either about a thing that is or is just by itself. Hence, false judgment is something different from judging things that are not. Socrates adds that there is false judgment when, in place of one of the things that is, the person substitutes his thoughts with another thing that is, and then asserts that substitution by his own thoughts is correct. In this way that man is always judging something that is, but really he is judging one thing in place of the other. Hence, having missed the thing that was the object of his observation he can be seen to be one who judges falsely. Theaetetus verbalizes Socrates’ argument that when a man judges “ugly” instead of “beautiful” or the other way around, he is truly judging what is false. Socrates asks if he approves the suggestion that false judgment is “other judging” and asks if it is possible to have in one’s thoughts the other thing and not the thing itself. Theaetetus answers positively, so Socrates asks whether a man should be thinking of one or of both of these things? Theaetetus replies that it is essential to consider either both things together or each in turn. Socrates asks Theaetetus if he agrees that his idea of what thinking is, is the same as his own? Theaetetus requests some clarity here. Socrates says that he believes that when a soul thinks, it asks itself questions and then answers them. This question-and-answer affirms a desire, and that is called judgment. Thus, to judge is to make a statement that is addressed to oneself. When a man judge’s one thing to be another, he is telling himself that one thing is the other. Socrates asks Theaetetus if he has ever tried to persuade himself that one thing is another thing: something like “a cow must be a horse.” Theaetetus replies in the negative. No one judges ugly to be beautiful, when someone has both things in his mind as he judges. He cannot possibly say that one is the other. Socrates says that he realizes that false judgment occurs, not in relation to a perception or thought of one thing in relation to another, but in the connecting of perception and thought. Socrates suggests that false judgment is other than misapplication of thought to perception, but that, too, is a problem. At this stage of their discussion, there is either no such thing as false judgment or a man may not know what he knows. Socrates notes that this conclusion shows that those who do not know what knowledge is, should not make pronouncements about what knowing is.

      Socrates offers further examples. How can people say: “we are acquainted with” or “we are not acquainted with,” “we know,” or “we do not know,” if they are still ignorant of what knowledge is? When people say that they know something, it means that they have the knowledge of it. Socrates says that he would like to change this declaration to: “possession of knowledge.” Theaetetus questions how these two statements are different? Socrates explains that to possess is not the same as to have. He adduces the example of a man who buys a coat but is not wearing it. In that case it can be said that he possesses the coat but does not have it with him at that time. The same concept applies to knowledge. To possess knowledge is one thing, but to have knowledge is another thing. It is impossible for anyone not to possess something that he has possession of. In the same manner he cannot not fail to know something that he knows. Nonetheless, he can still make a false judgment about that knowledge because he may not have the proper knowledge of it. Socrates concludes that it is therefore impossible for a person not to know what he knows, the same way that it is impossible not to possess what one possesses. Therefore, false judgment is merely a matter of interchange of pieces of knowledge. Socrates gives another example. Suppose a jury has been persuaded on some matter that only an eye witness could have known. Then the jury comes to a decision on hearsay evidence, forming a true judgment. Albeit that the jury has decided without knowledge even though they were persuaded to come to a correct decision and did their job well. However, if true judgment is the same as knowledge, then the jury could not claim to have done well. Even the best juryman cannot form a correct judgment without knowledge. So Socrates concludes that true judgment and knowledge must be different. Once again the discussants are left at an impasse.

      Theaetetus says that he once heard someone say that knowledge is true judgment with an account, while judgment without an account is not knowledge. Socrates replies that the problem is how to distinguish between the knowable and the unknowable. He begins to describe a dream he had. In his dream he heard that the primary elements from which everything in the world is composed have no account. It is not possible to say anything else about these elements except their names but, when things are composed of primary elements they become complexes of names. Therefore the elements are unaccountable and unknowable, but they are perceived just the same. However, the complexes are both knowable and expressible and therefore can be objects of true judgment. Theaetetus agrees that this distinction was just what he had heard. Socrates now asks Theaetetus if he agrees with the statement that knowledge is true judgment with an account. To this question Theaetetus replies in the affirmative. Socrates responds that he is surprised that they have found an answer to what wise men have been seeking for years and adds that there is one point with which he does not agree. It is that the elements are unknowable but the complexes are knowable. He continues, pointing out that when these statements were made, they were used as models, letters, elements language and syllables i.e., complexes. Socrates and Theaetetus then decide to examine this point. First, Socrates confirms that they have agreed that they can give an account of the syllables but not the letters, Theaetetus concurs. Next, Socrates asks what the first syllable of his name is. Theaetetus replies SO. Socrates asks what SO is? Theaetetus replies S and O. So that is an account of a syllable. Socrates then asks for an account of the letter S. Theaetetus replies that such an account is not possible, as it is merely a letter and hence unaccountable. Socrates says that they have proved the point that a syllable is knowable but not a letter. Now Socrates asks what people mean when they speak of a syllable. If a person knows the first two letters of his name then he must know both of the letters. The person can not be ignorant of each letter and yet know the two of them without knowing either. This restriction then proves that their initial theory was wrong. Socrates suggests an alternative condition. He proposes that a complex be considered as a single form resulting from a combination of several elements or things. Thus a complex cannot have parts, otherwise the whole thing will be different from the sum of its parts. Socrates comes up with another example, this time the number six. Five plus one, two plus four, two times three, they all equal six. Then he asks whether speaking of six means speaking of it as a sum of all these numbers. In that case there is no difference between a sum and part of a whole number. This means that the result of their initial discussion concerning letters and syllables was wrong. The two of them conclude that anyone who says that something that is a complex