PLATO. Hoshang Khambatta

law, based on the concept that it is better for those who are ruled to be doing what a true expert on the laws should do. Thus if such kingly expert knowledge does exist, then neither the collection of rich people nor the masses will ever acquire such knowledge. Only the one person who possesses the expert knowledge will be called king.

      The Visitor asks which combination of traits will be the best for the people. He presents the three possibilities again: rule by monarchy, rule by a collection of wealthy people, or rule by a collection of the masses. The Visitor again goes through his process of dividing every thing into two classes. This discussion leads to the conclusion that the one who possesses the art of kingship, is a statesman and lives by the written laws. However, it is not easy to find such a person. In other words, it is difficult to find a statesman.

9 Parmenides

       Overview: This dialogue is one of the most difficult of all Plato’s body of work to understand. It has confused and confounded philosophy pundits for centuries. Perhaps the concepts behind it are no longer an active part of the human experience. Even Aristotle, Plato’s most famous pupil, refuted Plato’s Theory of Forms.

      The dialogue, Parmenides, is presented as an account of a meeting thrice removed. The initial meeting takes place at Pythodorous’ house. Here, Zeno reads his new book on Unity and Plurality in the presence of Parmenides, Socrates and a young man named Aristotle, who is not the philosopher we know. Rather, he is the one who later in life became one of the Thirty Tyrants who ruled Athens after the Peloponnesian Wars. The venerable Parmenides is sixty-five years old and Zeno, his protege, is forty years old; both are from the city of Elea. Socrates is twenty and Aristotle is younger still. The book under discussion, the “Theories of Unity and Plurality” is now lost to us. The discussion was memorized by Pythodorous, who then recited it to Antiphon, half-brother of Plato. In turn, Antiphon has memorized it and then recites it to Cephalus for the present dialogue.

      In this dialogue, Parmenides rather than the usual Socrates, who is described as young and not mature enough, is Plato’s spokesman. Here, Plato describes his Theory of Forms. Zeno has argued that, if there are many things, then all of them will be both alike (similar) and unalike (different), but such a condition is an impossible contradiction. This uncertainty disappears if one separates, on the one hand the Form of sensible things, from, on the other hand, both the Forms of alike and unalike things. So the same things can be both alike and unalike by being both in the Forms of alikeness and unalikeness. Here is a brief description of Forms: A chair is a Form but there are wooden chairs, leather chairs, metal chairs, four-legged chairs, and three-legged chairs. In one sense these types of chairs are all unalike, while in a contrary sense they still are alike, as they all are chairs, objects used to sit upon. Parmenides points out that Socrates has made the distinction between Forms and Sensibles. Socrates says that he can recognize mathematical, ethical, and aesthetic Forms such as Unity, Plurality, Goodness, and Beauty. However he is unsure about the Forms of Man, Fire and Water and those of objects such as hair, mud and dirt. Socrates is brushed aside by Parmenides as being too immature to understand.

      The discussion continues with several arguments put forward with regards to the concept of Forms in Unity and in Plurality. For example, existence in a single Form for, Largeness or Smallness. Such categories suggest that each Form is a thought existing in a soul. If this placement is correct, then a thought must be considered as something that is a Form. The argument changes as Forms are taken to be patterns in nature. Later, Parmenides says that Forms exist only in their relationship to each other. Socrates is unable to follow all these arguments, but Parmenides brushes him aside and blames his lack of understanding on his immaturity.

       The second part of the dialogue presents Aristotle as Parmenides’ interlocutor. The two of them consider the subject, “if oneness is.” If one has no beginning, center, or end, then oneness is part of all being and vice-versa. Now, if oneness is not a separate entity then it participates in everything different from an entity. So everything is partially one.

      Scholars over the years have been unable to satisfactorily characterize this dialogue. No credible understanding is available, though the topic of Forms as the theory of Unity was very dear to Plato.

      Cephalus arrives in Athens from his home in Clazomanae, and meets Adeimantus and Glaucon in the marketplace. Adeimantus asks Cephalus if there is any thing he can do for him. Cephalus answers that the real reason he made the trip was to ask for a favor from him. They talk about Antiphon, who had met a friend of Zeno’s called Pythodorous. Pythodorous can recite from memory the discussion Parmenides, Zeno, Socrates, and Aristotle once had, as he had heard it many times from Pythodorous and now Antiphon can also recite it from memory. Cephalus says that he would like to hear about that discussion. Adeimantus replies that this request should not be difficult to fulfill, and they all walk to nearby Antiphon’s house. After some initial hesitation Antiphon agrees to the request.

      Antiphon tells them that at the time of the discussion, Parmenides was about sixty-five years old, Zeno was about forty, and Socrates was twenty. All three gathered to hear about Zeno’s book, The Theories of Unity and Plurality. They also had the namesake of Aristotle in their company, the youngest of them all; the man, who later in life, after Athens lost the war with Sparta, became one of the Thirty Tyrants who ruled Athens. Parmenides was initially outside the room when Zeno started to read his book out loud but joined them later. After Zeno finished reading his book, Socrates asked him to repeat his first argument. Then he asked Zeno what he means when he says that things that are many must be both alike and unalike. Socrates states that such a classification is impossible because things that are unalike cannot be things that are like each other, nor can things that are alike be unalike. Socrates asks Zeno whether he had misunderstood his statements. Parmenides intervenes, observing that actually Zeno is saying the same thing that Socrates had previously said, only changing it around a little. Parmenides adds that Socrates, had said before, that all is one, and he gives an excellent proof for that proposition. Zeno says that this proof is not sufficient and gives several proofs of his own. Hence, Parmenides argues that with one thing being “oneness” and the other “not many,” they both in essence mean the same thing. Socrates then asks if there is a Form that is itself-byitself. A thing is itself-by-itself if it is separate from other things. If that is the case, then itself, means apart and on its own. In another sense itself-by-itself also means responsible for its own being, independent of other things. Thus, itself means because of itself and that there is one Form, itself-by-itself of likeness, with an opposite Form for what unalike is. Therefore, of the things called many they get a share of both alikeness and unalikeness. Socrates adds that it would not be astonishing if he says he is both one thing and many things at the same time: When I want to show that I am many, I point out that my right side is different from my left side and that I have upper and lower parts. On the other hand, when I want to show that I am one, I note that I am one of the seven of us now present in this room. This analysis shows that I am both one and many. Hence, both of you apparently mean practically the same thing, but it appears that what you have said is not understood by some of us.

      Zeno claims that the book is in defense of Parmenides’ argument against those who make fun of it, as many absurdities result from the argument “if it is one”. Socrates tells Zeno that he accepts this point, but then asks if there is a Form itself-by-itself of alikeness, a Form that is apart on its own. Also another Form opposite to this, which is what unalike is. He further asks how what is called “many” can get a share of these entities. When Socrates finishes his question, Parmenides praises him for his understanding. Parmenides also distinguishes certain Forms being separate, which also separate the things that partake of them with alikeness itself being something separate. Parmenides asks him if there is a Form, itself-by-itself, of the Just, the Beautiful, the Good and other such things. Socrates replies in the affirmative. Then Parmenides asks about human beings and whether there is a separate Form for them or for all those others similar to them? He extends this question and asks whether there is a Form itself of Human Being, or of Fire, or of Water? Socrates replies that he doubts that such a Form exists or that he would talk about Form in this context in the same way.

      Parmenides further asks about