.

United Fruit (later Chiquita) and Standard Fruit (Dole).

      It took a number of years before bananas could be transported economically over long distances — after all, the distance from Ecuador to London is twice as long (5,600 nm) as the distance between Ecuador and New York (2,800 nm).

      But also in the Atlantic Ocean, the transport of bananas first began on the comparatively short route from Las Palmas, Gan Canaria to Great Britain.

      “Around 1880, the incoming ships of Elder, Dempster & Co. (still under the direction of Alexander Elder and John Dempster) used the regular coal and replenishment deliveries in Las Palmas, Gran Canaria, by replenishing their cargoes with bananas. The then rare fruit became so popular in Lancashire (due to the short ripening time of a banana and the difficulties of rapid distribution) that plantation farmers, mainly British living abroad, began to join forces with Elder and Dempster and the number of banana export requests increased”. (Haws 1996, p. 2).

      A short time later, Elder, Dempster and the fruit importer Fyffe began working together, and at the end of the 19th century a project was developed with the British government to import bananas from Jamaica with the aim of developing the economy of the Caribbean colonies. A postal ship contract was signed in which the government subsidized the traffic and the shipowner guaranteed a correspondingly large number of departures. Especially outgoing cargo (from Great Britain to the Caribbean) was not easy to find, so the contract offered a certain economic security. In 1901 the time had come “The pioneering voyage in this area began in 1901 with the arrival in Bristol of the new reefer ship PORT MORANT of Sir Alfred Jones’ Imperial Direct West India Line, which carried 18,000 banana plants. (Tolerton, 2008, p. 10). Elder Dempster, as a shipping company, was not able to provide the shore-side infrastructure and the connection with the fruit merchant Fyffes was sealed by the founding of Elders & Fyffes Limited. This organization was a win-win situation for both partners, as Elders might otherwise have had a shipping competitor and Fyffes might have had a competitor in the fruit business.

      However, the business did not work out as hoped at first. Natural disasters in the exporting countries and unprofessional handling of the fruit during transport meant that the expected quantities were not available to the British market. The solution was a cooperation with the US-American United Fruit Company, in which the latter took a 45 % share in Elders & Fyffes — thus keeping the company British. United Fruit also opened up other export markets and business was not limited to Jamaica.

      With the death of Sir Alfred Jones in 1909, the group was reorganised. Sir Owen Philipps, who through his King Line and the Royal Mail Group built up the largest shipping empire in the world, acquired Elder, Dempster & Co. and incorporated it into his group. The trading interests of Elders & Fyffes went 100 % to United Fruit in the United States when the postal ship contract expired in 1913. (Green, 1982, p. 29ff)

      The First World War brought the traffic of bananas and other refrigerated cargo across the Atlantic to a standstill.

      After the war, the export of bananas took a leap. From America’s exporting countries, the quantity rose from 8.4 million perennials (1912) to 29 million in the last year before the Great Depression. (1929) — after all by 345 % or 7.5 % annually.

      After the ships of the German merchant fleet were either lost in the war or had to be delivered to the Entente under the Treaty of Versailles, there was no refrigerated fleet in Germany for many years. Anyway, before the war the fleet was only being built up and the ships did not come to a peace mission under German flag.

      The reefer fleet only picked up after the National Socialists seized power in Germany — and here above all with the support of the US American United Fruit, because the extreme rearmament, which led to the Second World War, forced a concentration on armaments, i. e. “cannons instead of butter”. The Bremen fruit importer Gustav Scipio found the solution. “In 1935, when in the system of foreign exchange control the handsome foreign currency allotments for the import of bananas almost ceased to exist, Scipio succeeded in reaching an agreement with the United Fruit Company on a compensation deal, which included the provision of six refrigerated ships under German flag and with German crew: founding of the shipping company Union Handels- u. Schiffahrts-Gesellschaft mbH with Scipios holding 33 % of the capital”. (Kiekel, 2010, p. 461). Rübner expresses it even more clearly: “Such barter and compensation transactions, such as the export of heavy cargo and high-value finished goods to Central America and the West Indian Islands in exchange for tropical fruit (mainly bananas), were handled by Union Handels- und Schiffahrtsgesellschaft mbH, which was entered in Bremen’s commercial register on 18 January 1936. Hamburg and Bremen business circles and the United Fruit Co., Boston each contributed one third of the total founding capital of RM 1 million. The company’s fleet consisted of six cargo ships with a total of 29,307 GRT, four of which were older English-owned refrigerated ships (Elders & Fyffes Ltd., which belonged to the United Fruit Group) and two steamers from Deutsche Seeverkehrs AD “Midgard”, Nordenham, which built the ships on behalf of the Bremen export company Scipio & Co. disposition. “The working objective of the new company” was “to achieve a foreign exchange surplus under all circumstances. [...]. It was also agreed that the four older foreign steamers would be replaced by German newbuildings, which would then be handed over to United Fruit in exchange for a corresponding quantity of bananas. (Rübner, 2005, p. 350)

      In general, it was important for National Socialist Germany to sell abroad rather than to buy from there — including sea transport services. This promoted the establishment of a fleet of refrigerated ships. Especially the shipping companies Laeisz, H. Schuldt and Rob. M. Sloman — besides the Union — began to get involved in this segment.

      But this upswing was short-lived in the end, because with the beginning of the fighting in 1939, Germany’s fruit imports from the traditional countries came to a standstill. This also applied to Great Britain to a certain extent, which until 1939 was affected by disruptions in supplies from Spain as a result of the Spanish Civil War. But in general, imports in 1939 had only decreased slightly — despite a hurricane in Jamaica and the outbreak of Panama Disease (a fungal disease), 288,000 long tonnes were still imported — compared to 305,000 long tonnes in 1938 (Davies, 1990, pp. 166/260).

      The temporary “end” then came in 1940: “On 9 November 1940 the Ministry of Food decided — without prior consultation — to ban bananas completely. Lord Wolton, the minister in question, claimed that it was better to supply a single fruit than to allow a poor supply of several fruits” (Davies, 1990, p. 166).

      It took until September 1945 for the import ban to be lifted. And even though the TILAPA of Elders & Fyffes arrived in Avonmouth in December of that year with ten million bananas on board, it took until 1955 before the import volume of 1938 was exceeded — simply because there were no corresponding ships, since many of the units fell victim to the war and the German reparations could not compensate for this.

      In the period after the Second World War, there was a structural change in refrigerated shipping. While until then most shipowners had also been importers or — within the vertical group structure — producers, more and more “independent” shipping companies came into the picture with their fleets of reefer vessels, most of which had their headquarters in (Western) Europe. German and Scandinavian shipowners are particularly noteworthy here. While in 1953 British and US-American shipping companies were leading, only twelve years later a decisively different picture emerged. In an article published in 1965 in the shipping journal “Hansa” on the situation of banana shipping (Suhren, 1965, p. 2179), it becomes clear that the dominant merchant fleet is the German (12.5 million cubic feet = 18 % of the total fleet) followed by the Swedish (10.4 million = 15 %) and the French (7 million = 10 %). In all these countries the independent shipping companies play the leading role. They are followed by the USA and Great Britain, whose fleets are dominated by the ships of the large fruit companies United Fruit (Chiquita) and Standard Fruit (Dole).

      In the period that followed, the large fruit companies increasingly divested themselves of their ships, as the independent shipowners had enough reefer vessels on offer, thus reducing the capital risk for the companies — after all, shipping has always been a very capital-intensive business. Fruit producers were able to obtain ships on the market and rely on the competition among shipowners