1 Recce, volume 2. Alexander Strachan

attended the operational briefings at COMOPS. Consequently, he could pass on all information to MI and Special Forces. He had free access to various units such as the SAS, the Selous Scouts and the Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI) as well as the air force squadrons. This enabled him to facilitate the Selous Scouts’ and the SAS’s liaison with Special Forces (Recces).

      In the lead-up to the first free election in Rhodesia-Zimbabwe, he could already draw up a contingency plan for rendering assistance if the new government should embark on retaliatory actions. Bestbier regularly flew to South Africa where he held discussions with generals Malan, Loots and Van der Westhuizen, Chief of Staff Intelligence (CSI). At the same time, he kept his personal planning up to date in case he were to be exposed as a representative of the South African security forces.

      After the withdrawal of the South Africans – the Recces and air force pilots – Bestbier stayed behind in Rhodesia for a while and still attended the briefings at COMOPS. During his visits to South Africa in that period, his discussions focused specifically on how Special Forces could accommodate the Rhodesians – the SAS and the Selous Scouts in particular – in South Africa after independence.

      It was decided to fly sensitive items and equipment out of the country from Fylde airbase. Four C-160 and C-130 cargo planes of the SA Air Force were used for this purpose. The Rhodesian personnel had to drive to South Africa under their own steam. Members of the Selous Scouts would go to 5 RC at Phalaborwa, while the SAS would be accommodated at 1 RC in Durban. The motivation for the removal of the sensitive items and equipment was to hamper the ‘new’ Rhodesian special forces – now Robert Mugabe’s defence force – in their deployment possibilities.

      The Rhodesian conflict came to an end in December 1979 after constitutional negotiations between the Rhodesian government, Britain, Mugabe and Nkomo at Lancaster House in London. All the parties signed the Lancaster House Agreement, and Rhodesia was temporarily placed under the control of Britain and the Commonwealth.

      Bestbier was still in Rhodesia at the time of the election in March 1980 that took place under the supervision of Britain and the Commonwealth. Following Zanu-PF’s election victory, Robert Mugabe was inaugurated as Zimbabwe’s prime minister on 18 April 1980. Mugabe called in all the senior officers, including Bestbier, and requested them to stay on and to support the country. Bestbier wore his full Rhodesian uniform every day and passed himself off as a Rhodesian.

      Although South Africa had lent assistance during the first democratic election, the relationship with the RSA was very tense. The expectation in Rhodesia was that South Africa would intervene if the outcome of the election was not to their liking. This hostility had built up gradually and intensified after the election, with the result that the majority of South African citizens, as well as numerous Rhodesians, left the country. All these factors contributed to a further heightening of tension in the country.

      Loots and Van der Westhuizen instructed Bestbier to be prepared ‘to withdraw at great speed’.

      ‘I carried enough money and my passport with me at all times,’ Bestbier recounts. ‘One morning in August 1980, just after the morning session at COMOPS, my friend at Special Branch phoned me. All he said was, “André, get out … Now!” I took my leave and said nothing further, only Gen. Walls knew. Apart from saying goodbye to me, he didn’t say anything. With my hand luggage, I rushed to the airport in Salisbury where I bought a ticket for an SAA flight. The passengers were already boarding. I was the very last person to board the plane.’

      At the airport, Bestbier had hidden the keys of the liaison officers’ car – an old Peugeot14 that had been put at their disposal – under the seat. On landing in South Africa, he requested his contact at the embassy in Zimbabwe by phone to remove the car. He also contacted his secretary at COMOPS and learnt that 20 minutes after the plane had taken off, Mugabe’s new Special Branch had arrived at the office to arrest him. They had found out that Bestbier was a South African officer who had supported the old Rhodesia.

      In Pretoria, he briefed the staff of CSI, Gen. Loots and Gen. Malan on the situation.

      After his stint in Rhodesia, André Bestbier was deployed to the Special Forces HQ as SO1 Ops15 under Hans Möller (then the SSO Ops Army at the Special Forces HQ) in August 1980. This was where he was summoned to Gen. Loots’s office one morning in February 1981. Loots informed him that he had to go to 1 RC in Durban to take over the command of the Recces from Cmdt. Jakes Swart.16

      Bestbier regards his transfer to 1 RC (and later 1 RR) as the best thing that could have happened in his life because it opened up completely new horizons for him. Two years later, on 30 March 1983, he took over the command of 1 RR from Ewald Olckers and was 1 RR’s commander for five years, until December 1988.

      He excelled at organisational and management level. During his tenure as commander, there was a revolutionary change in the procurement of high-quality equipment as well as extremely advanced equipment for the Recces. He looked after the welfare of all levels of his staff, including signals, medical and maintenance staff and every other department in the unit. In his younger days, he also made his mark on the sports field by representing the Springboks and Free State as hooker.

      During 1977 Bestbier’s predecessor as commander at 1 RC, Cmdt. Jakes Swart, was doing the SA Army’s senior command and staff course in Pretoria. As a result, he was not part of the initial planning process in respect of cooperation between 1 RC and the SAS. Hence he did not have contact with the SAS’s commander, Brian Robinson, or the Selous Scouts’ commander, Ron Reid-Daly, at the beginning. Swart did, however, have considerable contact with Lt. Gen. Walls, especially during Operation Bootlace/Uric that was executed in Mozambique’s Gaza province after his staff course (see part 1, chapter 7).

      The SAS had a great shortage of manpower, and the deployments of 1 RC, 2 RC and 5 RC strengthened their hand in this regard. The Recces assisted with area operations; 1 RC operated in vast areas of responsibility in the Gaza province and dominated the areas that had been allocated to them. 1 Recce not only cooperated with the SAS in Gaza but also conducted quite a number of successful operations in support of the Mozambican resistance movement Renamo.

      2

      Operation Acrobat17

      Aggressive action on the Russian Front

      ‘The terrs were walking on our tracks, and luckily we had made a dogleg before we lay up. One of the terrs’ gun barrels caught on a branch and the sound alerted us. We opened fire, and shot some of them dead and wounded a few.’

      This is how SW Fourie recalls a fatal contact in early February 1978 when Lt. Kokkie du Toit’s team sabotaged the railway line in the vicinity of Madulo Pan in Mozambique’s Gaza province. Afterwards they moved to a drop zone (DZ) for a ration resupply. Near the DZ the team assumed an ambush position. Lt. Douw Steyn, the team’s demolition specialist, laid a few Claymore mines on their tracks and linked them with electrical cords to the firing device. A Frelimo group unexpectedly walked into the ambush position, and Steyn detonated the mines.

      A fierce firefight ensued and once it subsided, Du Toit deployed his team in a formation to clear the killing zone. They swept the bush in an extended line in search of wounded Frelimo soldiers – but failed to spot one who had crawled under a bush.

      ‘When the fire stopped, Kokkie walked forward and returned with one of their AK-47s,’ recounts Fourie. ‘He showed me that a branch had broken off in the barrel – the terrs probably thought the barrel would explode in the face of anyone who fired it. Then Kokkie signalled that we had to get ready to move. We were lying behind a thick tree, and he moved round it on the left and I on the right. He gave another signal leftwards … it was for the guys to spread out because we were going to sweep the killing zone.’

      The wounded Frelimo soldier under the bush easily identified Du Toit as the team leader since he gave the hand signals and controlled the team. The man fired a single shot at close range and hit him in the side. Kokkie du Toit died before his body struck the ground.

      ‘When Kokkie turned to the front, the wounded terr shot him. He spun around and fell behind me. We applied mouth-to-mouth resuscitation, but he was already dead. The bullet