1 Recce, volume 2. Alexander Strachan

RC, 2 RC, 4 RC and 5 RC were deployed in Rhodesia. From here they were deployed to Mozambique with a view to disrupting the enemy by means of fighting patrols and also obstructing their logistical support. In Gaza they concentrated mainly on the rail and power lines between Malvernia and Maputo and on the adjacent road. The Recces’ other targets were the armed observation and machine-gun posts that were deployed in an anti-aircraft role to attack Dakota infiltrations.

      Drop zones for parachute landings were unmarked, and the jumpers usually landed in trees – it was actually miraculous how few injuries were sustained. One of the most serious was that suffered by Lt. Douw Steyn who fell through the trees in a sandalwood forest. During the landing, a dry branch penetrated his Waxie boot and stuck into his foot. The injury was of such a nature that he subsequently had to be evacuated.

      During one of the parachute infiltrations in January 1978, Sgt. Jack Greeff landed among stones in the Lebombo Mountains and tore his ankle ligaments. But he held out and accompanied the team to their target, a railway line, and was only flown out later. Other parachuting injuries included that of Cpl. FL (Frik) Gouws, who suffered a branch through his thigh on landing and also had to be evacuated.

      Recce and SAS teams were deployed without support for about seven to fourteen days and sometimes longer. They would then either be withdrawn or relieved by others, or resupplied for another seven to fourteen days. Their tactic was to lay mines on a road and attack the enemy by means of ambushes. It produced the desired results: when the enemy moved by road, their vehicles were protected by at least a company of infantry soldiers on foot. Consequently, the enemy always had to deploy a large number of troops along the road, which limited other deployments.

      As a rule, there were casualties within the ranks of the enemy during contacts. The losses curbed their combativeness and speed, which then gave the Recces the opportunity to withdraw to a safer area. These were invariably high-risk deployments that were largely instrumental in securing south-eastern Rhodesia and the north-eastern border of South Africa.

      During December 1977, members of Bravo Group 1 RC under the leadership of Capt. Hannes Venter commenced intensive training. The group was informed that they were preparing for an Eheke-type19 operation against Swapo in Angola. But that was yet another of the cover stories that were regularly concocted for the sake of secrecy.

      To the group’s great surprise, on their arrival at Durban’s air force base they found two Dakota planes waiting to transport them. Normally, a C-130 or C-160 plane would be used for movement to South West Africa.

      In the case of one deployment, for instance, the cover story was that the group had to go to the Oudtshoorn area for retraining. To lend more credence to the cover story, the big HF-radio antenna on the Bluff was even turned in Oudtshoorn’s direction by the signallers. Much effort went into making the cover stories seem completely credible in order to deflect attention (including that of their own personnel) from the real mission at hand.

      The group took off from Durban’s air force base in the two Dakotas, and in the course of the flight they were ordered to change into other uniforms. Instead of the customary Swapo or Eastern Bloc uniforms, the familiar Rhodesian camouflage uniforms, which had been packed in sealed cardboard boxes, were distributed. For the first time it came home to the group that they were actually headed for Rhodesia. An oversight during the first deployment was that the men had not been issued with Rho­desian dollars, and they had to exchange rands for dollars in Rhodesia. In subsequent deployments, regard was specifically paid to this aspect.

      During the flight Venter informed the group that they were to be deployed with the SAS and from now on had to speak only English for security purposes. Late that afternoon the two Dakotas landed at Buffalo Range, where they were immediately welcomed and briefed by the SAS intelligence officer and SAS commander. The Tactical HQs of 1 Recce and the SAS were at Buffalo Range, but they were moved to Mabalauta on the banks of the Nuanetzi River. This was mainly for security reasons and because the distances to the operational area were shorter and reaction times faster from Mabalauta.

      Mabalauta was a semi-permanent tented camp from where the Recces and the SAS launched operations into Mozambique’s Gaza province. There were several trenches around the base. The tents stood under big trees, and a medical post had been set up in a tent of 4m × 4m. The smallish ablution block was a permanent structure.

      The base was informally divided in two, with the Recces and the SAS each having their own section. Each group also had its own operations tent from where the operational commanders controlled the operations. The men mixed socially, however, and it was customary to gather at a mortar pit between the SAS and Recce sections of the camp after last light and sink a few beers.

      The Nuanetzi River (today the Mwenezi River) was also a pleasant recreational spot, and the men would go to wash there towards late afternoon. Mabalauta was known for its beautiful sunrises and sunsets. It was as if the red-tinted western sky brought a great calm over the base in the evenings. Despite it being a dusty place, the base was nonetheless a very welcome sight when the helicopters dropped the operators there after deployments.

      Recce teams operated independently and infiltrated by parachute, after which they were extracted by Alouette helicopters. The objective of the deployments was to attack the enemy with aggressive fighting patrols and disrupt their logistical support. Venter’s time was largely devoted to command-and-control. Hence he spent much of his day in a Rhodesian Lynx aircraft in which he criss-crossed the Russian Front. The Lynx, with its old-fashioned push-pull configuration, was extremely noisy. The pilots were always fresh and were constantly rotated after two weeks’ duty on the Russian Front.

      Day after day, Venter flew Telstar20 to provide radio relay support and do reconnaissance. He provided top cover for Alouette helicopters and Dakotas when they flew in with paratroops and exfiltrated them again. The Lynx was armed with two .303 Browning machine guns that were mounted above the cockpit as well as with two 37-mm Sneb rocket launchers with four rockets on each wing. On a few occasions they attacked vehicles east of Mapai, and frequently provided air support during Dakota parachute infiltrations when the Dakotas drew fire.

      Dakotas invariably drew fire over the Limpopo valley where Russian DShK 12,7-mm machine guns were deployed. The Lynx would then dive-bomb the artillery positions and bombard them with the ‘heavy’ weapons. This had the desired effect, as the Lynx would become the target and the Dakota could fly on in much less danger.

      To provide top cover for the Alouette helicopters, Venter and the pilot had to evade the 23-mm anti-aircraft cannons that were deployed at the railway stations and at Mapai. They assisted the Alouette pilots with navigation because the latter only followed the railway line. When they neared a station, Venter and the pilot in the Lynx would guide the Alouettes around the station and back to the railway line once they had passed it.

      The effective ceiling height of the 23-mm anti-aircraft cannons was 1 400 m, and the Telstar flew just above that. Almost every day they saw 23-mm warheads exploding around and below them, which was nerve-racking. In cloudy weather they would fly just below the clouds. As soon as they drew fire they would bounce up into the clouds, knowing full well that they were still within striking range.

      In the Telstar, they wore very old parachutes and sat on the canopies. Venter was in full combat dress and had his AK-47 on his body, and he and the pilot were ready to jump if necessary. But he did not know how he would get out of the plane in such an event because of everything he had on his body. As a result of the many hours in the air, Venter was by this time capable of handling the plane himself if an emergency situation arose. According to him, he was able to control the plane up to the final approach run.

      The pilots with whom he flew were young and daring. So, too, were the Alouette pilots, who were fearless and conducted emergency extractions under extremely dangerous conditions. They would sometimes run out of fuel and land in the bush without knowing exactly where they were. At times it could even be in Mozambique. The Lynx would then guide Alouettes with fuel to the stranded Alouette. Quite a few pilots and crewmen of the SA Air Force flew Alouette helicopters during the Rhodesian conflict. One of them was Capt. Dave Atkinson, who was