1 Recce, volume 2. Alexander Strachan

people were extracted. It was already 21:45 when the helicopters finally made radio contact with Blaauw. John Church, a good friend of his, was the mission leader. ‘My call sign was Moby Dick, and John’s was Retriever. “Okay, Moby Dick, we are 10 minutes out,” he said. “Retriever, I have a problem, I am stuck with 31 people,” I informed him.’ Church retorted: ‘Geez, this is a chopper, not a London bus.’ Couldn’t they make a plan, Blaauw inquired, even if they had to get rid of some fuel?

      ‘John said they would see what they could do, and there they came … he also said we needed to hurry because he saw fires all around us and it looked as if we were surrounded.’ With that, the helicopters came in to land. Blaauw took charge on the ground and divided them into two groups of fifteen each. Only 27 of Savimbi’s 31 could go along. Savimbi, Ana and the Frenchman were in Blaauw’s group.

      When the two helicopters landed, Blaauw went forward to meet them. John said it was okay, they would drain fuel from the two Pumas. The process took a full ten minutes, and Blaauw’s nerves were on edge. If they could only airlift the group to Omauni and rebunker there or even sleep over – they just had to get out of the area as quickly as possible.

      When enough fuel had been dumped, Church signalled that the helicopters could take off. ‘I had never thought a ten-minute wait could feel so long. Fortunately, everything went off in a very orderly fashion as far as Savimbi and his officers were concerned. Chiwale stayed behind in the bush, and Ben Ben and Alcides Sakala were in the second group. Those who had been left behind were now in a very desperate situation, but I suppose that is the nature of war.’

      From the air, Blaauw saw fires burning everywhere. “And they were not veld fires, one could see immediately that there was a human presence. We turned south and then we were off.’ At a point Savimbi called Queiroz to him. He wanted to know from him what the problem was; why were they not flying, since the helicopter was stationary in the air? ‘I told him he did not have to worry, the chopper was indeed flying. But the Unitas were convinced that the chopper was just hovering in one spot.’

      Blaauw, who was wearing a headset, heard Church say they were near ‘the white road’. ‘It was a whitish limestone road and the moonlight shone brightly on it. The moment we flew over the road, we drew fire and I saw the light streaks of the tracer bullets flying past us.’ Church enquired from Blaauw where Savimbi was. ‘He is sitting right here with me in the chopper, what is the problem?’ asked Blaauw, whereupon Church informed him that the second helicopter had been hit.

      Blaauw suggested that they first land with both helicopters at Omauni – the damage to the one that had been hit was not too serious. They could leave the damaged chopper there and fly with Savimbi to Rundu. When they landed at Omauni, Blaauw realised he had a major problem on his hands. ‘32 Battalion’s troops at Omauni were all former FNLA soldiers. And here I was arriving right in their midst with the bunch of Unitas. That was asking for trouble. A confrontation between the two groups was almost inevitable.

      ‘“Listen,” I told the commander, “we now have a problem because the Unitas in the chopper have to stay over in your base tonight. We can’t all fly in one chopper to Rundu. You should please arrange for all your white officers and non-commissioned officers to sleep between the groups so that fighting does not erupt between the two factions.”’

      The second helicopter had bullet holes just in front of the tail rotor, and the flight engineer said it was unserviceable. They then flew to Rundu in the other one. On their arrival, Blaauw and the liaison officer organised accommodation for Savimbi in the small Unita base at Rundu while they themselves were given a place to sleep at Rundu’s military base. Eksteen was immediately taken to hospital where he was admitted with malaria. In fact, in the bush he had been in such a bad way that four Unitas had to carry him along on a makeshift stretcher consisting of a groundsheet between two poles. His condition had worsened to such an extent that when they landed at Rundu it looked as if he was slipping into a coma.

      Early the next morning they were already with Savimbi. He thanked the Recces repeatedly for what they had done. A technical team was flown to Omauni to repair the damaged helicopter, after which the rest of the Unita group were also brought to Rundu.

      ‘I handed Savimbi over officially to Col. Flip du Preez, and we then said goodbye to him and wished him all the best. He was quite overcome with emotion when he thanked us once again. We had no further contact with him, as our departure from Rundu back to South Africa was imminent.’6

      * * *

      According to Thirion and Blaauw, Savimbi’s rescue had far-reaching consequences for the Bush War. Without the charismatic and eloquent Savimbi, Unita would have been leaderless because there was no one of similar stature to take over from him. The Unita grouping would probably have splintered into separate gangs and poachers with no visible cohesive factor, as well as no external support.

      Because Savimbi and his leadership element were snatched away from under the enemy’s noses, so to speak, Unita could develop and grow as an ally of South Africa. Had the enemy captured Savimbi, they would certainly have locked him up or maybe sentenced him to death. His capture would have changed the entire situation around the Bush War. With Savimbi at liberty, he was able to remobilise Unita and take over the whole of eastern Angola. This kept Swapo away from the South West African border and consequently prolonged the war.

      According to Blaauw, MI later confirmed that the MPLA had mentioned to a military intelligence agent in London that they would undoubtedly have captured Savimbi if the South Africans had not extracted him that evening. They knew where he was and would have struck the following morning.

      PART 1

      Operations in Rhodesia

      1

      SADF deploys liaison officers in Rhodesia

      The Rhodesian Bush War was also known as the Second Chi­mu­renga7 and the Zimbabwe War of Liberation. This civil war lasted from July 1964 to December 1979.

      On the one side of the conflict was Ian Smith’s Rhodesian government and later Bishop Abel Muzorewa’s Zimbabwe-Rhodesian government. On the other side of the spectrum were the opposing groups: Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (Zanla) and Joshua Nkomo’s Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (Zipra).

      In March 1979 Lt. Gen. George Peter Walls GLM DCD MBE became commander of the Rhodesian armed forces. The Rhodesian Bush War was still in full swing. On the government’s side, it was organised and controlled from Combined Operations (COMOPS) that divided Rhodesia into seven operational areas. In each area a Joint Operational Centre (JOC) was established, which planned and controlled operations.

      Gen. Magnus Malan, Chief of the SADF, and Walls had identified the need for a South African liaison officer to serve on Walls’ staff (he was then still commander of Combined Operations). Consequently, from June 1977 to August 1980 SADF liaison officers were deployed at regular intervals at COMOPS in Salisbury (today Harare). At the time of the deployment of the liaison officers, Col. Minnaar Fourie was already settled in Salisbury as military attaché. He had to keep Gen. Malan abreast of the military and political situation in the country.

      The liaison officers’ duties involved personal liaison with Malan and Walls, as well as briefings regarding planned cross-border operations and air support for upcoming cross-border operations. They also had to take care of maritime support for east coast operations and the acquisition of special equipment for the Special Air Service (SAS), the Selous Scouts and the Special Branch.8 The liaison officers were at the same time closely involved with the provision of non-conventional weapons.

      * * *

      Col. Hans Möller, a paratrooper and former commander of 1 Parachute Battalion, was the first South African liaison officer to be deployed to Rhodesia. He was attached to Military Intelligence (MI) at the time. The liaison officers all stayed at the King George VI officers’ mess (KG VI) in the suburb of Borrowdale in Salisbury. Their accommodation was a secluded luxurious one-bedroom flat in the garden of the officers’ mess that was known as the ‘King George VI VIP Flat’.

      For