Lifespan Development. Tara L. Kuther

with their memories. These can include conversations with parents and adults, exposure to media, and sometimes intentional suggestions directed at changing the child’s view of what transpired. Children’s vulnerability to suggestion is discussed in Applying Developmental Science.

      Theory of Mind

      Over the childhood years, thinking becomes more complex. In particular, children become increasingly aware of the process of thinking and of their own thoughts. Theory of mind refers to children’s awareness of their own and other people’s mental processes. This awareness of the mind can be considered under the broader concept of metacognition, knowledge of how the mind works and the ability to control the mind (Lockl & Schneider, 2007). Let’s explore these concepts.

      Young children’s theory of mind grows and changes between the ages of 2 and 5 (Bower, 1993; Flavell, Green, & Flavell, 1995; Wellman, 2017). For example, 3-year-old children understand the difference between thinking about a cookie and having a cookie. They know that having a cookie means that one can touch, eat, or share it, while thinking about a cookie does not permit such actions (Astington, 1993). Young children also understand that a child who wants a cookie will be happy upon receiving one and sad upon not having one (Moses, Coon, & Wusinich, 2000). Similarly, they understand that a child who believes he is having hot oatmeal for breakfast will be surprised upon receiving cold spaghetti (Wellman & Banerjee, 1991). Theory of mind is commonly assessed by examining children’s abilities to understand that people can hold different beliefs about an object or event.

      Culture shapes children’s thinking. Samoan and Vanuatu cultures deemphasize internal mental states as explanations for behavior. Children are not exposed to discussions about the mind and they get little experience considering other people’s thoughts.

      age fotostock / Alamy Stock Photo

      False Belief

      Young children do not yet understand people can hold different beliefs and that some may be incorrect. Three-year-old children tend to perform poorly on false-belief tasks, tasks that require them to understand that someone can have an incorrect belief. In a classic false-belief task, children who are presented with a Band-Aid box that contains pencils rather than Band-Aids will show surprise but tend to believe that other children will share their knowledge and expect the Band-Aid box to hold pencils (Flavell, 1993), similar to Figure 7.6. The children do not yet understand that the other children hold different, false beliefs. In addition, the children will claim that they knew all along that the Band-Aid box contained pencils (Birch, 2005). They confuse their present knowledge with their memories for prior knowledge and have difficulty remembering ever having believed something that contradicts their current view (Bernstein, Atance, Meltzoff, & Loftus, 2007).

      Some researchers, however, assert that young children are much more competent than they appear. Research with infants using preferential looking and habituation tasks has suggested an understanding of false belief as early as 15 months of age (Scott & Baillargeon, 2017). Similar to arguments regarding object permanence in infancy and egocentrism in early childhood (see Chapter 5), it may be that children understand the concept (that another person will understand that the Band-Aid box contains bandages, not pencils) but may have difficulty communicating their understanding to the researcher (Helming, Strickland, & Jacob, 2014). Yet many researchers counter that false-belief findings with infants reflect perceptual preferences, that is, a desire to look at one object over another, not theory of mind (Heyes, 2014). Indeed, the research to date suggests that theory of mind as evidenced by false-belief tasks emerges at about 3 years of age and shifts reliably between 3 and 4 years of age (Grosse Wiesmann, Friederici, Singer, & Steinbeis, 2017). By age 3, children can understand that two people can believe different things (Rakoczy, Warneken, & Tomasello, 2007). Four-year-old children can understand that people who are presented with different versions of the same event develop different beliefs (Eisbach, 2004). By age 4 or 5, children become aware that they and other people can hold false beliefs (Moses et al., 2000).

      Figure 7.6 False-Belief Task

      Source: Nathan Davidson

      Advanced cognition is needed for children to learn abstract concepts such as belief. Performance on false-belief tasks, such as the Band-Aid task, is associated with measures of executive function, the abilities that enable complex cognitive functions such as planning, decision making, and goal setting (Doenyas, Yavuz, & Selcuk, 2018; Sabbagh, Xu, Carlson, Moses, & Lee, 2006). Advances in executive functioning facilitate children’s abilities to reflect on and learn from experience and promote development of theory of mind (Benson, Sabbagh, Carlson, & Zelazo, 2013). For example, one longitudinal study following children from ages 2 to 4 found that advances in executive functioning predicted children’s performance on false-belief tasks (Hughes & Ensor, 2007). Children’s performance on false-belief tasks is closely related with language development and competence in sustaining conversations (Hughes & Devine, 2015).

      Context and Theory of Mind

      The contexts in which children are embedded contribute to their developing understanding of the mind. Children in many countries, including Canada, India, Thailand, Norway, China, and the United States, show the onset and development of theory of mind between the ages of 3 and 5 (Callaghan et al., 2005; Wellman, Fang, & Peterson, 2011). However, social and contextual factors may influence the specific pattern of theory of mind development. North American and Chinese children develop theory of mind in early childhood, but along different paths (Wellman, 2017). Chinese culture emphasizes collectivism, commonality, and interdependence among community members. Chinese parents’ comments to children tend to refer to knowing and shared knowledge that community members must learn. U.S. parents emphasize Western values such as individuality and independence. They comment more on thinking, including differences in thoughts among individuals. U.S. children, and other children from individualist cultures, develop an understanding of beliefs before knowledge. Chinese children tend to show the reverse pattern: an early understanding of the knowledge aspect of theory of mind and later come to understand beliefs (Wellman, 2017). Children from Iran and Turkey follow a similar pattern in theory of mind development (Shahaeian, Peterson, Slaughter, & Wellman, 2011).

      Everyday conversations aid children in developing a theory of mind because such conversations tend to center on and provide examples of mental states and their relation with behavior. When parents and other adults speak with children about mental states, emotions, and behaviors, as well as discuss causes and consequences, children develop a more sophisticated understanding of other people’s perspectives (Devine & Hughes, 2018; Pavarini, Hollanda Souza, & Hawk, 2012). In addition, siblings provide young children with opportunities for social interaction, pretend play, and practice with deception. Children with siblings perform better on false-belief tests than do only children (McAlister & Peterson, 2013). Success in false-belief attribution tasks is most frequent in children who are the most active in shared pretend play (Schwebel, Rosen, & Singer, 1999).

      Children’s interactions with people in their immediate contexts can also influence the development of theory of mind. Children can be trained in perspective taking. For example, when children are presented with a series of objects that look like a certain thing but are actually something else (candle and apple) and are shown the appearance and real states of the objects, along with explanation, 3-year-olds showed improvements on false-belief tasks (Lohmann & Tomasello, 2003). Discussion emphasizing the existence of a variety of possible perspectives in relation to an object can improve performance in false-belief tasks—dialogue can facilitate the development of theory of mind (Bernard & Deleau, 2007). Other studies have engaged North American and European children in discussion about the thoughts,