The New Irish Constitution: An Exposition and Some Arguments. Various

General and Vital Statistics.

      (2) Deeds.

      (3) Titles.

      (4) General Records.

      (5) Friendly Societies.

      (6) Registry of Receipts and Issue of Letters.

      Group IX.—General Purposes.

      (1) Sea and Inland Fisheries.

      (2) Labour Questions, other than Housing.

      (3) Scientific Investigations.

      (4) Thrift and Credit Societies; Agricultural Banks.

      (5) Quit Rents.68 (Woods and Forests).

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      (6) Temporary Commissions of Enquiry.

      (7) Stationery.

      (8) Office of Arms.69

      Before proceeding to discuss the method by which the control of the Legislature may be most easily and effectively established over these various departments, I wish to consider whether any of them should be temporarily reserved from that control. There is undoubtedly, a strong feeling among Irish Unionists, and among many moderate Nationalists, that, if Home Rule does come, Judicial Patronage, and the control over the Police, should be in the beginning reserved or excepted from the general transfer of control to the new Government which would take place when the Bill becomes law. On the other hand, the Nationalist Party are, I understand, anxious that there should be no delay in transferring the judicial patronage. They have been dissatisfied with the exercise of judicial patronage in the past: and they wish for a distribution more to their liking in the immediate future.

      I have myself no fear that judicial patronage will be misused to the detriment of any party by the Irish Government of the future; but Irish Unionists are apprehensive on the point; and in my opinion something should be done to allay their fears. If the Bill should contain provisions similar to Clause 19 of the Bill of 1893, which maintained in the Irish Supreme Court two judges with salaries charged on the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom, appointed by the King in Council, and removable only by his Order, the Unionist apprehensions might be, to some extent at all events, removed. But as the Financial Provisions of the coming Bill will probably be different [pg 064] from those of the Bill of 1893, a clause like Clause 19 of that Bill may not be inserted.70

      In that case, I think it would tend to the establishment of general confidence if the patronage in connexion with judicial appointments were, during the transition period, reserved and administered, as at present, by the Lord-Lieutenant. I think it would be good policy to abstain from every transfer of authority from the Lord-Lieutenant to which the Irish minority may at the outset reasonably object. There must be a period of transition—be it seven years or ten years or even longer—during which the minority will be suspicious of such change as I am now concerned with. I would let these suspicions wear themselves out, as in time they are sure to do with the growth of further knowledge and of that saner outlook on Imperial and Irish affairs, which collaboration towards common objects brings with it. It seems to me that in the reassurance of opponents and hesitating well-wishers, and even in the immunity, for a time, from the pressure and annoyances of this class of patronage, the new Irish Government may well find, in its infancy, satisfaction for the temporary withholding of a part of its prerogatives. It might be an instruction to the Lord-Lieutenant, that, during the transition period, (which need not be long) the wishes of the Irish ministry, in regard to appointments to judicial vacancies, should be ascertained and fully considered before the vacancies are filled.

      But if this view cannot prevail then I suggest that during the transition period the patronage in connexion with the Supreme Court should, at all events, [pg 065] be reserved. It is highly desirable that the apprehensions of the Irish Unionists should be allayed in every practicable way.

      Advantage should, I think, be taken of this opportunity to remove the Irish Chancellorship from the list of political appointments. Whatever strong reasons or justification may exist in England for the Lord Chancellor changing with the Government, there should be none that I can discover in the Ireland of the future, unless it be in connection with the appointment of Justices of the Peace. But fairness in distributing that sort of patronage can surely be secured by other means than a frequently recurring and unnatural change of Chancellors, whereby the Pension List is heavily and unnecessarily burdened.

      In connexion with the Royal Irish Constabulary, I am clear that the control should rest, as now, with the Lord-Lieutenant (that is, with the Imperial Government) until Land Purchase has made further progress, and the new Government has gained experience of administration; but it is only fair that during this period of reservation the Imperial Government should allow Ireland a drawback on the cost of the police force, the present strength of which is excessive if judged from the Irish point of view.

      The situation will, of course, be anomalous inasmuch as there will be an Executive Government responsible to the Irish Parliament yet relieved of the prime responsibility resting on all Governments—the maintenance of law and order. This anomaly cannot be avoided: it inevitably arises from the political conditions of the case. The best way of dealing with the situation will be to maintain existing arrangements which are directed by the Under-Secretary and to preserve the subordination of the Law Officers to the [pg 066] Lord-Lieutenant in all matters relating to the maintenance of order. But while the Minister for Law and Justice should have no control over the police during this transition period, his wishes in regard to any matter will, of course, be carefully considered; his request for the performance by the police of all duties not of a purely police character which they now customarily discharge, will be complied with, and his proposals to reduce the strength of the force, and thereby effect saving in the public expenditure, will no doubt be favourably considered by the Lord-Lieutenant if the state of the country permits.

      I presume the Bill will indicate the kind of police force which in time will take the place of the existing force. I confess I am not prepossessed in favour of the plan embodied in this connexion in the Bill of 1886 or 1893. I think the best plan will be to retain the organization of the Royal Irish Constabulary, and to reduce the present force by short recruitment when the Imperial Government think that can be safely done. I deprecate the creation of a local force under the control of the local authorities.71

      Finally, the question whether the force to be locally employed should be armed, or not armed (as the Bill of 1893 proposed), may be left to be decided at the time by the Imperial Government: but, in any case, it will, I think, be necessary for the Irish Government to maintain a sufficiently strong armed body of police in Dublin and other suitable centres to deal with emergencies.

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      The control over the staff of Resident Magistrates is so intimately bound up with the existing system of police administration that one cannot be safely separated from the other, and this section of Law and Justice should, in my opinion, also be reserved during the transition period. At the same time I think the services of the Resident Magistrates can be more fully utilized in the business of general administration than they are at present.

      There is less reason for retaining the Dublin Metropolitan Police under the Lord-Lieutenant's direct control during the transition period than for retaining the Royal Irish Constabulary; and if the national feeling would be gratified by giving to the Irish Parliament, at once, the control of the Dublin police, I would defer to that feeling. But my personal opinion is that the Irish Parliament in its earliest days would be wise to concentrate upon self-organization, the establishment of control over the departmental system, and the taking stock of the condition of the country in all the various aspects of national life. It will then with greater assurance of success take over from the Imperial Government the responsibility for the maintenance of order.

      I have already referred to the Land Commission. There is a general agreement that the department of land purchase, which depends essentially upon the use of British credit, should remain with the Imperial Government. The only question is: should this department be permanently excluded from Irish control, or only temporarily excluded, the period of exclusion being in the discretion of the Imperial