The New Irish Constitution: An Exposition and Some Arguments. Various

(3) Queen's University, Belfast. (4) National University.

      Departments, etc., not Controlled by the Irish Government.

	(1) The Judiciary.
	(a) The Supreme Court of Judicature and its officers.
	(b) Recorders.65
	(c) County Court Judges.
	(2) Registry of Deeds.
	(3) Local Registration of Titles.
	(4) Railway and Canal Commission.
	(5) Commissioners of Public Works.
	(6) General Valuation and Boundary Survey of Ireland.
	(7) Treasury Remembrancer's Office.
	(8) National School Teachers' Superannuation Office.

      English Civil Departments Working in Ireland and not under the Control of the Irish Government.

	(1) Customs.
	(2) Inland Revenue.
	(3) General Post Office.
	(4) Board of Trade (Dublin and other Ports).
	(5) Quit Rent Office (Woods and Forests).
	(6) His Majesty's Stationery Office.
	(7) Civil Service Commissioners.
	(8) Inspector of Mines.
	(9) Inspector of Factories.
	(10) Registrar of Friendly Societies and Trades Unions, Building and Co-operative Societies.
	(11) Ordnance Survey of Ireland.
	(12) Public Works Loan Commissioners.
	(13) Exchequer and Audit Department.

      It is thus apparent that at present the Irish Government exercises control over only a small portion of the official agencies working in the country. Many of these agencies—some of first-class importance and dealing with strictly Irish business—are uncontrolled by the Irish Government, while the supervision exercised over them by the Imperial Parliament is of the most shadowy character. The congestion of public business in Westminster effectually prevents attention being paid to any Irish business—at least to any Irish business out of which party capital cannot be made.

      In these circumstances, the first duty of the new Parliament will be to co-ordinate, and establish its control over, the dísjecta membra of Irish Government. To that end it will, presumably, group into classes or departments the various “Boards,” “Offices,” and other official agencies enumerated above on the principle of common or cognate functions. Such a classification is an essential preliminary to the establishment of effectual Parliamentary control over the transaction of public business. I proceed to suggest such a scheme of classification, but a preliminary word is necessary.

      Some controversy has taken place as to what is, and [pg 056] what is not, business of a “purely Irish nature,” with which alone, the Irish Government is to be concerned under the promised Bill. In my opinion, the following Departments, out of those enumerated above, namely:

	(1) Customs,
	(2) Excise,
	(3) Post Office, Telegraphs, etc.,
	(4) Treasury Remembrancer's Office,
	(5) Civil Service Commissioners,
	(6) Exchequer and Audit Office, and
	(7) Public Works Loan Commissioners,

      can not be so classed, for the following reasons.

      The control of the levy of Customs and Excise Revenue by the Irish Legislature, would imperil the fiscal solidarity of the United Kingdom, and be destructive of the further extension of Home Rule on federal lines. The Imperial Parliament should continue to control these all-important Departments, but power may be usefully reserved to the Irish Legislature to vary, under certain defined conditions, the duties on particular articles or commodities, without, however, any reservation of power to vary the articles themselves. For such a reservation, there is a precedent in the Isle of Man (Customs) Act of 1887, as I explained in an address delivered before the Irish Bankers' Institute last November. The suggestion was further developed in an Article on Irish Finance, which I contributed to the Nineteenth Century and After for January, 1912. In this connexion, it should be remembered that Mr. Gladstone's Bills of 1866 and 1893, excluded the Customs and Excise Revenue from Irish Control: and that the present Leader of the Irish Parliamentary Party, following, in this respect, Mr. Parnell's example, has recognized the propriety of the exclusion.

      The suggestion I make preserves the principle, thus [pg 057] confirmed by high authority, while it allows to Ireland, working in concert with Great Britain, the opportunity of adjusting her taxation to her own special necessities.

      The Administration of Posts and Telegraphs in Ireland is intimately associated with the Department's Administration in Great Britain; and though Ireland has an indefeasible claim, which can be readily conceded, to the great bulk of the patronage within her shores, (patronage mostly of a petty and purely local character) I fail to see in that claim sufficient justification for localizing the Irish part of the business and thereby incurring the risk of dislocating the working of a great Imperial Department. And my objection to transferring the Postal Department to the new Government is emphasised by the fact that in Ireland this Department is worked at a loss of about a quarter of a million sterling annually. There would, therefore, be a tendency on the part of the new Irish Government to curtail expenditure on the Post Office, to the detriment of the public convenience of the United Kingdom, in order that the expenditure on the Department should balance the income.

      The Treasury Remembrancer's Office will probably disappear with the system of which it is the symbol: but the Civil Service Commission calls for further consideration. As I am, at present, Chairman of the Royal Commission on the Civil Service, I feel myself precluded from writing on this important matter with complete freedom; but this much I may say—in recruiting her Civil Service Ireland will be well advised to follow the same general system of appointment, promotion, and conditions of service as prevail in Great Britain, (though this