The topos of Divine Testimony in Luke-Acts. James R. McConnell

See also works cited by Gardner, including Greenridge, “Repeal,” 158–61; W. McDonald, “Clodius,” 164–79; and Weinstock, “Clodius,” 215–22. More recent studies, which have appeared since Gardner’s summary, include: Mitchell, “Leges Clodiae,” 172–76; Linderski, “Römischer Staat und Götterzeichen,” 444–57; and Tatum, “Cicero’s Opposition,” 187–94. All of these essays grapple with the question of exactly what aspect of the Lex Aelia Fufia did Clodius’s law repeal.

      Cicero attributes great significance to this practice. In De legibus, he sheds light on this tradition when he states: “But the highest and most important authority in the State is that of the augurs, to whom is accorded a great influence” (Leg. 2.12.31). He then continues by asking a series of rhetorical questions: “What is of graver import than the abandonment of any business already begun, if a single augur says, ‘On another day?’ What power is more impressive than that of forcing the consuls to resign their offices? What right is more sacred than that of giving or refusing permission to hold an assembly of the people or of the plebeians, or that of abrogating laws illegally passed?” (Leg. 2.12.31).

182. It is possible, however, that here Cicero is invoking Jupiter somewhat ironically.

183. “Do you know of any tribune of the commons since the foundation of Rome who transacted business with the commons, when it was well known that an announcement had been made that the heavens had been watched? I should like you to answer this. During your tribunate of the commons, the Aelian and Fufian Laws still existed in the State, those laws which often checked and crippled revolutionary tribunes, those laws which on one except yourself has ever ventured to resist . . . I ask you, did you ever hesitate, contrary to those laws, to transact business with the commons and summon a Meeting? Have you ever heard that any of the most seditious tribunes of the commons was so audacious as to summon a Meeting in defiance of the Aelian or the Fufian Law?” (Vat. 7.17–18).

184. “What audacity was yours, what violence! What your nine colleagues held should be regarded with awe, you alone, one sprung from the mud, the lowest of the land in every way, regarded as contemptible, trivial, ridiculous!” (Vat. 7.17). Craig studies Cicero’s use of and the audience’s reception of invective in his speech Pro Milone in “Audience Expectations,” 187–213.

185. A similar accusation is found in Cicero’s speech against Clodius. Here, Cicero argues that Clodius’s tribunate is actually invalid, in that it was established while the augurs were searching for omens in the skies. See Dom. 14.39–41.

186. Concerning Clodius, Cicero states, “It is impossible to express in words or even to form a conception of all the guilt, all the capacity for destruction, that were in him” (Mil. 78).

187. A. R. Dyck argues that Cicero is attempting to “situate the event [Clodius’s murder] rather in a larger cosmic context.” See Dyck, “Narrative Obfuscation,” 219–41, esp. 233.

188. Later in the speech, Cicero will state: “Then it was that the immortal gods, as I remarked a while ago, instilled into [Clodius’s] reckless and desperate brain the thought of laying a plot against my client” (Mil. 88). Here, Dyck’s comments are appropriate: “Milo, on trial de vi, is reduced to a tool of the divine vis, which holds in check the vis of Clodius by infatuating him and leading him to his destruction” (“Narrative Obfuscation,” 235).

189. In stating that he will first dispense with Clodius’s case against his home, but then further accuse Clodius, Cicero says: “I shall even be delighted, to comply with the portents of the immortal gods [portentis deorum immortalium] and the obligations which they impose” (Har. resp. 11).

190. Cicero accuses Clodius of inviting a rabble of slaves to the games: “So these games, the sanctity whereof is so deep that it has been summoned from distant lands and planted in this city . . . were performed by slaves, viewed by slaves, and were indeed converted under Clodius’ aedileship into a Megalesia of slaves” (Har. resp. 24). This last part of this statement (hos ludos servi fecerunt, servi spectatverunt, tota deniue hoc aedile servorum Megalesia fuerunt) is an example of conduplicatio (i.e., reduplication), a figure of speech described in Rhet. Her. 4.28.38: “Reduplication is the repetition of one or more words for the purpose of Amplification or Appeal to Pity.”

191. Cicero vehemently states (note the use of conduplicatio, which serves to heighten the punishment by the gods): “It was by mortals [Homines] that you were defended in this loathsome business, from mortals [homines] that your deep guilt and degradation drew praise, mortals [homines] who gave you a verdict of acquittal though you all but avowed your sin, mortals [hominibus] who expressed no resentment at the affront which your adultery had inflicted upon them, mortals [homines] who put into your hands weapons to be used either against me, or later against our invincible fellow-citizen; mortals [hominum], I grant you freely, have done you benefits that could not be exceeded. But what punishment could be visited upon a man by the immortal gods severer than madness and infatuation?” (Har. resp. 38–39).

192. For earthquakes considered as portents, see Pliny the Elder, Nat. 2.181.191–192, 86.200. After noting several earthquakes, he writes: “Nor yet is the disaster a simple one, nor does the danger consist only in the earthquake itself, but equally or more in the fact that it is a portent; the city of Rome was never shaken without this being a premonition of something about to happen” (Nat. 2.86.200).

193. See Litfin, St. Paul’s Theology of Proclamation, 91–108, 109–36. In these two chapters, Litfin analyzes the importance of persuasion as described by Cicero and Quintilian (ibid., 91–108), and by other ancient rhetoricians (109–36). He also helpfully includes a discussion of the role of the audience and the need for rhetoricians to adapt their speeches to the intended audience in order to be persuasive. I am indebted to Litfin for the primary references in this section.

194. In comparing the emphases of philosophy and rhetoric as seen in the writings of Cicero and Quintilian, C. Neumeister (Grundsätze der Forensischen Rhetorik, 23–24) argues that for the rhetor, “Zweckmäßigkeit” was paramount, as opposed to a determination of the “Wahrheit” in the case of the philosophers.

195. The practical nature of this aspect of rhetoric is reinforced by Cicero’s statement in De inventione (which directly precedes Cicero’s concept of the function of rhetoric given above): “Therefore we will classify oratorical ability as a part of political science” (Inv. 1.5.6). This is a linkage which has already been noted.

196. See Litfin, Paul’s Theology of Proclamation, 92–97, 104–6. In these sections, Litfin discusses the views of Cicero and Quintilian regarding adapting a speech to the audience. For example, Litfin cites Quintilian, Inst. 12.10.56, in which Quintilian states: “The judge’s attitude to what he hears is also very important— . . . his face is often itself the speaker’s guide. You must therefore press points you see are to his liking, and retreat smartly from those which are not well received.” Cf. Cicero’s thoughts on adapting the style of the speech