The topos of Divine Testimony in Luke-Acts. James R. McConnell

of the diction of the philosophers who, I think . . . prescribe no rules for speaking, but none the less undertake to discuss with overflowing copiousness, whatever subject is laid before them” (2.35.151). The context is one of oratory vs. philosophy; therefore, it is not unreasonable to assume that when Cicero mentions Aristotle’s work, one which concerns the discovery of arguments, Aristotle’s Top. is in view.

122. According to Schütrumpf (“Non-Logical Means of Persuasion,” 95–110), another significant difference between Aristotle and Cicero is that Aristotle differentiates between those elements in the argument for which the orator is responsible (ἔντεχνος; earlier these were called the “artificial” means of persuasion) and those for which the orator is not directly responsible (ἄτεχνος; the “inartificial”). Those arguments that fall under the heading of ἔντεχνος include arguments from ethos, pathos, and logical arguments. In Cicero’s De or., however, what he considers ἄτεχνος actually falls under the heading of logical proof. Schütrumpf concludes: “In Cicero, therefore, the ‘non-technical evidence’ does not constitute a means of persuasion in its own right, as in Aristotle; rather it is classified as subordinate to one of the three means of persuasion which for Cicero are the only means of persuasion” (ibid., 105).

123. An excellent overview of the content of Top. can be found in Gaines, “Cicero’s Partitiones oratoriae and Topica,” 469–70.

124. Or perhaps he does not. Gaines argues that the phrase in question should be rendered “I began to write a Topica in the manner of Aristotle” (Gaines, “Cicero’s Partitiones oratoriae and Topica,” 469); see also Stump, Boethius’s De topicis differentiis, 21–22.

125. Bornscheuer (Topik, 63) notes that Aristotle did not consider the topos as a source of arguments; rather, he saw topoi as being elements of an argument; see also McAdon, “Probabilities,” 226. Cf. Aristotle, Rhet. 2.2.13: “Let us now speak of the elements of enthymemes (by element and topic of enthymeme I mean the same thing).” As seen in the citation from Rhet. 1.2.21 above, Aristotle conceived of topoi as being elements of syllogisms and enthymemes. Stump notes that Cicero’s concept of loci is much different from that described in Aristotle’s Topics. In Top., Aristotle presents an organization of topoi useful for dialectical argumentation. Aristotle emphasizes the process of developing an argument, rather than the rote memorization of possible arguments. Stump contrasts this with Cicero, who, she argues, is developing a system for forming arguments for legal cases. Thus, for Cicero, the significance of the loci is found in their use within oratory and rhetoric, which make use of dialectic for the purposes of arguing legal cases. Here, one notes an emphasis on the practical nature of the loci in Cicero. See Stump, Boethius’s De topicis differentiis, 18–23. Leff also points out the practical nature of loci in the Latin rhetoricians. He, however, compares the descriptions of loci in Cicero and Quintilian to the later Boethius in forming this conclusion. See Leff, “Up from Theory,” 203–11. On this see also the work of Van Ophuijsen (“Where Have the Topics Gone?,” 131–73), who notes that Critolaus makes a statement in which he rejects rhetoric. Van Ophuijsen maintains that “far from being directed at Aristotle’s more rarefied conception of the subject, this is likely to have been an assertion of its [the peripatetic school at Lyceum] claims in the face of an unphilosophical rhetoric encouraged by the new demand for unadorned and intellectually unambitious but practically effective legal speeches created by the extension of Roman jurisdiction” (ibid., 133).

126. Kemper notes that this is a shift in emphasis from that in Rhet. Her. (see below) and Inv. In these two works, loci are predominantly meant to be the arguments themselves. See Kemper, “Topik,” 27.

127. Cicero also provides an example for each one; each example is derived from a forensic issue.

128. In comparing Cicero’s idea of locus to Aristotle’s presentation of topoi, Bornscheuer persuasively argues that the main difference is one of means and ends. For Aristotle, according to Bornscheuer, it was important for the orator to know the means of persuasion for every eventuality. Bornscheuer contrasts this with Cicero, who, he argues, is much more practical and therefore sees an intimate connection between the speech and the situation in which the speech is offered. Cicero ultimately makes this connection through the selection of loci. Bornscheuer also notes that the emphasis on the practicality of oratory in Cicero is a direct result of his involvement in Roman politics, so that his system of rhetoric is governed by political and public ends. See Bornscheuer, Topik, 71–90. Reinhardt somewhat similarly argues that Cicero developed his concept of locus as a result of the Roman legal system becoming more formalized. Around the second century BCE, trials in Rome became more structured, which led to an increased emphasis on the arguments being made, rather than the reputation of the one making the arguments. This occurred along with an increase in legal literature, which included the classification of cases. Thus, Cicero’s system of loci served the legal system as a τέχνη which would assist orators in becoming more familiar with the legal system and equip them to argue cases more persuasively. See Reinhardt, Topica, 53–66.

129. Hohmann argues that in Cicero, dialectic becomes a tool which supports rhetoric. For example, in Cicero’s Top. 6, dialectic is used to evaluate the various arguments available to the orator. For Hohmann, therefore, Top. is a rhetorical work (rather than dialectical), in which the emphasis falls on application of loci and the practicality of using them within a speech. Hohmann, “Rhetoric and Dialectic,” 41–51.

130. This same distinction will be found in Theon’s Progymnasmata as well. Pernot, in his study of topos and commonplace, concludes that topoi represented a system of examining a plethora of cases with a limited number of patterns or examples, while through a commonplace a rhetor could treat a specific issue as a general question. See Pernot, “Lieu et lieu commun,” 253–84.

131. Leff’s comments are apposite and should be cited in full (see Leff, “Common-places and Argumentation,” 448):

      Obviously, the commonplace is an argument elaborated more carefully and fully than other types of argument. But the distinction between loci and loci communes should not be understood as a distinction between two kinds of argument, since, for Cicero, the loci are not arguments, but resources used in discovering materials for arguments; they provide individual pieces—the timbers and planks as it were—which enter into the construction of arguments. The loci communes are finished products that integrate logical argument, emotional appeal, and style into a single structure. They are “minor forms” that contribute to the general development of a discourse but can be detached and appreciated as independent units.

132. Conclusions (epilogoi) are found “in the Direct Opening, after the Statement of Facts, after the strongest argument, and in the Conclusion of the Speech” (Rhet. Her. 2.30.47).

133. “For neither the Prooemium nor the Narrative has any function except to prepare the judge for the Proof . . . Lastly of the five parts into which we divided the forensic speech, any one of the other four may sometimes be unnecessary for the Cause; but there is no dispute which does not need proof” (Inst. 5.pr.).

134. Quintilian indeed cites Aristotle at this point; cf.