Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius. Niccolò Machiavelli

Of the various kinds of Government; and to which of them the Roman

       Commonwealth belonged

      III. Of the accidents which led in Rome to the creation of Tribunes of the People, whereby the Republic was made more perfect

      IV. That the dissensions between the Senate and Commons of Rome made

       Rome free and powerful

      V. Whether the guardianship of public freedom is safer in the hands of the Commons or of the Nobles; and whether those who seek to acquire power, or they who seek to maintain it, are the greater cause of commotions

      VI. Whether it was possible in Rome to contrive such a Government as would have composed the differences between the Commons and the Senate

      VII. That to preserve liberty in a State, there must exist the right to accuse

      VIII. That calumny is as hurtful in a Commonwealth as the power to accuse is useful

      IX. That to give new institutions to a Commonwealth, or to reconstruct old institutions on an entirely new basis, must be the work of one Man

      X. That in proportion as the founder of a Kingdom or Commonwealth merits praise, he who founds a Tyranny deserves blame

      XI. Of the Religion of the Romans

      XII. That it is of much moment to make account of Religion; and that

       Italy, through the Roman Church, being wanting therein, has been ruined

      XIII. Of the use the Romans made of Religion in giving institutions to their City; in carrying out their enterprises; and in quelling tumults

      XIV. That the Romans interpreted the auspices to meet the occasion; and made a prudent show of observing the rites of Religion even when forced to disregard them; and any who rashly slighted Religion they punished

      XV. How the Samnites, as a last resource in their broken fortunes, had recourse to Religion

      XVI. That a People accustomed to live under a Prince, if by any accident it become free, can hardly preserve that freedom

      XVII. That a corrupt People obtaining freedom can hardly preserve it

      XVIII. How a free Government existing in a corrupt City may be preserved, or not existing may be created

      XIX. After a strong Prince a weak Prince may maintain himself: but after one weak Prince no Kingdom can stand a second

      XX. That the consecutive reigns of two valiant Princes produce great results: and that well-ordered Commonwealths are assured of a succession of valiant Rulers by whom their power and growth are rapidly extended

      XXI. That it is a great reproach to a Prince or to a Commonwealth to be without a National Army

      XXII. What is to be noted in the combat of the three Roman Horatii and the three Alban Curiatii

      XXIII. That we should never hazard our whole fortunes, where we put not forth our entire strength; for which reason to guard a defile is often hurtful

      XXIV. That well-ordered States always provide rewards and punishments for their Citizens; and never set off deserts against misdeeds

      XXV. That he who would reform the institutions of a free State, must retain at least the semblance of old ways

      XXVI. That a new Prince in a city or province of which he has taken possession, ought to make everything new

      XXVII. That Men seldom know how to be wholly good or wholly bad

      XXVIII. Whence it came that the Romans were less ungrateful to their citizens than were the Athenians

      XXIX. Whether a People or a Prince is the more ungrateful

      XXX. How Princes and Commonwealths may avoid the vice of ingratitude; and how a Captain or Citizen may escape being undone by it

      XXXI. That the Roman Captains were never punished with extreme severity for misconduct; and where loss resulted to the Republic merely through their ignorance or want of judgment, were not punished at all

      XXXII. That a Prince or Commonwealth should not defer benefits until they are forced to yield them

      XXXIII. When a mischief has grown up in, or against a State, it is safer to temporize with it than to meet it with violence

      XXXIV. That the authority of the Dictator did good and not harm to the Roman Republic; and that it is, not those powers which are given by the free suffrages of the People, but those which ambitious Citizens usurp for themselves that are pernicious to a State

      XXXV. Why the creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, although brought about by the free and open suffrage of the Citizens, was hurtful to the liberties of that Republic

      XXXVI. That Citizens who have held the higher offices of a Commonwealth should not disdain the lower

      XXXVII. Of the mischief bred in Rome by the Agrarian Law: and how it is a great source of disorder in a Commonwealth to pass a law opposed to ancient usage with stringent retrospective effect

      XXXVIII. That weak Republics are irresolute and undecided; and that the course they may take depends more on Necessity than Choice

      XXXIX. That often the same accidents are seen to befall different

       Nations

      XL. Of the creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, and what therein is to be noted. Wherein among other matters it is shown how the same causes may lead to the safety or to the ruin of a Commonwealth

      XLI. That it is unwise to pass at a bound from leniency to severity, or to a haughty bearing from a humble

      XLII. How easily men become corrupted

      XLIII. That men fighting in their own cause make good and resolute

       Soldiers

      XLIV. That the Multitude is helpless without a head: and that we should not with the same breath threaten and ask leave

      XLV. That it is of evil example, especially in the maker of a law, not to observe the law when made: and that daily to renew acts of severity in a City is most hurtful to the Governor

      XLVI. That men climb from one step of ambition to another, seeking at first to escape injury, and then to injure others

      XLVII. That though men deceive themselves in generalities, in particulars they judge truly

      XLVIII. He who would not have an office bestowed on some worthless or wicked person, should contrive that it be solicited by one who is utterly worthless and wicked, or else by one who is in the highest degree noble and good

      XLIX. That if Cities which, like Rome, had their beginning in freedom, have had difficulty in framing such laws as would preserve their freedom, Cities which at the first have been in subjection will find this almost impossible

      L. That neither any Council nor any Magistrate should have power to bring the Government of a City to a stay

      LI. What a Prince or Republic does of necessity, should seem to be done by choice

      LII. That to check the arrogance of a Citizen who is growing too powerful in a State, there is no safer method, nor less open to objection, than to forestall him in those ways whereby he seeks to advance himself

      LIII. That the People, deceived by a false show of advantage, often desire what would be their ruin; and that large hopes and brave promises easily move them

      LIV. Of the boundless authority which a great man may use to restrain an excited Multitude

      LV. That the Government is easily carried on in a City wherein the body of the People is not corrupted: and that a Princedom is impossible where equality prevails, and a Republic where it does not

      LVI. That when great calamities are about to befall a City or Country, signs are seen to presage, and seers arise who foretell them