Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius. Niccolò Machiavelli

      LVII. That the People are strong collectively, but individually weak

      LVIII. That a People is wiser and more constant than a Prince

      LIX. To what Leagues or Alliances we may most trust, whether those we make with Commonwealths or those we make with Princes

      LX. That the Consulship and all the other Magistracies in Rome were given without respect to Age

      BOOK II.

      PREFACE

      I. Whether the Empire acquired by the Romans was more due to Valour or to Fortune

      II. With what Nations the Romans had to contend, and how stubborn these were in defending their Freedom

      III. That Rome became great by destroying the Cities which lay round about her, and by readily admitting Strangers to the rights of Citizenship

      IV. That Commonwealths have followed three methods for extending their power

      V. That changes in Sects and Tongues, and the happening of Floods and

       Pestilences, obliterate the memory of the past

      VI. Of the methods followed by the Romans in making War

      VII. Of the quantity of land assigned by the Romans to each colonist

      VIII. Why certain Nations leave their ancestral seats and overflow the

       Countries of others

      IX. Of the Causes which commonly give rise to wars between States

      X. That contrary to the vulgar opinion, Money is not the sinews of War

      XI. That it were unwise to ally yourself with a Prince who has reputation rather than strength

      XII. Whether when Invasion is imminent it is better to anticipate or to await it

      XIII. That Men rise from humble to high fortunes rather by Fraud than by

       Force

      XIV. That Men often err in thinking they can subdue Pride by Humility

      XV. That weak States are always dubious in their resolves; and that tardy resolves are always hurtful

      XVI. That the Soldiers of our days depart widely from the methods of ancient Warfare

      XVII. What importance the Armies of the present day should allow to Artillery; and whether the commonly received opinion concerning it be just

      XVIII. That the authority of the Romans and the example of ancient warfare should make us hold Foot Soldiers of more account than Horse

      XIX. That conquests made by ill governed States and such as follow not the valiant methods of the Romans, lend rather to their ruin than to their aggrandizement

      XX. Of the dangers incurred by Princes or Republics who resort to

       Auxiliary or Mercenary Arms

      XXI. That Capua was the first City to which the Romans sent a Prætor; nor there, until four hundred years after they began to make war

      XXII. That in matters of moment Men often judge amiss

      XXIII. That in chastising then Subjects when circumstances required it the Romans always avoided half measures

      XXIV. That, commonly, Fortresses do much more harm than good

      XXV. That he who attacks a City divided against itself, must not think to get possession of it through its divisions

      XXVI. That Taunts and Abuse breed hatred against him who uses them, without yielding him any advantage

      XXVII. That prudent Princes and Republics should be content to have obtained a victory; for, commonly, when they are not, their victory turns to defeat

      XXVIII. That to neglect the redress of Grievances, whether public or private, is dangerous for a Prince or Commonwealth

      XXIX. That Fortune obscures the minds of Men when she would not have them hinder her designs

      XXX. That really powerful Princes and Commonwealths do not buy Friendships with money, but with their valour and the fame of then prowess

      XXXI. Of the danger of trusting banished men

      XXXII. In how many ways the Romans gained possession of Towns

      XXXIII. That the Romans entrusted the Captains of their Armies with the fullest Powers

      BOOK III.

      I. For a Sect or Commonwealth to last long, it must often be brought back to its beginnings

      II. That on occasion it is wise to feign folly

      III. That to preserve a newly acquired freedom we must slay the Sons of

       Brutus

      IV. That an Usurper is never safe in his Princedom while those live whom he has deprived of it

      V. How an Hereditary King may come to lose his Kingdom

      VI. Of Conspiracies

      VII. Why it is that changes from Freedom to Servitude, and from Servitude to Freedom, are sometimes made without bloodshed, but at other times reek with blood

      VIII. That he who would effect changes in a Commonwealth, must give heed to its character and condition

      IX. That to enjoy constant good fortune we must change with the times

      X. That a Captain cannot escape battle when his Enemy forces it on him at all hazards

      XI. That one who has to contend with many, though he be weaker than they, will prevail if he can withstand their first onset

      XII. A prudent Captain will do what he can to make it necessary for his own Soldiers to fight, and to relieve his Enemy from that necessity

      XIII. Whether we may trust more to a valiant Captain with a weak Army, or to a valiant Army with a weak Captain

      XIV. Of the effect produced in Battle by strange and unexpected Sights or Sounds

      XV. That one and not many should head an Army; and why it is disadvantageous to have more leaders than one

      XVI. That in times of difficulty true Worth is sought after whereas in quiet times it is not the most deserving but those who are recommended by wealth or connection who are most in favour

      XVII. That we are not to offend a Man, and then send him to fill an important Office or Command

      XVIII. That it is the highest quality of a Captain to be able to forestall the designs of his adversary

      XIX. Whether indulgence or severity be more necessary for controlling a

       Multitude

      XX. How one humane act availed more with the men of Falerii than all the might of the Roman Arms

      XXI. How it happened that Hannibal pursuing a course contrary to that taken by Scipio, wrought the same results in Italy which the other achieved in Spain

      XXII. That the severity of Manlius Torquatus and the gentleness of

       Valerius Corvinus won for both the same Glory

      XXIII. Why Camillus was banished from Rome

      XXIV. That prolonged Commands brought Rome to Servitude

      XXV. Of the Poverty of Cincinnatus and of many other Roman Citizens

      XXVI. How women are a cause of the ruin of States

      XXVII. How a divided City may be reunited; and how it is a false opinion that to hold Cities in subjection they must be kept divided

      XXVIII. That a Republic must keep an eye on what its Citizens are about; since often the seeds of a Tyranny lie hidden under