Environmental Ethics. Группа авторов

of Nature within the context of community dynamics (ti esti).

      Part II: Why Should We Care?

      The Ethical Constraints on Interfering with Nature. If we accept the depiction in Part I of this chapter, then we already have an argument outline on why we should care:

      1 There are two sorts of understandings of N/nature: (a) nature which refers to individuals (tokens) and (b) Nature which refers to larger, general groups (types)³²—A(ssertion).

      2 The systemic, operational mechanisms of both nature and Nature are intricate, complex, and difficult fully to understand—F(act).

      3 Whenever one comes to a correct, partial understanding of intricate and complex systemic mechanisms there follows a reaction that is akin to aesthetic appreciation—A.

      4 Aesthetic value-appreciation incurs a duty to protect that which has been valued—F.³³

      5 When one engages with nature/Nature and one comes to an understanding (on some level) of the causal operation of these systemic mechanisms such that one will both value nature/Nature and, as a result, be obliged to protect nature/Nature—1−4.

      6 Coming to terms with understanding nature/Nature involves a model that situates individuals within communities (both proximate and remote)—A.

      7 There are (at least) two large understanding of communities that all humans must recognize: human communities and N/natural communities—A.

      8 Properly understanding the human communities and the N/natural communities requires an accommodation and engagement in both proximate and remote versions of the same—6, 7.

      9 Duties follow from recognizing obligations that people have toward others—such as human and Natural communities both proximate and remote—F.³⁴

      10 All humans have a duty to engage in and protect their human and their natural/Natural communities—5−9.

      Argument One: The Recognition, Valuing, and Protection of Nature

Once we accept Argument One, then it is incumbent upon us to ascertain what are the constraints upon our activities that do not arise from n/Nature. This area of development might be termed artificial. All technology is artificial. One popular definition of humans is as tool-making animals.³⁵ The making (ποεῖν + τεχνή/ poein + techne) is at the etymological center of the realm of the technological which is a novel creation that will augment the realm of Nature by Homo sapiens. One way to think about these additions is by using the language of the Ancient Greek physical philosophers. The given order, Nature (φύσις/ phusis) exists. The making can either accord with Nature (κατα φύσιν/ kata phusin) or it can go against the Natural grain and thus interrupt, change, or go against Nature (παρα φύσιν/ para phusin).³⁶ Thus, one distinction of importance is between kata phusin and para phusin.³⁷

      If, from Part I there is a general duty to protect Nature (phusis), then ceteris paribus one should only make things that are in accord with nature (kata phusin). But what would this mean? How much elasticity does Nature possess? At what point are we really harming Nature? And to what extent is the harm?

This is an issue in much dispute.³⁸ In the nineteenth century in Britain, during the rise of the first Industrial Revolution, the climate was heavily affected.³⁹ The conceptual dissonance on this is noted in a painting of J.M.W. Turner, Rain, Steam, and Speed: The Great Western Railway. In the painting we are presented with three facts. (1) There is a train (a new making) coming right at us over the Waterloo Bridge in London (metaphorically a symbol of augmented Nature going into the future). (2) There is a row boat (the old kata phusin) going in the opposite direction (a vision of the past). (3) In the midst of it all is an atmosphere of pollution (the present para phusin caused by the new technology). Turner makes his visual case that this is the direction of human makings in the nineteenth century in Britain. Depending upon whether one identifies with the locomotive or the row boat determines whether the critic judges positively or negatively on this.⁴⁰

      Illustration J.M.W. Turner, “Rain, Steam, and Speed: The Great Western Railway,” National Gallery of Art, London, UK.

      This artistic rendering illustrates a critical possible conflict between Humans (considering themselves atop the scala naturae) and Nature (the broader class which includes humans as members). The fact that humans often get this logical relation confused is the source of much confusion. The human making, poein + techne (now to be referred in shorthand as technology), is the output of human activity. It is executed within a Natural construct. But because it originates from its own designs narrowly understood, it can create community (human and/or Natural) disruption.

Community disruption is an important concept. It occurs when one member of a community acts as if s/he lives in a “community of one.” Everyday examples of this within the shared community worldview of a micro community occur when an individual or group of individuals ignores the values of the community and wish (without consultation) to impose their will upon the rest of the community.⁴¹

      This debate in the nineteenth century context of Britain is complicated by another variable: a static versus a dynamic view of Nature, viewed as a system with various perturbations that affect the output. Often Nature was thought of as some sort of enclosed garden upon which humans (both separated and apart as per Part I) enter and gaze at this exotic other in order to ascertain whether they are satisfied or not.

There are echoes here of the Garden of Eden. In this theologically-based model there is a sub-portion of Nature that is especially set out as being perfect from the anthropocentric viewpoint so long as one obeys certain rules—principal being not eating the fruit of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil.⁴² In the narrative as depicted by John Milton, what was really behind God’s prohibition to Adam and Eve was really an attempt to frame the story in terms of the seventeenth century scientific revolution—putting these dynamic ideas of a changing view of Nature (cutting edge, but controversial science) into the mouth of Eve.⁴³

The unchanging view of Nature takes another hit in the nineteenth century with Darwin and other advocates of evolutionary theory.⁴⁴ The dogma in this chapter is that the static view is the wrong way to view Nature. Nature is in constant flux⁴⁵ so that species₁ in environment₁ might prosper in time₁ but when we approach time₂ the environment may change to environment₂ such that some existing and nascent species will prosper and some others will go extinct—such as species_1. This is just a factual discussion of change, but many of the evolutionary folk (harkening back to the scale naturae) thought that this was a modern way to provide an explanation for the superiority of humans in Nature (however they are situated: outside-looking-inside or partially inside).⁴⁶

The social evolutionary attitude is also often countered by an antithetical devolutionary attitude. In the former account, people expect that human life in Nature will always improve.⁴⁷ There is much incentive among most politicians around the world to trumpet this possibility. That’s how they stay in power (so long as they are a part of the traditional ruling party).

The devolutionary attitude is rather different. These folks contend that things were better in the past and are now deteriorating. Vastly different social/political groups can take this position. For example, in Hesiod’s Theogony it is asserted that in the past, there was an age of gold. It was a far better time to be alive on earth: things were much better as opposed to the present, lower age of iron.⁴⁸ Some politicians around the world cynically set out a similar account of the status quo in order to support either their election