Environmental Ethics. Группа авторов

“All people must develop a single comprehensive and internally coherent worldview that is good and that we strive to act out in our daily lives.” Michael Boylan, Natural Human Rights: A Theory (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014): 166.

      15 ¹⁵ For a discussion of this distinction see: Michael Boylan, Basic Ethics, 2nd edn. (Upper Saddle River, N.J. Pearson, 2009): 30−32.

      16 ¹⁶ An advocate of this position is Hilary Putnam, Ethics Without Ontology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004).

      17 ¹⁷ The move to ethical anti-realism is no small matter. Ethical anti-realists believe there are no certain facts about ethics in the world. This means that norms are created by force: kraterism (might makes right). For my argument on this see: Boylan (2014): 196−202.

      18 ¹⁸ “All people must develop a single comprehensive and internally coherent worldview that is good and that we strive to act out in our daily lives,” Boylan (2014): chapter 6 .

      19 ¹⁹ It is important to distinguish a non-ethical (non-moral) practice from an unethical (immoral) practice. The former does not concern ethics while the latter is judged to be wrong by some theory of ethics.

      20 ²⁰ I define a micro community as one in which a participant can, in principle, know all the members of that community. Governance in the micro community is via a committee of the whole. A macro community is rather larger and its governance is via elected representatives. See: Boylan (2004): 113−115.

      21 ²¹ Of course, if one is in the position to influence the macro community via the media or public lectures, this would be helpful, too. However, this is a position only open to a few. To impose this duty generally upon all would be utopian.

      22 ²² “Kraterism” I hold to be the philosophy that “might makes right.” Most philosophers disavow this approach. For a famous discussion on this topic, see Plato’s Republic, Book One, 338c−354a.

      23 ²³ Of course, the existence of other species poses other problems. For an example of this sort of analysis see Thomas White, In Defense of Dolphins (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008).

      24 ²⁴ Boylan, 2014: 176−177.

      25 ²⁵ According to the Washington Post around 47% of the world’s population has access to the Internet. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/11/22/47-percent-of-the-worlds-population-now-use-the-internet-users-study-says/?utm_term=.1de178a04090 Accessed 2 June 2019.

      26 ²⁶ For an exposition of this argument see: Michael Boylan, “Worldview and the Value-Duty Link in Environmental Ethics” in Michael Boylan, ed. Environmental Ethics, 3rd edn. (Malden, MA and Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2014): 95−104.

      27 ²⁷ One example of this is the false information about childhood vaccinations. For a discussion of this see: http://www.immunize.org/reports/report038.pdf Accessed 7 June 2019.

      28 ²⁸ See Julie Kirsch’s take on this: “When Is Ignorance Morally Objectionable?” in The Morality and Global Justice Reader, ed. Michael Boylan (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2011): 51−64.

      29 ²⁹ This is widely cited but without a clear single reference, see: https://www.huffpost.com/entry/our-own-facts_b_542796, viewed 6 June 2019.

      30 ³⁰ Some may say that I am naïve on this aspect of the education requirement. The regular eco-community worldview imperative can be satisfied by one’s daily life and interaction with the local eco-system and the larger biome. But this extended eco-community worldview imperative requires more. If, as previously established, roughly half the world has access to the Internet, then there is opportunity. But if one is working 12−14 hours a day just to survive, this may not be a functional reality. Here Kant’s “ought implies can” caveat can fit in with otherwise sincere individuals seeking truth. Sadly, this group is often exploited by demigods who have their own personally enriching scenarios to set forth in the place of dispassionate science.

      31 ³¹ Michael Boylan, “Worldview and the Value-Duty Link to Environmental Ethics” in Environmental Ethics, 2nd edn. Ed. Michael Boylan (Malden, MA and Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2014): 95−108.

      32 ³² The type-token distinction is variously represented. My use of the distinction owes its source to Paul Grice, “Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions” (1969) 78 Philosophical Review 147−177 and Willard Van Quine, Quiddities: An Intermittently Philosophical Dictionary. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987).

      33 ³³ Boylan (2014).

      34 ³⁴ For the fine points of this see the argument for “The Moral Status of Basic Goods” in Boylan (2014): 182.

      35 ³⁵ The relationship between “tool-making” and the evolution of rationality is a controversial subject. For a general discussion of some of the key points to this discussion see: Alex H. Taylor and Russell D. Gray, “Is There a Link Between the Crafting of Tools and the Evolution of Cognition” WIREs Cogn Sci 2014, 5: 693−703. doi: 10.1002/wcs.1322.

      36 ³⁶ For a more complete depiction of this in the context of Ancient Greek Science see Boylan (2015).

      37 ³⁷ Of course, there are some who think that all interference in nature is improper. These are people who assert that Nature was created by God and since God is perfect, God’s makings are perfect, too. Any interference will inevitability lead to a diminished outcome. This point of view was set out in the seventeenth century (a time of great scientific questioning and innovation in Europe): “Heaven if for thee too high/to know what passes there; be lowly wise: /Think only what concerns thee and thy being” from John Milton, “Paradise Lost” in John Milton, The Poetical Works of John Milton, vol. 1, ed. Helen Darbishire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952): Bk. 8, ll. 172−174.

      38 ³⁸ For two different perspectives on this issue see: Beril Idemen Sözman, “Harm in the Wild: Facing Non-Human Suffering in Nature” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice: