Environmental Ethics. Группа авторов

for a definition of nature that can be the basis of our discussion. But “definition” is last on Aristotle’s list. Why is that? It is because the definition must be the result of experience (empeiria) that itself allows one to have confidence in his/her beliefs about what the fact actually is (hoti) and its structure and modalities within various contexts (ei esti) in order to speculate on the causal structure that underlies its operation (dioti). As has been the case in the past, this author is greatly influenced by Aristotle’s approach to understanding nature.² However, this chapter will use this general structure and move beyond the Stagirite’s exposition (though using this structure in Part I).

Primitive Posits. Nature is a term full of meanings.³ For our purposes here, let us begin with an understanding of nature in its contextual sense (the brute facts observed, hoti): we view nature as being outside us. But this does not mean that we, also, are not a part of nature (though some make this mistake in issues concerning the environment).⁴ There is an historical/religious tradition that views nature as outside of us just like children are outside of their parents but a part of the family. This is the tradition that talks about being “stewards of nature.” It goes back to the scala naturae.⁵ This model owes much to Aristotle’s notion of the three sorts of living enties (souls, psuche: plants, animals, and humans).⁶ In addition, we have two understandings of denotation: the individual and the group. It has been this author’s practice in the past to stipulate this distinction by the use of “small ‘n’” and “capital ‘N’.”⁷ Thus “nature” will refer to individuals and their capacities/executions while “Nature” will refer to larger groups—such as species, genera, et al. including integrated systems such as ecosystems, and more general systems such as biomes, biota, and the earth’s biosphere. By using language in this way, we can be more exact in our denotative referents (ei esti, above).

      This sort of distinction helps a little in making clear the “inclusion problem” cited above: whether the individual looking around sees Nature as the other that does not include themself since they are an individual human and humans are exceptional in this scheme: residing at the top of the scale naturae. Though said human, let’s call her “Sue,” resides in Nature, her nature is as a power figure: on the Board of Directors for the corporation, Nature. Though she is nominally a part of the larger scheme, it is only as one of the ruling executives, trumped solely by God (if she is a theist) or by nothing else save the physical laws governing the interaction of states of matter (if she is an agnostic or atheist).

If this analysis is correct, then why is this so (dioti)? I have argued in a recent book that the European and Chinese traditions used the concept of Nature as the source of limitation on human excesses up until the seventeenth century in Europe and until the nineteenth century for the Chinese.⁸ Under this earlier account Nature was recognized as more powerful than humans—especially regarding violent killing events such as hurricanes, tornadoes, floods, tsunami, earthquakes, and volcanic eruptions. In this way, an abstract Nature is seen as a force apart from living organisms (plants, animals, humans) and non-living entities (earth, air, water). This force was viewed by some as Divine.⁹

What occurred (once a general reverence for Nature is withdrawn, around the seventeenth century for Europeans) was that this particular collection of human civilizations replaced Nature with some other reverential object based upon human technological power—weapons using gunpowder and lead bullets along with improved naval vessels that could travel with large cargos for long distances. The new reverential object became colonial conquest (“discovering” and “civilizing” the “primitive world”) and then they expropriated riches from their aggressive land thievery. This made these empire builders believe that they were Masters of the Universe: Nature.¹⁰ They came, they saw, and they conquered. Then they destroyed the land configurations and substituted their own visions of majesty in its stead: constructing cities with brick buildings, roads, and monumental cathedrals that redefined the landscapes. This is what a Master of the Universe believes is in his job description.

Though for hundreds of years the magisterial attitude among Europeans and their thralls was supreme, there were a few architectural renegades such as Frank Lloyd Wright (1867−1959) who thought that organic approaches of fitting into the existing physical space rather than conquering it was a better goal.¹¹ This was also the goal of many conquered indigenous peoples who also often set out the organic in their architectural vision: fitting into the landscape rather than refashioning it in their own image. The standard European approach marks a transition by embracing a community worldview of dominion.¹²

In the worldview of dominion, the powerful individual (and by extension their cadre of helpers) rejects the perspective of the Natural community for that of a personal scope of control: This plot of land belongs to me. I own it. I may do whatever I want with it! This is the mantra. Such individuals think that they are entitled to shave down mountains, change the course of rivers, eliminate wetlands, pollute air and water, create new mountains (landfills with piled toxic waste)—all because they view nature as the other which they can own and do with it what they will. The dioti here is constructed around power to execute a personal, natural vision of what is.

Part of what is behind this worldview is what I’ve called the “egg carton” community worldview.¹³ Under this view, people wish to fulfill their nature by doing as they want without any interference from others (just like eggs in an egg carton are protected from touching any other egg in the carton). Such an aspirational vision is also thought to be possible as if we all were detachable units that can operate on our own apart from any interaction with other people or with Nature.

      It is the contention of this author that such visions of personal human independence/autonomy are factually inaccurate concerning our existence on earth and are normatively false depictions of what we should aspire to individually as our nature. This is because we are intertwined with Nature—including the human community along with terrain, climate, plants, and animals. Our fates are not separate. The scala naturae model is the wrong way to think about our existence. In its stead we should consider a model of various community memberships in which we participate.

Living in Community. One important piece of the (hoti and ei esti) is to describe the manner of how it is we situate ourselves into communities. It has been this author’s contention that a better dioti than the exclusive, individualistic perspective of who we are and how we ought to understand the way forward is to jettison extreme individualism in favor of a worldview that accepts the concept of community. Under this account individuals live within community. There are constraints upon individuals both on how we should act (since purposive action defines the mode our human nature, ei esti)¹⁴ but our focus here is on the manner that individuals live in various communities: human communities (close at hand and extended throughout the world) and within Natural communities (close at hand and extended throughout the world). Like the individual perspective, the community perspective is normative and governed by imperatives for action.

A brief review of these various perspectives that set out their normative structure are as follows. First, the shared community worldview imperative (human communities: close at hand), “Each agent must contribute to a common body of knowledge that supports the creation of a shared community worldview (that is itself complete, coherent, and good) through which social institutions and their resulting policies might flourish within the constraints of the essential core commonly held values (ethics, aesthetics, and religion).” There are five important parts of this imperative that deserve attention. The first criterion is agent contribution. This means that members of a community have responsibilities to be active members. Ethically, one cannot completely shift this responsibility to others. Even in communities in which there are elected officials, this does not absolve each person in the community from periodically checking to see whether they think the community is doing what it says it’s doing and whether what it says it’s doing is proper policy. When it isn’t the case that what it says it’s doing is proper