Fateful Triangle. Tanvi Madan

Nehru warned against any knee-jerk Indian rejection of US aid in retaliation or any statement about forsaking such aid.²⁸³ The need for aid also caused Indian officials to express deep concern about the deterioration in US-India relations in March–April 1954.²⁸⁴ Furthermore, later that year, it partly led to Nehru advising against public ranting against SEATO.²⁸⁵

      As the internal Eisenhower administration debate about aid broadly and to nonaligned India specifically continued in summer and fall 1954, China remained part of the discussion. The Far East bureau’s economic coordinator contradicted his boss, contending that the US could not wait for countries like India to come to their senses; they needed immediate strengthening so they could resist communism.²⁸⁶ A working group considering large-scale, long-term economic assistance for Asia advised that neutral countries be included.²⁸⁷ This was important given, as an intelligence estimated outlined, Chinese economic progress, especially on the industrial front.²⁸⁸

      The NSC planning board proposed that in response the US should “develop the basic stability and strength of non-Communist countries, especially Japan and India.”²⁸⁹ The State Department and most other members of the board believed that since there was little prospect of reducing absolute Chinese power—as the Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff desired—by building up these other countries, they could reduce relative Chinese power.²⁹⁰

      Not everyone on the NSC agreed that India was important. Treasury Secretary Humphrey argued that the US was better off focusing on building up Indonesia and Japan as counterbalances to China. Eisenhower disagreed: India’s size and its “very good military material” made it significant, and if it fell to the communists, it might “cost us the entire Middle East” too. The US “could not afford to lose such great areas as India.” Defense Secretary Wilson concurred, asserting “every effort should be made to hold” that country.²⁹¹ Dulles’s special assistant for foreign aid separately noted that even Congress realized that Indian failure could “be disastrous to US security interests,” which is why they eventually always appropriated some funds for it.²⁹²

      By 1955, the Soviet economic offensive in the nonaligned world, military setbacks in Indochina, and increased India-Soviet engagement caused the re-emergence of American concern that the West was losing ground in India.²⁹³ This led to discussions of an expanded foreign assistance program, which Eisenhower called “the cheapest insurance in the world.”²⁹⁴ And for the president, India had “special status.”²⁹⁵ Admitting that he did not trust Nehru, Eisenhower nonetheless told the head of a media conglomerate visiting Asia that spring, “Don’t go slamming the Indians in any stories.” After all, if that country was lost to communism, “the free world will be up against it, not only in the East but throughout the world … We have got to keep them at least on the neutral side if we can.”²⁹⁶ This echoed Acheson’s remark that even though Nehru was “one of the most difficult men with whom I have ever had to deal,” he “was so important to India and India’s survival to all of us” that the US had little choice.²⁹⁷

      In congressional testimony in support of aid to India that summer, Dulles also echoed his predecessor, identifying Japan and India as the “keystones” of security in Asia. He noted that in both countries the most urgent problem was economic rather than military. Former ambassador Bowles talked of “competitive co-existence,” with Stassen highlighting the beginning of Soviet “economic warfare.”²⁹⁸ A foreign aid official elaborated to a key House subcommittee, “With Russia intensifying its efforts to get a foothold in India … and with China developing the show window,” it did set up a “competition” and made “the task of India and ourselves perhaps, as hard during the coming year as it has been so far.” When Rep. Judd raised concerns about aiding a “socialize[d]” India, the official suggested that, like Asian countries, the US should focus on the contrast between China and India rather than between the more similar American and Indian systems. Judd grudgingly acknowledged, “It is the philosophy of the lesser evil.”²⁹⁹

      Escalating India-Soviet interaction in 1955 only heightened US anxiety. So did intelligence assessments in early 1956 that indicated that China’s power and prestige had grown in Asia and that with Soviet assistance, Beijing’s military programs were charging ahead.³⁰⁰ Soviet efforts changed what Dulles called “the scene of the battle” in a way that would eventually come to benefit India.³⁰¹

      The tone in India had also changed. US assessments in the second half of 1955 indicated that there was a greater appreciation of American aid in India. There were also suggestions of cooperation in countries like Nepal to counter Chinese influence.³⁰² Nehru worked to limit public censure of the US, for example, by trying to restrict any official criticism of the Baghdad Pact to private channels.³⁰³ His efforts at message discipline hit a bump in the road with the Dulles statement on Goa. Nehru told senior officials of his concern that, without damage control, the negative reaction in the country would escalate, adversely affecting India-US relations and “indirectly … the question of our receiving any help from the US for our developmental programme.” He lamented to Pandit, “Everything that the US might have done to India is likely to be forgotten in the anger caused by this.”³⁰⁴

      For the Indian government, improved India-Soviet and Sino-Indian relationships only made it more important to maintain India’s relationship with the US. Nehru’s policy called for balance: between defense and development, but also between the Soviet Union and the United States. For one, this would allow India to play one off against the other. But more than that, Nehru hoped this would allow India to maintain its freedom of action by diversifying its dependence. Diversification would allow India to reduce dependence on any one country or bloc, as well as to cope with the questionable reliability of benefactors. Finally, it was necessary to maintain the US option because of continuing Indian concerns about the Soviet Union’s support of Indian communists and its lack of support for UN membership for a number of decolonized states.

      Thus, to maintain balance, even as Khrushchev and Bulganin were due to visit India, Nehru extended an invitation to Eisenhower. Worried about the American reaction to the Soviet leaders’ trip, he also tried to eliminate or limit their public criticism of the US.³⁰⁵ Then, in March 1956, India rejected a Soviet offer of aircraft, partly because Dulles had made clear that India was unlikely to receive economic aid from the US if it was spending money on Soviet aircraft.³⁰⁶

      It helped India’s case that, by spring 1956, China-India comparisons were being heard on Capitol Hill. China bloc members like Judd noted the importance of not jettisoning India, whose five-year plans were “succeeding due in no small degree to American assistance.” Another argument started to gain traction as well—not necessarily that the US should try to win India over, but that it should, at the very least, try to maintain the very Indian nonalignment that had previously created trouble in the US-India relationship. Representative Clement J. Zablocki (D-WI), who had led a congressional study mission to India, vocalized this sentiment, adding, “Discontinuing or stopping future assistance will only drive India further into the Soviet and Communist orbit.”³⁰⁷

      There was also some improvement in the interactions of policymakers on both sides. Dulles traveled to India in March 1956. While differences over issues like recognition of China remained, signs of change were evident. Nehru reiterated the need to resolve the offshore islands problem as soon as possible, but he admitted that the issue of Taiwan could be “deferred” for years. Furthermore, he acknowledged that though China was “inherently less aggressive than the Russians,” given that its experience with revolution was more recent, Beijing might be “more aggressive.” The tone of the Dulles-Nehru meeting also seemed less trenchant than three years before. Dulles described the conversations as “intimate and animated and informal”; the Indian prime minister called them “long and frank.” Both policymakers offered assurances and explanations on key subjects of concern to the other (Goa, Pakistan, the Soviet Union). Dulles also passed on Eisenhower’s invitation for Nehru to visit the US, which the prime minister seemed inclined to accept.³⁰⁸ Before that visit would take place in December, a number of changes would occur, including in how the two countries perceived and