Fateful Triangle. Tanvi Madan

Moreover, Indian diplomats in Moscow believed that “a little competition” would help India’s case with Washington.²³³ And while Nehru expected an “angry reaction” from American policymakers, he also thought that Soviet attention would generate among them “a feeling that India [was] even more important than they [had] thought, [and] far greater efforts should be made to win [India to] their side.”²³⁴ But, at least in the near term, that was not the impact Soviet aid had on the US.

      American policymakers warily watched the India-Soviet interactions. They believed there were limits to how far the new friendship could go, but saw it as a setback. The India-Soviet bonhomie contributed to skepticism within and outside the administration about aiding an India that supported Chinese and Soviet policies.²³⁵ Returning from a study mission to India, Representative Robert Byrd (D-WV) said the Soviet leaders’ trip only highlighted that India was not a dependable country. He said that while he had previously supported aid to India, it was time to “let Mr. Nehru and his people know that those who like to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds just can’t get American aid.” Representative Adair agreed, criticizing American and Indian officials urging assistance so that India could beat China in the development race.²³⁶ But it was that race that would eventually elicit the more positive American reaction that Nehru had expected.

      “Must Not Leave Backdoor Unlatched” (1950–1956)

      Why did the divergence on China policy from 1949 to 1956 not lead to a complete rupture between the US and India? For all their differences, both governments faced a dilemma then that they would continue to face over the next decade and a half: they may not have liked each other’s policies, but they needed each other. With China-India comparisons becoming commonplace and gaining strength in the early 1950s, US administrations could not see India fail or go communist like China. As Bowles put it in 1952, it was important to stop communists at the “front door,” but also crucial not to “leave [the] backdoor unlatched.”²³⁷ For India, the US was an essential component in its plans for development. Development, in turn, was seen as critical for India’s defense as well as its political stability. There was a broader political motivation as well—as Bajpai noted, “[The] Prime Minister made [a] great many promises and history may record it was Americans who made it possible for him to keep them.”²³⁸

      From the Truman administration’s perspective, difficulties with India over China notwithstanding, the communist takeover of China in 1949 and successful military action against UN forces in Korea in winter 1950 made it crucial that India did not “go communist” like China had. A State Department policy review in December 1950 noted that “India has become the pivotal state in non-Communist Asia by virtue of its relative power, stability and influence.”²³⁹ An NSC reassessment of South Asia policy in January 1951 stated that if India was lost, “for all practical purposes all of Asia would [be] lost; this would constitute a most serious and threatening blow to the security of the United States.”²⁴⁰ The loss of India would also constitute a political blow to the Truman administration, still suffering from accusations that it had lost China. The loss could happen either through the lack of economic development, leading to political and socioeconomic instability, or through India turning elsewhere for aid because it had not been forthcoming from the US. Consequently, the US needed to aid India’s development.

      Given Indian officials’ public statements, there was little point in the administration arguing to Congress that aid could win India over. Instead, as aid requests bluntly stated, the objective was to prevent India’s loss. This formulation was evident in Truman’s message to Congress supporting food aid legislation for India in 1951. As presidents after him would, he appealed for aid to India for strategic, symbolic, and humanitarian reasons. Acheson, on his part, replied in the affirmative when asked by Representative Jacob Javits (R-NY) if aid was to help “keep India in the column of the free people.” His special assistant, in turn, noted that there were some areas in the world where bread and butter rather than guns and bullets worked better to contain communism. And they would, moreover, also help strengthen the hand of those in the Indian government who were pro-US.²⁴¹

      Administration officials worried about the adverse impact of Indian rhetoric and actions on congressional support for aid to India and for foreign aid more broadly. Making the case for India despite its seeming intransigence, US officials like Assistant Secretary George McGhee argued, “India is too important to us and Nehru too important to India for us to take the easy road of concluding that we cannot work with Nehru. We must work with him.”²⁴² Many in the US public agreed. In October 1951, two-thirds of respondents asserted that the US should continue to try to cooperate closely with India despite India’s disagreement with America’s China and Korea policies.²⁴³

      India’s need for aid meant it had an interest in maintaining a working relationship with the US as well. Thus Nehru tried to minimize the impact of differences on his visit to the US in 1949.²⁴⁴ Later, in December 1950, the Indian finance minister acknowledged that India’s request for food aid indicated formal recognition that India needed the US for its major objective: peace and stability.²⁴⁵ The food minister bluntly noted to a US official, “We have got to have American help.”²⁴⁶ At the time, while the Soviet Union had offered food aid, only the US could provide the quantity that India needed, at the speed India wanted, and on terms India preferred. Policymakers were also cautious about accepting Beijing’s offers of assistance since promises of grain repeatedly fell short because of either China’s terms or its domestic needs. Furthermore, Beijing’s offers of grain were a double-edged sword for the Indian government: they helped to a limited degree, but they simultaneously constituted a propaganda coup for China’s alternate system.²⁴⁷ Finally, Indian policymakers realized that the acceptance of “red rice” might have an adverse impact on its position in the US—this contributed to India’s relative silence on its grain negotiations with China.²⁴⁸

      Indian officials also understood that the broader narrative could affect aid policy. Thus, in spring 1951, as the food assistance bills worked their way through Congress, they tried to limit criticism of the US in India. The food minister urged patience in parliament, stressing that, as in India, the bill had to go through a democratic process.²⁴⁹ Officials also waited to inform the US about the Indian inability to provide troops in Korea until after the passage of the bill.²⁵⁰ Subsequently, when Washington reacted negatively to India’s position on the Japan Peace Treaty, Delhi moderated its response. It also helped temper Rangoon’s reaction to American silence about the presence of GMD troops on Burmese territory.²⁵¹

      Moreover, in support of India’s case for US aid, some Indian commentators laid the groundwork for China-India comparisons. Westerners like Barbara Ward (and later Chester Bowles) had already outlined the idea of the two countries as “laboratories.”²⁵² Frank Moraes, editor of the Times of India, elaborated in Life magazine in 1951: “China and India are two testing grounds. If India … can assure her people of economic security and individual freedom, Asia will be won for democracy. But if India fails and China succeeds in proving that her present way of life offers food and employment for the millions, Asia will be lost to Communism.”²⁵³ Indian officials even employed the “loss” argument in the defense sphere. Officials negotiating for the purchase of tanks and aircraft from the US, for example, noted that it was not in US interest for India to become weak. Washington agreed, approving the sale of 200 Sherman tanks and 54 C-119 transport planes (though India did not eventually purchase that quantity).²⁵⁴

      Some in the US used the China loss analogy instrumentally to garner support for India, but there were also true believers. Publisher John Cowles noted in Look magazine that if the US did not support the stability of the Nehru government in India—“the last important stronghold of democracy in Asia”—it would be a mistake “almost as calamitous as the one we made in China.”²⁵⁵ Spurred by the arguments of Paul Hoffman, director of the Ford Foundation, Bowles also took to making explicit China-India “economic competition” references to lobby for economic aid for India.²⁵⁶ In a US election year, he further asked legislators to think about the repercussions for the country (and for them) if the US lost