When Culture Becomes Politics. Thomas Pedersen

The commitment to a social Europe is confirmed in the Berlin declaration, which refers to justice, social responsibility and solidarity as European values.³

      Europeans are deeply divided on the issue of the place of religion in society with 46 % saying that it is too important and 48 % disagreeing. On this question many French and German politicians take opposite views with German Christian democrats advocating the inclusion of a reference to Christianity in the EU constitution and French politicians calling for a clear separation between religion and politics in European – as well as national – politics.

      We may, however, be dealing with a spurious relationship in that many respondents may have been thinking about Muslim immigration when responding to the general question about religion. Unfortunately, Eurobarometer tends to ask one-off questions without following up with control questions, which is also the case here. However, in a separate question Eurobarometer does enquire about attitudes to immigrants. Interestingly, a majority of Europeans do not agree with the proposition that … “immigrants contribute a lot to our country”. Thus probably the surprisingly high number of people saying that they think religion plays too big a role in European society should not be interpreted as an indication that many Europeans are becoming atheists, but rather as a sign that there is widespread concern about the strong presence of a non-European religion on European soil.

      Homosexual marriages and child adoption by homosexual couples are rejected by a clear majority of European citizens with only 32 % in support, and there is even stronger opposition to the legalisation of cannabis. This pits the majority of Europeans against very libertarian nations like the Netherlands.

What has not been examined by Eurobarometer in the wider EU-27 context is the extent to which European citizens feel they share a common historical and cultural legacy. To what extent, for instance, do they feel they share a common philosophical tradition? Is there perhaps a “hidden Europe” in the sense of Europeans sharing a set of ideals and common cultural reference points originating in philosophy, literature, art etc? At the level of governments, we know more about this question: Thus the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, regards Europe as the “continent of tolerance”.⁴ But her conception of tolerance is a tolerance based on commitment to the European tradition. Thus in early 2007, Angela Merkel told the weekly Focus that she still regretted the fact that the current draft constitution does not include any mention of God or Christianity.⁵And in her speech in connection with the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Rome, the German chancellor referred not only to a European identity and to “basic European values”, but also – and more importantly – to Europe’s “Jewish-Christian roots” and to “the European way of life” as well as the “European social model”.⁶ The statements are historical, especially the use of the term “a European way of life”. The term a European way of life is cultural, and the use of it by a German chancellor raises the question, how she defines the European way of life, and what from her point of view are the implications for future, day-to-day politics in Europe – also keeping in mind the much more vague common statement on the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Rome.

The French political elite on the whole remains attached to the vision of a strong Europe, l’ Europe puissance, which has been French policy since the 1950s with de Gaulle’ s reign as a brief, intergovernmental interlude. The former Prime Minister, Dominique de Villepin, expresses it clearly and with a very French sense of the dramatic in a speech to the Humboldt University in 2006 … “there is such a thing as a European duty … Europe’s political ambition is immense: to find a balance between the multiple memories and the common future.” He later refers to “the European social and economic model” and to his belief in “a European, economic patriotism”. De Villepin also stresses that … “we affirm a European identity”; “Europe has its roots” and “there is such a thing as a European humanism”. One notes, however, that he does not talk about common European roots. Where the German chancellor refers to Christianity, De Villepin refers to humanism and secularism. He also – unlike the German chancellor – explicitly raises the question of Europe’s borders. In a rather sharp formulation and with a veiled criticism of the UK and the US, De Villepin states that … “there is no such thing as a natural or historical right to admission to the EU. And the promise of enlargement cannot be the only instrument for stabilizing Europe’s neighbouring regions”.⁷

If we turn to the opposite pole in the debate on this issue, the UK, we find a different position, but one that has evolved considerably in recent years, at least if one focuses upon the now former prime minister’s views. In a speech in 2001, Blair still emphasized the goal of efficiency in his statements on the future of Europe.⁸ In 2005 and 2006 the tone and message had changed: In a speech to the European Parliament in 2005, Blair declared … “I am a passionate pro-European”. He went on to state that … “this is a union of values, of solidarity between nations and peoples, of not just a common market in which we trade, but a common political space in which we live as citizens”. Gone was the talk of Europe as an economic enterprise … “I believe in Europe as a political project. I believe in a Europe with a strong and caring social dimension. I would never accept a Europe that was simply an economic market”.⁹ A year later, Blair had essentially taken on board the vision of France, Germany and its allies … “the issue at present is not the long term vision, but the short term strategy to realign today’s reality with it … I see a Europe around me that has a long term vision in need of a short term strategy … the vision is one that I share with Europe’s founders”.¹⁰

      As regards the proposed European constitution, over half of the people living in the countries, which at the time of the survey had not yet ratified the treaty establishing the European constitution, supported the constitution (53 %). This represents an improvement of 6 % compared with spring 2006. But it is a far cry from the large majorities normally associated with constitutional decisions.

      The European citizens’ attitude to the European institutions is not very well analyzed by Eurobarometer. Significantly, in a 2006-poll the question is not asked, what Europeans think about the European institutions as a whole, but instead a comparison about trust in individual institutions is made. This is a clever tactical move in that it sidesteps the fundamental question, if the current set of European institutions are deemed worthy of support and trust.

      The European Parliament remains the most trusted European institution with 52 % of all EU-citizens trusting it. The European Commission is trusted by 48 % of Europeans. Once again, the validity of this polling can be questioned. In recent years the summits (European Council) have gained in importance as an agenda-setting institution. Yet, neither the attitude to the European Council nor the attitude to the Council of ministers has been examined.

      Turning to more traditional questions, one notes a very considerable support for a common European foreign policy (68 %), and an even higher support for a common security and defence policy (75 %). The latter figure is surprisingly high and probably to some extent reflects context-specific factors such as widespread concern over US-policy in Iraq.

      To enquire about European identity also begs the question, which Europe? Not only in geographical terms but also in cultural and ideological terms. Our knowledge on this matter is imperfect in a number of respects. Thus a number of the existing polls, for instance on attitudes to citizens from other countries, only cover attitudes in the EU-15. We do however have data on EU-25 attitudes to further enlargement. On average, 46 % of EU citizens support further enlargement, while 42 % oppose it. This is a very significant opposition and a politically relevant opposition, since an important country