When Culture Becomes Politics. Thomas Pedersen

of high culture and ethnic groups this is not necessarily the case. At this level, citizens are likely to become more different or at least remain different. This is because technological globalization also offers new opportunities for implementing life projects or maintaining links between diasporas and the mother nation. Instead of gradual assimilation we are likely to see the emergence of parallel, ethnic communities on the fringe of national communities. Ralf Dahrendorf has talked about the emergence of a “new tribalism” in the world. This is a promising concept to the extent that it points to the growing cultural fragmentation and the decrease in the size of the typical cultural unit. Yet, Dahrendorf’s use of the concept of tribalism is unfortunate, since its ontology is fundamentally holistic despite the fact that what Dahrendorf wants to emphasize is precisely the loss of predictability and order.

      What are the implications for the study of European identity? Putting it briefly, I regard European identity at one and the same time as

      • personal

      • composite and

      • additive

      Personal in the sense that agency is regarded as more important than holistic structure, which implies that essentially identity – like culture – is not so much a matter of customs as a matter of (existential) choice. Now, existential choices can be made in many ways and contexts and can be difficult to identify. Discursive institutions compete for the attention of identity-seeking individuals, but essentially have no identities themselves. Thus even the seemingly rock-solid phenomenon of nationality is, I would argue, increasingly personalized. This understanding implies that research should focus upon the ideas and activities of citizens and “exemplary individuals”. In the EU-context research is being facilitated by the fact that a large amount of the common decisions are made by elites. Thus personal elite identities are an important field of study from this perspective.

Composite in the sense that, like European legitimacy, European identity must be seen as composed of different layers or sources, each of which to varying extents potentially contribute to a sense of common identity. The importance of each source depends upon its degree of fit with the innate needs of human beings. The basic view underlying this proposition is not altogether new: Psychologists increasingly emphasize the multidimensionality of social identity. Thus Cameron referring to other similar approaches proposes a three-factor model of social identity centering on centrality, in-group affect, and in-group ties.⁵¹ What is important in this context is the introduction of the notion of a composite identity – not so much the precise variables emphasized by Cameron. However, given my individualistic assumptions psychological research on individual identification must be accorded a role in the study of national or regional identity, although the emphasis must be upon existentialist, meaning-oriented psychology. It is interesting to note that Cameron also finds evidence in support of the conclusion that “group membership can mean different things to the same person”.⁵² And he observes that individual differences on various dimensions of social identity can be quite stable over time. All this implies that identity is reminiscent of a chord on a piano – composed of different sounds of attachment. Over time the relative weight of different sources of identity may change.

What I am advocating is in a sense an extension of a general conception of complexity. Thus Adrienne Héritier has characterized democratic legitimation in the EU as “composite”.⁵³ Although he draws attention to some mutually contradictory elements in the structure of legitimation, the interesting point is that it is argued that legitimation may rely on several, different sources, and – I shall come back to this point – that in large part these elements are additive.

      This understanding can be assumed to be applicable to the realm of European identity as well, since our underlying assumption is individualistic: Culture and democracy are not only linked but fundamentally overlapping. Just as we as citizens choose which politicians to support, so to a large extent we choose our own political – and to a significant extent, also our own cultural – identity. The important proposition I wish to make about Europe is that the variety of sources of common identity has ensured that a kind of supranational democracy has been able to survive in the absence of a foundation of common ethnicity.

      Additive therefore in the sense that at least in the European post-war context, common identity has not generally been seen as an either/or question, but more pragmatically as a multiple phenomenon, perhaps a reflection of a European learning process. This does not mean that there are no factors disrupting or slowing down the endeavours in the direction of a common European identity. It just means that it is possible for various sources of common identity to function in an additive way.

      This theoretical position involves certain methodological problems: It is difficult to test the “composite identity proposition” empirically. We have no polls explicitly comparing the relative importance of different sources of European identity. Nor do we have polls asking European citizens, if different sources of European identity are additive as opposed to competing. In this situation one has to make do with a theoretical argument, and try to back this up with reasoning by analogy. In any case, my individualist and pluralist conception of European identity implies that instead of talking about a European identity, it might be more helpful to use the softer concept European identity area, thus indicating the rejection of a strong and reified notion of identity.

The integrist position is not without its drawbacks: It implies i.a. a certain loss of predictive capacity. The emphasis is more upon situational logic, processes and personal experiences than upon structures and macro-patterns. It involves applying a kind of epistemic pragmatics, which is necessary in order to grasp contemporary complexity. In epistemological terms, it implies the need to use hermeneutical and perhaps also grounded theory and anthropological methods. However, from this it does not follow that one has to abandon positivism. A modern reflective positivism is compatible with a broad understanding of human motivation and agency. Some sociologists have tried to adapt to the challenges referred to in the foregoing, but simply talking in terms of i.a. a “comprehensive sociology” is not an adequate response to the challenges, we are confronted with⁵⁴.

      An immediate objection to my basic line of argument is that it fails to account for the great similarity in individual responses in a number of identity-related fields. For instance, how do we account for phenomena such as large-scale demonstrations or the continuing existence of very dogmatic, political parties? First of all, the fact that many people react the same way does not necessarily mean that they have not made a choice. It may simply mean that they have been facing a special choice situation, involving emotional simplification. Regarding identity-issues, it is likewise easy to lose sight of the choices behind identical identifications. Secondly, I therefore suggest we talk about ideal-type situations that may serve as identity-activators. Such activators do not cause reason to stop functioning, but just confront citizens with a special kind of affective choice situation that simplifies choices. But even very emotional appeals do not necessarily elicit the same response from citizens. We would expect citizens to react in broadly similar ways in a crisis situation. And yet, to take the case of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, European sympathy with Americans following the attack on the twin towers was very short-lived, soon to be followed by ideological clashes and clashes of interest. To take an example from another world, the fact that some commercials have no noticeable effect on individuals and the fact that some human beings do not even want to look at commercials shows how, in many everyday choice situations, human beings react very differently.

      I thus end this chapter with the proposition that holism generally has to be downgraded or abandoned in Political Science and particularly in studies of identity. Political Man ought to be conceived in broad terms as a being that combines rational and non-rational behaviour, and as a being that has a durable inner Self and makes existential choices about cultural identity. My integrist ontology points towards a theory of liberal culturalism in that it accords key importance to cultural factors but within the framework of a “liberal” approach broadly