From Manassas to Appomattox. James Longstreet

of war, and prepared to cross swords with his able adversary. At the opening of the campaign he had in hand one hundred and five thousand men. General Lee’s returns were not accurately made, but a fair estimate puts his numbers between eighty and eighty-five thousand.

      The losses of the campaign were, on the Union side, 15,249; on the Confederate side, greater; in the absence of complete returns, it is fair to say that they were from 18,000 to 19,000. Up to the time of Malvern Hill the casualties were about equally divided between the two armies, but in that battle the Confederates lost not far from 5000 men, and the Federals not more than one-third that number.

      Upon reaching the gunboats, General McClellan’s power was about doubled. Although fire from the gun-boats was not very effective against a land battle, the moral effect of fighting batteries that could not be reached was most powerful. It was reported on the Confederate side that General McClellan, on boarding one of the boats, where he spent most of the day of battle, said, “There should be a gunboat in every family.”

      Some critics say that McClellan should have taken Richmond during the campaign. The great Napoleon would have done so after the disaster at Malvern Hill with his regularly organized army of veterans. They say, too, that Lee should have captured McClellan and his army. So thought General Lee, but some of his leaders were working at cross-purposes, and did not have that close attention that the times called for.

      We may now consider the probable result of the plan mapped out and ordered by General Lee in his letter of June 11th to General Jackson had it been followed,—i.e., Jackson to march down the right bank of the Pamunkey with his troops from the Valley district and attack McClellan’s rear east of the Chickahominy, while Lee attacked from the Richmond side with his army. On the Richmond side, McClellan had four army corps, well fortified, supported by his powerful artillery. The battle of Gaines’s Mill, where the troops from the Valley were reinforced by four of Lee’s choice divisions and most of his cavalry,—more than doubling Jackson’s column,—may be significant of the result of Jackson’s attack on that side if it had been made as ordered. The battle of Malvern Hill, from an open field, may tell the result of an attack upon the four corps in their fortified position had the attack been made upon them from the Richmond front.

      Chapter XII.

       Halleck and Pope in Federal Command

       Table of Contents

      Centres of Activity gravitate towards Orange and Culpeper Counties—Pope’s Unsoldierly Preliminary Orders—Jackson’s and Pope’s Encounter at Cedar Mountain—Confidence in and Esteem for General Lee—The Confederate Commander’s Plans for cutting off Pope miscarry—Capture of Captain Fitzhugh with Important Orders—Longstreet puts General Toombs under Arrest—General Pope withdraws.

      The Federals had by this time organized the “Army of Virginia” from the independent forces in the State,—the First Corps under General Sigel, the Second under General Banks, the Third under General McDowell, commanded by Major-General John Pope, brought from the West for that object and appointed June 26. This army reported July 31, 46,858 strong, for field service.

      On the 23d of July, General H. W. Halleck assumed command of the Federal armies as general-in-chief, by order of the President of July 11.

      The quiet of General McClellan’s army at Harrison’s Landing assured General Lee of his opportunity for attention to the movements of the army under General Pope, working towards Richmond by the Orange and Alexandria Railway. On the 13th of July he ordered General Jackson, with his own and Ewell’s division, to Gordonsville, to have a watch upon the Federal force operating in that quarter, promising reinforcements as soon as occasion should call for them. Stuart was at Hanover Court-House, in observation towards Fredericksburg, and Robertson’s cavalry was ordered to Jackson, to reinforce his cavalry under Colonel Munford.

      To engage attention pending these movements, General D. H. Hill, in command on the south side of the James, was ordered to have all of his artillery on that side available put in battery on the banks of the river against McClellan’s camps on the north side and his transports on the water.

      General Pope immediately displayed bold front as a diversion, seeking to draw General Lee away from McClellan.

      So General Lee sent General A. P. Hill with his division to reinforce Jackson, with orders to the latter to strike out for the enemy in his front.

      The threatening attitude of the Confederates at Gordonsville caused apprehension at Washington, and induced the authorities to consider the withdrawal of McClellan’s army to reinforce the army under Pope.

      Upon receipt of an intimation to that effect, General McClellan ordered a strong force under General Hooker to advance in threatening move against General Lee on the 4th of August. Hooker marched on the 5th, and occupied the ground of the battle of Malvern Hill. General Lee ordered the divisions of McLaws, D. R. Jones, that under Ripley (D. H. Hill’s), and my own to march against Hooker. It was night when our troops were posted, and before daylight of the next morning Hooker had marched back to his camp at Harrison’s Landing.

      Just here, as a digression from following the operations of the armies of Lee and Pope, it should be remarked that the latter, by injudicious and unsoldierly attitude assumed at the outstart of his campaign, intensely incensed the people of Virginia and the South generally, the Confederate army to a man, and probably to a considerable degree discomfited the most considerate and thoughtful of his own officers and the authorities behind him. The exigencies of war did not demand some of the harsh measures that he promulgated,—such, for instance, as his notorious “General Orders No. 11” and several other of his pronunciamentos:

      “Head-quarters Army of Virginia,

       “Washington, July 23, 1862.

      “General Orders No. 11.41

      “Commanders of army corps, divisions, brigades, and detached commands will proceed immediately to arrest all disloyal male citizens within their lines or within their reach in rear of their respective stations.

      “Such as are willing to take the oath of allegiance to the United States, and will furnish sufficient security for its observance, shall be permitted to remain at their homes and pursue in good faith their accustomed avocations. Those who refuse shall be conducted south beyond the extreme pickets of this army, and be notified that if found again anywhere within our lines, or at any point in rear, they will be considered spies, and subjected to the extreme rigor of military law.

      “If any person, having taken the oath of allegiance as above specified, be found to have violated it, he shall be shot, and his property seized and applied to the public use.

      “All communication with any person whatever living within the lines of the enemy is positively prohibited, except through the military authorities and in the manner specified by military law; and any person concerned in writing or in carrying letters or messages in any other way will be considered and treated as a spy within the lines of the United States army.

      “By command of Major-General Pope.

      “Geo. D. Ruggles,

       “Colonel, Assistant Adjutant-General, and Chief of Staff.”

      This was a measure of unnecessary severity towards non-combatants, and had an unsalutary effect. When men volunteer to fight in their country’s cause they should be credited with faith in its righteousness, and with expectations of meeting soldiers worthy of their mettle. Appeals to turn their strength against women and children and non-combatants are offensive to manhood, demoralizing in influence, and more likely to aggravate and prolong war spirit than to open ways of order and amity. Besides, such orders indicate a flaw in the armor of the author.

      General Scott set an example worthy of eternal emulation. In his march through Mexico he was as strict in the requirement of order and protection for non-combatants as he could have been in marching through his own civil communities. The result was speedy peace, respect from all the people, admiration and