The Great Debate That Made the U.S. Constitution. Madison James

legislature should be elected by the State Legislatures, the second branch elected by the first — the Executive by the second together with the first; and other appointments again made for subordinate purposes by the Executive, the people would be lost sight of altogether; and the necessary sympathy between them and their rulers and officers, too little felt. He was an advocate for the policy of refining the popular appointments by successive filtrations, but thought it might be pushed too far. He wished the expedient to be resorted to only in the appointment of the second branch of the Legislature, and in the Executive & judiciary branches of the Government. He thought too that the great fabric to be raised would be more stable and durable, if it should rest on the solid foundation of the people themselves, than if it should stand merely on the pillars of the Legislatures.

Mr. Gerry did not like the election by the people. The maxims taken from the British Constitution were often fallacious when applied to our situation which was extremely different. Experience he said had shewn that the State legislatures drawn immediately from the people did not always possess their confidence. He had no objection however to an election by the people if it were so qualified that men of honor & character might not be unwilling to be joined in the appointments. He seemed to think the people might nominate a certain number out of which the State legislatures should be bound to choose.3

      Mr. Butler thought an election by the people an impracticable mode.

      On the question for an election of the first branch of the national Legislature, by the people,

      Massachusetts ay. Connecticut divd. N. York ay. N. Jersey no. Pennsylvania ay. Delawer divd. Virginia ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Georgia ay.

      The remaining Clauses of Resolution 4th relating to the qualifications of members of the National Legislature, being posponed nem. con., as entering too much into detail for general propositions.

      The Committee proceeded to Resolution 5. "that the second, (or senatorial) branch of the National Legislature ought to be chosen by the first branch out of persons nominated by the State Legislatures."

Mr. Spaight contended that the 2d branch ought to be chosen by the State Legislatures and moved an amendment to that effect.4

      Mr. Butler apprehended that the taking so many powers out of the hands of the States as was proposed, tended to destroy all that balance and security of interests among the States which it was necessary to preserve; and called on Mr. Randolph the mover of the propositions, to explain the extent of his ideas, and particularly the number of members he meant to assign to this second branch.

Mr. Randolph observed that he had at the time of offering his propositions stated his ideas as far as the nature of general propositions required; that details made no part of the plan, and could not perhaps with propriety have been introduced. If he was to give an opinion as to the number of the second branch, he should say that it ought to be much smaller than that of the first; so small as to be exempt from the passionate proceedings to which numerous assemblies are liable. He observed that the general object was to provide a cure for the evils under which the U. S. laboured; that in tracing these evils to their origin every man had found it in the turbulance and follies of democracy: that some check therefore was to be sought for against this tendency of our Governments: and that a good Senate seemed most likely to answer the purpose.5

      Mr. King reminded the Committee that the choice of the second branch as proposed (by Mr. Spaight) viz. by the State Legislatures would be impracticable, unless it was to be very numerous, or the idea of proportion among the States was to be disregarded. According to this idea, there must be 80 or 100 members to entitle Delaware to the choice of one of them. — Mr. Spaight withdrew his motion.

      Mr. Wilson opposed both a nomination by the State Legislatures, and an election by the first branch of the national Legislature, because the second branch of the latter, ought to be independent of both. He thought both branches of the National Legislature ought to be chosen by the people, but was not prepared with a specific proposition. He suggested the mode of chusing the Senate of N. York to wit of uniting several election districts for one branch, in chusing members for the other branch, as a good model.

Mr. Madison observed that such a mode would destroy the influence of the smaller States associated with larger ones in the same district; as the latter would chuse from within themselves, altho' better men might be found in the former. The election of Senators in Virginia where large & small counties were often formed into one district for the purpose, had illustrated this consequence. Local partiality, would often prefer a resident within the County or State, to a candidate of superior merit residing out of it. Less merit also in a resident would be more known throughout his own State.6

      "Mr. King objected to the postponement for the reasons which he had offered before." — Pierce's Notes, Id., iii., 319.

Mr. Sherman favored an election of one member by each of the State Legislatures.7

      Mr. Pinkney moved to strike out the "nomination by the State Legislatures;" on this question.

8Massachusetts no. Connecticut no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pennsylvania no. Del. divd. Virginia no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Georg no.

      On the whole question for electing by the first branch out of nominations by the State Legislatures, Mass. ay. Connecticut no. N. Y. no. N. Jersey, no. Pennsylvania no. Del. no. Virginia ay. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Georgia no.

      So the clause was disagreed to & a chasm left in this part of the plan.

      The sixth Resolution stating the cases in which the national Legislature ought to legislate was next taken into discussion: On the question whether each branch should originate laws, there was an unanimous affirmative without debate. On the question for transferring all the Legislative power of the existing Congress to this Assembly, there was also a silent affirmative nem. con.

      On the proposition for giving "Legislative power in all cases to which the State Legislatures were individually incompetent,"

Mr. Pinkney & Mr. Rutledge9 objected to the vagueness of the term incompetent, and said they could not well decide how to vote until they should see an exact enumeration of the powers comprehended by this definition.10

      Mr. Butler repeated his fears that we were running into an extreme in taking away the powers of the States, and called on Mr. Randolph for the extent of his meaning.

      Mr. Randolph disclaimed any intention to give indefinite powers to the national Legislature, declaring that he was entirely opposed to such an inroad on the State jurisdictions, and that he did not think any considerations whatever could ever change his determination. His opinion was fixed on this point.

      Mr. Madison said that he had brought with him into the Convention a strong bias in favor of an enumeration and definition of the powers necessary to be exercised by the national Legislature; but had also brought doubts concerning its practicability. His wishes remained unaltered; but his doubts had become stronger. What his opinion might ultimately be he could not yet tell. But he should shrink from nothing which should be found essential to such a form of Government as would provide for the safety, liberty and happiness of the community. This being the end of all our deliberations, all the necessary means for attaining it must, however reluctantly, be submitted to.

      On the question for giving powers, in cases to which the States are not competent — Massachusetts ay. Connecticut divd. (Sherman no. Elseworth ay.) N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pennsylvania ay. Del. ay.Virginia ay. N. C. ay. S. Carolina ay. Georgia ay.

      The other clauses