Return to Winter. Douglas E. Schoen

language for U.S. involvement in Central Asia and the Middle East. (He shows no such compunction, of course, when it comes to his own interventions.) Now, the Chinese find the concept of national sovereignty amenable as well, given their concerns about American support for Japan in the South China Sea and other strategic concerns in the Far East. It was all part of a broader expression of “strategic partnership” that included support for each other’s territorial claims and goals. In a press conference with Xi, Putin even referred to Japan and Germany as “the defeated powers” from World War II.⁴⁰

      A WAKE-UP CALL

      In spring 2013, the world braced for a potentially catastrophic war on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea’s mysterious young leader, Kim Jong Un, was systematically cutting ties with the South, making threatening statements, and preparing a new missile launch. While periodic provocations from North Korea have become almost commonplace over the last two decades, the crisis unfolding in March and April 2013 seemed more severe, and it highlighted how destructive the leadership gap in Washington is becoming for our national security. While the Obama administration seemed to take the Pyongyang crisis seriously, it appears to lack an understanding of the bigger picture—the role China plays here and elsewhere, and the broader challenge all these crises present to U.S. interests.

      There are exceptions to the general lack of understanding. “Chinese behavior has been very disappointing,” said Senator John McCain. “Whether it be on cyber security, whether it be on confrontation on the South China Sea, or whether it be their failure to rein in what could be a catastrophic situation.” Warning that accidental war could break out on the Korean peninsula, McCain blamed China as an enabler of the North Korean regime and its nuclear program. “China does hold the key to this problem,” McCain said. “China could cut off their economy if they want to.”⁴¹ (From time to time, China does put the hammer down on its troublesome ally, as in May 2013, when Beijing announced that its biggest foreign-exchange bank, the Bank of China, would stop doing business with North Korea’s Foreign Trade Bank, which the U.S. has accused of facilitating transactions linked to weapons of mass destruction.⁴²)

      McCain’s frank talk is refreshing, but the Arizona senator is one of the few engaging in it. Far too few lawmakers on either side of the aisle are willing to put themselves on the line about the fundamental foreign-policy challenges facing the United States, though we desperately need American political leadership here—it makes a difference. During the height of the Chinese currency manipulation, for instance, Senator Sherrod Brown’s persistent criticism had a real impact; China has much modulated its practices in this regard. Likewise, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s defense of U.S. firms overseas—where, as she put it, they felt that the “deck was stacked against them”—has helped open markets for American companies.⁴³

      Leadership means not only speaking up, but also taking real action—and yes, taking action involves risk. But it also holds the promise of finding solutions. We don’t have the luxury of talking around these problems. America’s oft described “intervention fatigue” should not, and cannot, result in responsibility fatigue: the responsibility for our safety and prosperity and our obligation to the free world, which looks to us for leadership.

      Millions look to us as custodians of their defense against aggression and intimidation. They also look to America to uphold the principles we share: democracy, human rights, transparent government, and the rule of law. In short, if we believe in protecting our principles and privileges as American citizens, we must start thinking and acting to address these challenges. If we also wish to maintain our role as champion of such principles around the world, we must conduct ourselves accordingly. That is what we had to do during the Cold War. In this new era, we must make ourselves literate in our new, uncomfortable burdens.

      Americans must begin by acknowledging the realities. It took us too long to grasp the threat from militant Islam. When we finally did, we ignored the far more powerful adversaries waiting in the wings who were marshaling their strength and pretending to offer support while studying our weaknesses and exploiting our exhaustion. Russia and China emerged immeasurably stronger from America’s War on Terror. America, on the other hand, emerged deep in debt and uncertain of its calling.

      America’s misadventures in Iraq and Afghanistan have created the impression of American weakness. Our Axis rivals drew predictable conclusions. They saw that the interventions resulted in years-long chaos and in vast, untenable expenditures. They witnessed the spectacle of the lone superpower bogged down by insurgents. And they recognized a chance to reassert themselves. In his book about the rise of China, The Contest for Supremacy, Princeton professor Aaron L. Friedberg describes the opportunity China saw in American duress: “In the words of a People’s Liberation Army–sponsored journal . . . ‘Simply put, the United States has begun to enter a period of relative decline.’ While the United States wallowed, other potential power centers would continue to grow and ‘of course, China first of all.’”⁴⁴ The official Chinese Communist Party newspaper even gloated in a 2009 article: “U.S. strength is declining at a speed so fantastic that it is far beyond anticipation.”⁴⁵

      Why do we find ourselves so unprepared at this moment in history?

      There is plenty of blame to go around in the post-Soviet history of American foreign policy. Both Republicans and Democrats in Washington have helped forge our current predicament. The West missed many chances to disarm the Russian Bear in the post–Cold War era and to force Russian concessions on other issues. The potential for chaos, as first the Soviet Empire collapsed and then Russia itself began to fray, was perhaps too daunting. Bill Clinton seldom criticized Moscow throughout the 1990s, at the time of Russia’s greatest post-Soviet weakness, to avoid exacerbating instability. George W. Bush was taken in by Putin’s charisma, infamously proclaiming that he had looked the Russian leader in the eyes and gotten “a sense of his soul.”⁴⁶ Bush allowed himself to be lulled into a false security that Putin shared his democratic goals. But at least Bush understood that Putin had strategic objectives, even if he misjudged what they were. President Obama doesn’t seem to appreciate that Russian activities are part of broader geopolitical goals. He dismisses Putin’s tough-guy “shtick” and says that he acts like the “bored kid in the back of the classroom.”⁴⁷ This is a terribly foolish, cynical way to talk and think.

      Likewise, we abstained from any confrontation with China after the Tiananmen Square massacres. U.S. companies had too much invested in China’s stability. We told ourselves for years that economic prosperity in China would, sooner or later, lead to greater democratization.

      A decade later, after 9/11, as we focused all our attention and national will on Islamist terrorists, Moscow rebuilt its challenge—aided by President George W. Bush’s overstretch into Iraq and Afghanistan and by our vital need to view Putin as an ally. Meanwhile, political negligence and economic dependence left us mostly passive in the face of mounting Chinese power. Finally, as President Obama struggles to nurse the U.S. economy back to health, he has shown almost no inclination to confront Russia or China. For two decades, it has been a sorry litany of missed chances, poor choices, and hubristic acts of weakness. As a result, we face a challenge more formidable than any since the height of Soviet Communism—certainly one that is more formidable, over the long term, than that presented by al-Qaeda. There is no scenario in which militant Islam can dominate the globe.

      The Axis partners are capable of just that and have deployed their resources precisely to that end—even as they recognize the complexity of the world they live in and the limitations on their own efforts. Both Russia and China, of course, maintain relationships with the United States that are often cooperative in certain areas. Moscow and Washington have made substantial progress in trade and investment relations, which will be aided further by Russia’s joining the World Trade Organization. China and the United States are also economic partners; the Chinese have also taken part in joint military exercises with the United States to increase familiarity and lessen chances of conflict or misunderstanding in common international waters. Unlike the non-state actors of the Islamic world, Moscow and Beijing are in the business of survival. Martyrdom does not interest them. They don’t go about provoking manifestly stronger adversaries—and they recognize, for the time being, the United States’