The Hellenistic Settlements in the East from Armenia and Mesopotamia to Bactria and India. Getzel M. Cohen

practice of either Alexander or the Seleucids.

      We actually find relatively more settlements in this region—for example, ANTIOCH, APOLLONIA, ARTEMITA, and CHALA—than in the most areas of the Iranian plateau on the other side of the Zagros Mountains. None were apparently of any great importance.⁶⁷

      THE IRANIAN PLATEAU

      In any discussion of the Hellenistic Near East, it immediately becomes clear that once we cross the Tigris and move east the environment begins to change in a number of ways. I have already mentioned that the minting of quasi-municipal coinage, which is found in southeastern Anatolia, northern Syria, and Phoenicia, as well as northern Mesopotamia, is not attested in southern Mesopotamia, Iran, or any other point farther east. The territory east of the Tigris that Seleukos Nikator initially controlled was immense. The farther east beyond the Tigris that the Greeks and Macedonians went the fewer there were of them and the more difficult it was for them to come over from the Greek mainland. Furthermore, the Iranian plateau and central Asia encompass a vast area.⁶⁸ One thinks, incidentally, of the colonial French in the great stretches of what they called the “pays d’en haut” of North America during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—that is, the land upriver from Montreal or, roughly, western Ontario, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin.⁶⁹ French explorers, hunters, and traders roamed over this region. The names of numerous towns and cities in this regions (and beyond) recall their presence: for example, Presque Isle (Pennsylvania), Belpre—originally, Belle Prairie—(Ohio), Detroit and Sault Ste. Marie (Michigan), Terre Haute, French Lick, and Versailles (Indiana), La Salle (Illinois), Eau Claire and Marquette (Wisconsin), and so on. But in most cases the toponyms are all that remain as witnesses of the French presence. Why is this? There are, of course, many reasons and numerous explanations. Most of the French operating in these regions were traders and hunters, not settlers. Furthermore, the French colonial officials never followed a cohesive policy to encourage settlement of this area. Their apparent avoidance of a clearly articulated settlement policy may also reflect, among other things, a harsh demographic fact: there were not enough Frenchmen available (or willing) to settle this vast area.

      Like the French in North America, there were not enough Graeco-Macedonian settlers to fill the vast stretches of the Iranian plateau and central Asia.⁷⁰ A glance at a map of the Iranian plateau makes clear both the extraordinarily large area under consideration and the relative paucity of Hellenistic settlements in most parts of it. The contrast with Syria is quite striking. Furthermore, climate and geography will have made this region much less attractive to Greeks and Macedonians than, for example, Syria and Phoenicia. By comparison with the moderate Mediterranean climate of Syria and Phoenicia, the continental climate of the Iranian plateau and central Asia is harsh: hot, dry summers and cold winters.⁷¹ Furthermore, the Iranian plateau is mostly rocky and dry; it has two salt deserts in the center and is surrounded by mountain ranges that extend well into much of central Asia.⁷²

      In addition, we should bear in mind the geopolitical context.⁷³ In recent years scholars have correctly reemphasized the importance of Mesopotamia and especially Babylonia in the Seleucid realm.⁷⁴ Nevertheless, we should not forget that in 300 B.C., immediately after his conquest of northern Syria, Seleukos made the conscious decision to establish four major settlements there, including the foundation that was destined to become the capital of his kingdom, ANTIOCH near Daphne. Despite the establishment of Antiochos I in SELEUKEIA on the Tigris as coruler, the net effect of that decision focused Seleucid attention westward and undoubtedly weakened Seleucid authority beyond the Tigris, namely, in Iran and especially points farther east. One thinks of Edmund Burke’s observation in his “Speech on Conciliation with America,” which he delivered on March 22, 1775: “The last cause of this disobedient spirit in the [American] colonies is hardly less powerful than the rest, as it is not merely moral, but laid deep in the natural constitution of things. Three thousand miles of ocean lie between you and them. No contrivance can prevent the effect of this distance in weakening government. Seas roll, and months pass, between the order and the execution; and the want of a speedy explanation of a single point is enough to defeat a whole system. . . . In large bodies, the circulation of power must be less vigorous at the extremities. Nature has said it. The Turk cannot govern Egypt, and Arabia, and Kurdistan, as he governs Thrace; nor has he the same dominion in Crimea and Algiers which he has at Brusa and Smyrna. . . . The Sultan gets such obedience as he can. He governs with a loose rein, that he may govern at all; and the whole of the force and vigour of his authority in his centre is derived from a prudent relaxation in all his borders. Spain, in her provinces, is perhaps not so well obeyed as you are in yours. This is the immutable condition, the eternal law, of extensive and detached empire.” What affected the Turkish sultan doubtless affected the Seleucid kings as well.

      At least two other factors increased the difficulty of controlling the regions beyond the Tigris in the course of the third century B.C.: the restlessness and unhappiness of the Greeks in central Asia (on which, see below), the continuing warfare between the Seleucids and the Ptolemies—the so-called Syrian Wars—and the intermittent outbreaks of internecine warfare such as the “War of the Brothers.” Not surprisingly, various Macedonian generals in these eastern areas took advantage of these preoccupations in order to separate themselves and their fiefdoms from central Seleucid control (Strabo 11.11.1, 15.1.3).⁷⁵ It was only at the very end of the third century that a Seleucid monarch—Antiochos III—attempted to reassert royal control over these areas. Antiochos was successful, if only briefly. Soon after his defeat at Magnesia in 190 B.C. the Seleucids permanently lost control of large areas in the east—Bactria and the adjacent regions. Most of Iran remained under Seleucid hegemony during the first half of the second century B.C. In Media, it will be recalled, Antiochos IV Epiphanes refounded Ekbatana as an EPIPHANEIA. Nevertheless, the combined pressure of a native uprising under Epiphanes in Elymais followed by Parthian incursions in Elymais and Media further weakened the royal presence there until, finally, in 129 B.C. the Seleucids permanently lost control of all their territory beyond the Euphrates.

      E. Bickerman has correctly pointed out that we probably know less about the native Iranians under Hellenistic rule than we do about the indigenous inhabitants of, for example, Babylonia, Syria, or Phoenicia: contemporary records were written on perishable materials (e.g., leather, wood, and papyrus); furthermore, very few Greek inscriptions have thus far been found.⁷⁶ There are a number of monuments, bas-reliefs, and statues that recall the Graeco-Macedonian presence in these areas, but a memorial or monument does not necessarily indicate the existence of a Hellenistic settlement. The reception of the Hellenistic Greeks in the region of the Iranian plateau also presents a rather well-defined contrast with areas farther to the west. Thus, E. Yarshater has observed that the impact of the Greeks “produced in Iran a result differing from that in Syria, Asia Minor, and Egypt. Hellenism in these countries had a full flowering and spread a new form of culture; in Iran it remained only an influence—albeit a strong one. In other words, Iran did not lose its basic identity and did not abandon its own cultural traits, embodied above all in its religion. It soon attempted to pull away from the West. . . . Hellenism, which had been superimposed on latent national tendencies, was cast off in a movement initiated by the Parthians and carried out by the Sasanians.”⁷⁷ This is not to deny any Greek influence in the region. Quite the contrary. Thus, when the Parthians came to power they struck coins patterned after Seleucid models, complete with Greek legends. Furthermore, it useful to bear in mind that the Seleucid dynasty itself was half-Iranian in origin: Seleukos I Nikator had married Apama, the daughter of the Bactrian Spitamenes (Arr. 7.4.6). Thus, their son, Antiochos I Soter, was half-Iranian. But all these examples reflect the upper and ruling classes. The extent of the influence on the general population remains doubtful. In this context we may recall W. W. Tarn’s observation that the Greek and Macedonian settlers generally remained in the settlements and did not go out into the countryside.⁷⁸

      I have already alluded to some of the factors that will have discouraged heavy colonization on the Iranian plateau. Nevertheless, there was a relatively strong concentration of Hellenistic settlements in northwestern (and, to a lesser degree, northeastern) Iran.⁷⁹ This is especially noticeable in Media and the adjacent regions. The importance of Media to the Seleucids was noted by Strabo, who called them “the