The Foundations of Science: Science and Hypothesis, The Value of Science, Science and Method. Henri Poincare

enabling us to recognize the straight line and to distinguish it from every other line.

      Shall we say, for instance: "the following is such a property: the straight line is a line such that a figure of which this line forms a part can be moved without the mutual distances of its points varying and so that all points of this line remain fixed"?

      This, in fact, is a property which, in Euclidean or non-Euclidean space, belongs to the straight and belongs only to it. But how shall we ascertain experimentally whether it belongs to this or that concrete object? It will be necessary to measure distances, and how shall one know that any concrete magnitude which I have measured with my material instrument really represents the abstract distance?

      We have only pushed back the difficulty.

      In reality the property just enunciated is not a property of the straight line alone, it is a property of the straight line and distance. For it to serve as absolute criterion, we should have to be able to establish not only that it does not also belong to a line other than the straight and to distance, but in addition that it does not belong to a line other than the straight and to a magnitude other than distance. Now this is not true.

      It is therefore impossible to imagine a concrete experiment which can be interpreted in the Euclidean system and not in the Lobachevskian system, so that I may conclude:

      No experience will ever be in contradiction to Euclid's postulate; nor, on the other hand, will any experience ever contradict the postulate of Lobachevski.

      5. But it is not enough that the Euclidean (or non-Euclidean) geometry can never be directly contradicted by experience. Might it not happen that it can accord with experience only by violating the principle of sufficient reason or that of the relativity of space?

      I will explain myself: consider any material system; we shall have to regard, on the one hand, 'the state' of the various bodies of this system (for instance, their temperature, their electric potential, etc.), and, on the other hand, their position in space; and among the data which enable us to define this position we shall, moreover, distinguish the mutual distances of these bodies, which define their relative positions, from the conditions which define the absolute position of the system and its absolute orientation in space.

      The laws of the phenomena which will happen in this system will depend on the state of these bodies and their mutual distances; but, because of the relativity and passivity of space, they will not depend on the absolute position and orientation of the system.

      In other words, the state of the bodies and their mutual distances at any instant will depend solely on the state of these same bodies and on their mutual distances at the initial instant, but will not at all depend on the absolute initial position of the system or on its absolute initial orientation. This is what for brevity I shall call the law of relativity.

      Hitherto I have spoken as a Euclidean geometer. As I have said, an experience, whatever it be, admits of an interpretation on the Euclidean hypothesis; but it admits of one equally on the non-Euclidean hypothesis. Well, we have made a series of experiments; we have interpreted them on the Euclidean hypothesis, and we have recognized that these experiments thus interpreted do not violate this 'law of relativity.'

      We now interpret them on the non-Euclidean hypothesis: this is always possible; only the non-Euclidean distances of our different bodies in this new interpretation will not generally be the same as the Euclidean distances in the primitive interpretation.

      Will our experiments, interpreted in this new manner, still be in accord with our 'law of relativity'? And if there were not this accord, should we not have also the right to say experience had proven the falsity of the non-Euclidean geometry?

      It is easy to see that this is an idle fear; in fact, to apply the law of relativity in all rigor, it must be applied to the entire universe. For if only a part of this universe were considered, and if the absolute position of this part happened to vary, the distances to the other bodies of the universe would likewise vary, their influence on the part of the universe considered would consequently augment or diminish, which might modify the laws of the phenomena happening there.

      But if our system is the entire universe, experience is powerless to give information about its absolute position and orientation in space. All that our instruments, however perfected they may be, can tell us will be the state of the various parts of the universe and their mutual distances.

      So our law of relativity may be thus enunciated:

      The readings we shall be able to make on our instruments at any instant will depend only on the readings we could have made on these same instruments at the initial instant.

      Now such an enunciation is independent of every interpretation of experimental facts. If the law is true in the Euclidean interpretation, it will also be true in the non-Euclidean interpretation.

      Allow me here a short digression. I have spoken above of the data which define the position of the various bodies of the system; I should likewise have spoken of those which define their velocities; I should then have had to distinguish the velocities with which the mutual distances of the different bodies vary; and, on the other hand, the velocities of translation and rotation of the system, that is to say, the velocities with which its absolute position and orientation vary.

      To fully satisfy the mind, the law of relativity should be expressible thus:

      The state of bodies and their mutual distances at any instant, as well as the velocities with which these distances vary at this same instant, will depend only on the state of those bodies and their mutual distances at the initial instant, and the velocities with which these distances vary at this initial instant, but they will not depend either upon the absolute initial position of the system, or upon its absolute orientation, or upon the velocities with which this absolute position and orientation varied at the initial instant.

      Unhappily the law thus enunciated is not in accord with experiments, at least as they are ordinarily interpreted.

      Suppose a man be transported to a planet whose heavens were always covered with a thick curtain of clouds, so that he could never see the other stars; on that planet he would live as if it were isolated in space. Yet this man could become aware that it turned, either by measuring its oblateness (done ordinarily by the aid of astronomic observations, but capable of being done by purely geodetic means), or by repeating the experiment of Foucault's pendulum. The absolute rotation of this planet could therefore be made evident.

      That is a fact which shocks the philosopher, but which the physicist is compelled to accept.

      We know that from this fact Newton inferred the existence of absolute space; I myself am quite unable to adopt this view. I shall explain why in Part III. For the moment it is not my intention to enter upon this difficulty.

      Therefore I must resign myself, in the enunciation of the law of relativity, to including velocities of every kind among the data which define the state of the bodies.

      However that may be, this difficulty is the same for Euclid's geometry as for Lobachevski's; I therefore need not trouble myself with it, and have only mentioned it incidentally.

      What is important is the conclusion: experiment can not decide between Euclid and Lobachevski.

      To sum up, whichever way we look at it, it is impossible to discover in geometric empiricism a rational meaning.

      6. Experiments only teach us the relations of bodies to one another; none of them bears or can bear on the relations of bodies with space, or on the mutual relations of different parts of space.

      "Yes," you reply, "a single experiment is insufficient, because it gives me only a single equation with several unknowns; but when I shall have made enough experiments I shall have equations enough to calculate all my unknowns."

      To know the height of the mainmast does not suffice for calculating the age of the captain. When you have measured every bit of wood in the ship you will have many equations, but you will know his age no better. All your measurements bearing only on your bits of wood can reveal to you nothing except