1917. Key to the “Russian” Revolution. Николай Стариков

[32]

      In other words, Russians weren't starving any more than people in other countries at war and were much better than in the "free" Russia soon after the second and the third revolutions. And the deprivation experienced by the Petrograd citizens in 1917 definitely couldn't match the dreadful hunger people suffered during the Blockade of Leningrad. And it wasn't just the same city, many of the people were the same. Yet, starving to death in 1942, people didn't take to the streets to demand bread. Was it because people perceived the opponent differently? Was it because they were ideologically brain-washed? Yes, indeed. Yet, the main thing was that everyone knew that the government wouldn't tolerate any tricks and would suppress any the demonstrations definitely playing in the opponent's favor. And there were no instigators or leaders, no one to fire up and manipulate the crowd to direct it in accordance with their own needs. I mean, it was so easier for the foreign spies to work in Petrograd of 1917 than in Leningrad of 1942…

      The economy of the Russian Empire groaned, rattled, but stood up even to the enormous expenses for the war. If in 1914 the war expenses of Russia came to 1,655 mln rubles, in 1915 they were 8,818 mln rubles, and in 1916 they were 14,573 mln rubles.[33] Deliveries of military equipment were to a certain extent covered with the loans provided by Britain and the USA. The military draft sucked out up to 15 mln adult males from Russia. When this figure is announced out of context, it does astound. If compared with other belligerent countries, though, things look much different. Russian peasants draught to the army made up about 9% of the Russian population, whereas German and France sent about 20% of their adult males to fight. Even in Britain, which always used someone else to do the dirty work, it was about 13%.[34]

      The situation in Russia was not worse but better than in other countries at war! In Germany they had to draft 17-year-olds, some voted for general mobilization of all males from 15 to 60.[35] The high command demanded that this military service obligation "should be extended to women, at least, to a certain extent." In January 1916, the Emperor of Austria issued a decree declaring males of 50 to 55 liable for military service; in Turkey, it was up to 50.[36] As we see, toils of war affected Russia not more than the other countries at war.

      Why did the revolution happen in our country, then?

      This is the question we need to ask again and again. Might it be because of the country's lands occupied by the opponent? But then the revolution definitely should have happened in Paris, not in Petrograd, as half of the French lands were under the German heel. A great scene for disturbance formed in Romania. Their army was completely defeated, most of the country and even the capital were occupied by the Germans. And we just lost Poland, which wasn't too important to us, and some Baltic provinces. These lands didn't matter for food supply to the country. All the primordially Russian lands were safe and sound. The production sector was okay, and the population didn't suffer the horrors of war made beyond the stabilized front line. The primary blooming part of Russia was going to be destroyed much later, during the Civil War that was started with this objective, with the direct instigation and strong contribution of the Entente.

      Thus, there were no typical prerequisites that normally lead to riots and then to revolutions in war times. But for one, though – the wish of the British government to destroy their dangerous geopolitical opponents and the ability of the British intelligence to provoke unrest, turmoil, and regime changes in the undesirable states.

      To make the next move towards correct understanding of what happened in February, we should talk not about reasons of the revolution in general, but about why it actually started:

      • exactly in 1917;

      • exactly in February of that year.

      There were several reasons for that, and their coincidence caused that month of that year to put a start to the Russian tragedy…

      The Russian industry was taking every effort to rearm its army as fast as possible. Our military experience obviously demonstrated that we could only rely on ourselves. Deliveries of weapons from the "allies" were accurately measured and pursued a two-fold task – not to let Russia be resoundingly defeated and leave the war and to prevent decisive victories in the Eastern Front. Weakened yet resisting, Russia was needed to fulfil certain scenarios, and the completion time for those plans was drawing close…

      At the same time, the Russian government faced the future with confidence. Next year they planned to significantly improve the military situation in the country: the dreadful scourge of the Russian Army, the missile shortage, was coming to its end. It was impossible to measure how many lives we've paid for that persistent silence of the Russian arms. At early stages of the war the field artillery had a reserve of 1,000 missiles per a piece of ordnance, and by 1917 it was 4,000 missiles.[37] This empowered the Russians to plan any heavy attacks with a due preparatory bombardment of the opponent's defense posture. It clearly made the breakthrough and the victory much more possible. If the Russian soldiers managed to carry the war on without missiles and ammo, they were going to become simply unbeatable once they had them.

      Armed with only rifles, our soldiers mowed out the best of the Austro-Hungarian Army in the battlefields of Galicia and the Carpathian ravines. The Germans got their share, too – according to statistics, the German regiments fighting in the East Front suffered twice as many losses than the Germans battling in the west. The Turks, who had defeated the British and the French, suffered a catastrophic defeat from the Russian Army, and the Russian soldiers were at the approaches to Iraq already. And this heroic army entered the year 1917 as strong as ever.

      Both Russia and its "allies" planned their offensive blows in spring and summer. The German Army, by contrast, planned its strategic defense. "Our position was really challenging and almost desperate. We couldn't think of any offence, and we had to keep our reserves ready for defense. Any of the Entente members would hardly be put out of action. Our defeat seemed inevitable…" Erich Ludendorff wrote in his memoirs.[38]

      The German Army was pessimistic as they were reported not only by the German ministers but by their Austro-Hungarian colleagues, too. And the latter were full of some goner's "optimism."

      "It is quite obvious that our military strength is coming to an end. To enter into lengthy details in this connection would be to take up your Majesty's time needlessly. I allude only to the decrease in raw materials for the production of munitions, to the thoroughly exhausted human materials, and, above all, to the dull despair that pervades all classes owning to undernourishment and renders impossible any further endurance of the sufferings from the war.

      Though I hope we succeed in holding out during the next few months and carry out a successful defense, I am nevertheless quite convinced that another winter campaign would be absolutely out of question; in other words, that in the later summer or in the autumn an end must be put to the war at all costs. Without a doubt, it will be most important to begin peace negotiations."[39]

      This is how Count von Czernin, the internal minister in Austria, grimly described the situation in the report for his Emperor. After the Russian Army had significantly increased its combat might, the German Army wouldn't withstand the onslaught from the east and west for long. Germany would be definitely followed by Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, whose armies stayed up only with the German support. The German submarines were the only hope for Germany – if they didn't help to win the war, they would at least help them to stay up. "Without our submarine warfare, the Quadruple Alliance would have been inevitably defeated in 1917,"[40] Ludendorff indicated. Therefore, no one relied on the overland army anymore.

      The military catastrophe of Germany and all of its satellites was inevitably coming in 1917. "If in 1917 Russia had remained an "organized state," all the Danube countries would be just Russian provinces today," said Count Istvan Bethlen, the Hungarian chancellor. "Not only Prague but Budapest, Bucharest, Belgrade, and Sofia would follow the will of the Russian rulers. The Russian military

33

Multatuli P. God Bless My Decision… St. Pb.: Satis, 2002. P. 234.

34

Yakovlev N. August 1, 1914. M.: Algoritm, 2002. P. 291.

35

Zaichonkovsky A. World War I. St. Pb.: Polygon, 2002. P. 628.

36

Ib.

37

Barsukov E. Russian Ordnance in World War I. M.: Voenizdat, 1938. V. 1. P. 70.

38

Ludendorff E. My Memoirs of the War 1914–1918. Minsk: Kharvest, 2005. P. 379.

39

Czernin O. In the World War. M.; Pg.: Giz, 1923. P. 161.

40

Ludendorff E. My Memoirs of the War 1914–1918. Minsk: Kharvest, 2005. P. 384.