Название | 1917. Key to the “Russian” Revolution |
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Автор произведения | Николай Стариков |
Жанр | Документальная литература |
Серия | |
Издательство | Документальная литература |
Год выпуска | 2012 |
isbn | 978-5-4461-0485-7 |
"Let me put it straight… Right now we are thoroughly getting ready for a possible Europe-wide war… We prefer the Austrian Army to the Germans. The Polish military resources are already being trained in our Galicia… We prefer Austria to Germany because the former is weaker and can be imposed our terms," Pilsudski's envoy pulled back the shroud of secrecy.[27]
As the discussion progressed, Viktor Chernov started to groan inwardly. Having seen the first Russian Revolution, he understood that something grand and large-scale was about to start, and he, the head of the SR Party, knew nothing about it. Wheelmen and people directing the flows of the global behind-the-stage politics had steered clear of him this time. The problem was that giving "crazy" lectures was one thing, and following them and training the military resources for the Austrian Army was an absolutely different thing. Independence of Poland, Pilsudski's homeland, was at stake. If his prediction, which sounded like a madman's raving, had turned out wrong, consequences for Poland would have been absolutely unpredictable. That meant that Pilsudski knew something that Viktor Chernov didn't.
And Jodko went on. It turned out that the Polish Socialists had taken everything into account. At the right moment, they were going to betray the Germans and side with the Anglo-French.
"…It isn't a secret for either Paris or London. During the early stage of the war, we are going to cooperate with the Germans to oppose Russia. During the second and the final stage of the war we are going to side with the Anglo-French to oppose Germany."[28]
After these words there was silence. Chernov was definitely impressed. All that we can do is wonder with our eyes wide open. However, as we know what objectives the British and the French had in the coming war, why should we be surprised? They were tediously preparing World War 1 to destroy Russia and Germany Whoever had hatred for these two nations could help. Yet, "the allies' planned a combination so complicated and brilliant that the Polish could have failed to understand all the political narrow curve. That was why Pilsudski was given this information – for Poland to get ready and act as needed. They weren't afraid of the data leak. Should some Jodko share the knowledge with the Russian gendarme, no one would have taken him seriously. Just like in January 1991, no one would believe a story about the August Putsch in the USSR, about the future collapse of the Soviet Union, and the start of the first Chechen War. Such things seem absolutely impossible until they actually happen…
There were so many other incredible and fantastic stories in the Chronicles of World War 1 and the Russian Revolution that rose from it. These stories appear many-colored in reputed memoirs and absolutely free sources, one just needs to pay attention. For instance, the future hero of Finland, at that time – a Russian Cavalry General Carl Gustaf Mannerheim spent three years in battles of World War 1. In February 1917, he came to his native Suomi for a stay. There were joyful meetings, visits, and dates. And in Mannerheim's memoirs we read, "When I visited an old friend of mine from the Cadet Corps for lunch, I met some ex-officers and old friends. Over lunch, no one said a word about 2,000 volunteers that had moved to Germany to receive military education there within the recent two years. And by the way, those were the people that should have joined the army to free Finland in case the long-expected revolution happened in Russia."[29]
Stop. It is 1917. If the Finns had been leaving for Germany for already two years, they should have started in 1915. At that time the revolution was nowhere near Russia. Then how did "the hot-tempered Finnish blokes" (Translator's note: This phrase was popularized by the 1995 Russian comedy 'Peculiarities of the National Hunt' due to the Russian stereotype of Finns being slow in speech, thinking, and action) know that it was to happen? Moreover, for them it was "long-expected," and they were training the anti-Russian Army in advance to make their country independent. Was it a coincidence, a chance, or a twinge of intuition?
No, it wasn't. It was exact knowledge, just like with Pilsudski. The British were planning to destroy Russia and Germany through setting them on one another. They needed allies to fulfil their plan. Russia was very large, and the Poles alone can't have done the trick. Albeit Poland had the top-priority part in crushing of our country, Finland due to its size could have joined the process as late as in 1915. It had a much more humble task, and it received information later, in strict compliance with the scenario…
Thus, using facts and logic, we can find who orchestrated the collapse of the Russian Empire…
Still, logic alone isn't enough for history, so let's turn to facts. The generally accepted version of how the February Revolution started is simple and plain. Russia entered the war, sustained tremendous losses, its economy was exhausted, and naturally, its people were annoyed and overthrew the corrupted autocracy. Was everything so? If we look into the facts in greater detail and consistently interpret them, this simple explanation will fall to pieces like a house of cards.
Let's start with some obvious things that can't be argued. A successful attempt to change the existing regime is called a revolution, and an unsuccessful one – an uprisal, a coup, or an anti-government plot. Whenever the people are dissatisfied with their government, there is a reason that will either lead to a victorious revolution or will be ingloriously suppressed. World War 1 involved 38 countries, including the largest European monarchies. By 1917, after three years of fighting, all members of the global fight incurred tremendous human and economic losses. Surely, the extents of their losses varied, but the participants were different in size, too, and their economic and mobilization potentials were diverse.
Reasons for dissatisfaction, i. е., for dumping the regime during the war, can be some military defeats or incredible deterioration of living conditions. At the end of World War 1, revolutions happened in Germany and Austria-Hungary. Regime changes there were in many respects caused by the military defeats of these empires and the dismal state of their economies. However, in 1917 Russia was the only country where the revolution had already happened. Following this logic, Russia either lost the war a year and a half earlier than all of its opponents, or sufferings and hardships of its citizens were beyond all expectations. This is what the Soviet historiography kept telling us, and today all pro-liberal historians repeat it. Yet, in February 1917 the Russians had neither strategic military nor economic reasons for revolting!
The potential of our country development in the early 20 century was so great that the situation in the country, at the front, and in the army didn't get any worse but even improved. The front was stable, and it was all calm in the country. Of course, in the third year of the war Russia wasn't as full with bread and wine as it used to be. And yet, don't forget that whenever a war happened, it always brought along hunger, deprivation, and military draft. The unprecedentedly colossal encounter caused problems in all spheres of life. The living conditions naturally lowered, the food economy changed for the worse if compared with peaceful times. However, this happened everywhere – at our opponents' and our allies, too. Almost everywhere it came to regulated consumption and food coupons. When the German government discovered the lack of food caused by the British naval blockade, they quickly started to confiscate food and redistribute it directly. Austria-Hungary in early 1915 introduced coupons for bread, which was followed with coupons for other consumer goods. The British were starving, as their ships loaded with foreign provisions were sent to the bottom by the German submarines, and "various agencies confiscated all delivered provisions for military units and supply workers; potatoes and flour were unavailable to the poor."[30] David Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister, wrote, "By the autumn of 1916 the food position was becoming increasingly alarming and grave."[31] France had serious issues with food, too, as half of its territories were occupied by the Germans, and many industrial enterprises were within the warfare zone. Trotsky, who passed Sweden when returning to Russia in 1917, wrote that the only thing he recalls from this neutral Scandinavian country was "bread coupons."
27
Chernov V. Before the Storm. Minsk: Kharvest, 2004. P. 296.
28
Ib.
29
С Mannerheim. Memoirs. M.: Vagrius, 1999. P. 70.
30
Czernin O. In the World War. M.; Pg.: Giz, 1923. P. 159.
31
D. Lloyd George. War Memoirs. V. 2. P. 597.