Civl society. Группа авторов

seeing that political violence is often motivated by unquestionably good intentions.

      A starting point for many manifestations of violence that endangers freedom is that one reacts to political positions that one does not like with a kind of “political arachnophobia”. Disgusted and – genuinely or supposedly – driven by fear, the troublemaker is attacked with words and whistles, or other means, although he is generally only aggravating and not really dangerous. Many are motivated to use this kind of behaviour because they feel that grim situations they are aware of from history are looming up on the horizon; that is why they are determined to “nip it in the bud”. This reaction unfolds particularly easily whenever a connection can be made between somebody with a different opinion and National Socialism. It is then usually the case that communication is ruled out and forms of exclusion practiced that, in turn, make use of some subtle – and some very crude – techniques of the use of force.

      The techniques employed to ostracise dissidents begin with refusal to question one’s own mindset and not even wanting to attempt to comprehend those connections that are so important to the person with a different opinion. This kind of ostracism goes further when it is considered a sign of special competence to be able to “explain away” everything that has caused the dissident to take his political position. One can make fun of “obviously unfounded” fears or pass them off as being “merely a pretext” – and portray the “real reasons” in appropriately dark colours. It is possible to achieve even more if the opponent is deprived of important terms, or if their use in the public sphere has been prevented or made slightly scandalous by setting “limits to what can be said”. This is intended to show that the distinctions and evaluations that are important for those who think differently can only be put forward against directly expressed contradiction – showing that the opponent is wrong through his choice of words alone.

      The next stage of ostracism is reached when it becomes possible to attach labels to the opponent that show that somebody is really a “bad person”. The best way to begin is by judging him to be a “notorious troublemaker” or “political diehard”. A “strategic context formation” of this kind is particularly effective in Germany if it is possible to describe somebody as a “right-wing populist”, “fascist”, or – really popular in recent times – as a “racist”. And, in case the person is not directly recognisable as being evil, speaking of the “extremism of the middle” that the person to be outcast personifies, usually helps. It can also be particularly practical if it is possible to portray the marginalised person as being the incarnation of type that is dangerous to the general public. In that case, the demand for exclusion is no longer specifically directed against a fellow human being, who might even be likeable under different circumstances, or his particular actions, but simply against evil and its embodiment in the enemy. This makes it possible to assert one’s own moral superiority that can no longer be refuted for all practical purposes.

      It is highly plausible that anybody who has been branded as being a “latent Nazi” or “populist” will be deprived of any possibilities for public appearances. You cannot provide a platform for a right-wing radical or racist; he can therefore no longer participate in talk shows on an equal footing – and, naturally, also not on discussion podiums and rostrums. The result of this kind of process reaches perfection as soon as the dissident not only shows weakness that justify his exclusion, but also reacts to such pressure by accepting his role as an outsider and, full of defiance, proves himself to be increasingly wrong.

      The ostracism can go even further. The aim is to bring the dissident before a “virtual court” – for example, to “finish him off” on a talk show and then post the relevant video clip on the internet. It might even be possible to pin an investigation by the public prosecutor on him; there must be something behind it! The goal has been reached when the person who is to be rejected is regarded as “not to be taken seriously”, when he is no longer seen as a “trustworthy expert” – and maybe not even an “acceptable fellow citizen”. And the exclusion reaches the desired conclusion when the opponent withdraws from the public sphere. In a dictatorship, he might be incarcerated, exiled, admitted to a psychiatric institution, or possibly even murdered.

      All of these steps can be rounded of perfectly with schadenfreude towards the “bad guys” and with self-celebratory symbolic actions by the “heroes”. This becomes particularly effective when this schadenfreude is not only accompanied by serious threats, but when these are put into practice in an exemplary fashion: from preventing public speeches to rededicating cakes to be used as accusatory projectiles, from discourse-preventing chants and throwing stones at demonstrations to attacks on offices, vehicles, and people. All of these activities have now become a mutual practice that damages an existing civil society from within and undermines the foundations of its pluralistic democracy.

      6. Lessons to be heeded

      It will only be possible to enjoy the advantages of a civil society as long as desirable argumentativeness or radicality does not result in violence, or the respective opponent – even if he is a radical – is not confronted with violence. That makes it absolutely essential to accept and adhere to the following rules. First, violence that is against the law must be categorically rejected – regardless of who it is aimed at, and independent of all motives except self-defence and in an emergency. Police action must be taken against any actually executed violence. Second, violence is to be rejected even more strongly as a means of internal politics – this also applies to violence in the form of intimidation although it might still be within the framework of law. Concern about the consequences of substandard politics or indignation about the arrogance of the political opponent never justify violence or the threat of it.

      We would be well advised to not only draw up such principles for the functioning of a civil society in the abstract, but also to consider their concrete consequences, and take them to heart in practice. That is why we should attempt to relate these principles to the issues of immigration and integration, which will definitely remain with us for some time to come, and – specifically – to the recurring attacks on refugees and their accommodation. Although this example is substitutable, it is particularly instructive in the present situation. No matter how radical the political disagreement, it must be handled in this way: It is unjust to come down on civil-war refugees and asylum seekers, foreigners living in the country, and fellow citizens with a different appearance, just because one is dissatisfied with the deficiencies in migration and integration policies.

      This makes refugee and asylum seekers’ accommodations absolutely the wrong places to protest against migration and integration policies. It is deplorable to try to get attention by organising demonstrations of this kind in places where those people, who can do nothing at all about the conflict that needs to be fought out in a country, become the target of aggression. It is also unjust to translate concerns and indignation resulting from the inadequacies and flaws in immigration and integration policies into hostility against overtaxed mayors and district executives, and even against those police officers who have to maintain public order and secure the rights of everybody to demonstrate under such difficult circumstances. And the fact that somebody looks different or has been socialised by a culture different from one’s own does not in any way justify belittling or despising others and treating them accordingly. Anyone who does this, anyone who acts in a racist manner, has a damaged moral compass or bad character. And anyone who – despite willingness to engage in a dialogue – cannot be won over to humane coexistence must, quite simply, be excluded from the acceptable political discourse.

      Put in a nutshell: For the sake of the continued existence of a civil society and its pluralistic democracy, it is necessary to fight violent radicals and all extremists – then, thanks to the self-evident assertion of non-violence, one will be able to afford the radicality that is so important for political educability and make the pluralistic democracy especially educable in this way. Of course, this is a complex view, and often an emotionally difficult attitude. However, without accepting the necessary intellectual and emotional costs, it will quite simply be impossible to benefit from the great value of the civil society and its pluralistic democracy.