Bow-Tie Industrial Risk Management Across Sectors. Luca Fiorentini

1 Applicability of tools for risk assessment.

      Table 2 Example of “what‐if” analysis. Source: Adapted from Assael, M. and Kakosimos, K., 2010.

      Table 3 Guidewords for HAZOP analysis.

      Table 4 Extract of an example of HAZOP analysis. Adapted from Assael and Kakosimos (2010).

      Table 5 Subdivision of the analyzed system into areas.

      Table 6 Hazards and assumed event in HAZID.

      Table 7 List of typical consequences.

      Table 8 HAZID worksheet.

      Table 9 Different classification of barriers as physical or non‐physical.

      Table 10 Comparison of defined hazards with insufficient detail and optimal degree for evaluation.

      Table 11 Comparison of defined top events with insufficient detail and with an optimal degree for evaluation.

      Table 12 Comparison of defined causes with insufficient detail and with an optimal degree for evaluation.

      Table 13 Comparison of defined consequences with insufficient detail and with an optimal degree of evaluation.

      Table 14 Barrier Types.

      Table 15 Quality scores and judgments on the effectiveness of barriers.

      Table 16 Standard Performance Scores (PS).

      Table 17 Definition of BRFs in Tripod Beta.

      Table 18 Example of spreadsheet event timeline.

      Table 19 Example of Gantt chart investigation timeline.

      Table 20 Barrier function score (FS).

      Table 21 Barrier consequence of failure score (CS).

      Table 22 Barrier redundancy score (RS).

      Table 23 Barrier criticality ranking.

      Table 24 Barrier criticality assessment example.

      Table 25 Interpretation of the barrier‐based audit response histograms.

Table 26 Survey team members should and should not.

      Table 27 General information about the case study.

      Table 28 Record of the supervisor systems (adapted from Italian). Source: Marmo, Piccinini and Fiorentini, 2013.

      Table 29 Threshold values according to Italian regulations. Source: Marmo, Piccinini and Fiorentini, 2013.

      Table 30 Summary of the investigation.

      Table 31 Example of calculating HEP with the SPAR‐H Method.

      Table 32 PIF (current configuration)

      Table 33 PIF (Configuration A)

      Table 34 PIF (POST configuration)

      Table 35 Frequency of incidental assumptions considered.

      List of Acronyms

AHJauthority having jurisdictionAIChEAmerican Institute of Chemical EngineersALARPas low as reasonably practicableBCMbusiness continuity managementBCMSBusiness Continuity Management SystemBFAbarrier failure analysisBIAbusiness impact analysisBPCSbasic process control systemBRFbasic risk factorBSCATbarrier‐based systematic cause analysis techniqueBTBow‐TieCCDcause‐consequence diagramCCPSCentre for Chemical Process SafetyCOSOCommittee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway CommissionERMenterprise risk managementETAevent tree analysisFARSIfunctionality, availability, reliability, survivability and interactionsFMEAfailure modes and effects analysisFMECAfailure modes, effects, and criticality analysisFMEDAfailure modes, effects, and diagnostic analysisFSMSfire safety management systemFTAfault tree analysisGAMABglobally at least as goodGIGOgarbage in, garbage outHAZIDhazard identificationHAZOPhazard and operability analysisHEARThuman error assessment and reduction techniqueHEMPhazard and effects management processHEPhuman error probabilityHFACShuman factors analysis and classification schemeHLShigh‐level systemHSEhealth, safety, and environmentHSEQhealth, safety, environment, and qualityICTinformation and communications technologyIEinitial eventIECInternational Electrotechnical CommissionIEFinitial event frequencyIPLindividual protection layerIRMThe Institute of Risk ManagementIRPAindividual risk per annumIRTindependent protection layer response timeISOInternational Organization for StandardizationITinformation technologyKPIkey performance indicatorLFElearning from experienceLOPAlayer of protection analysisLOPCloss of primary containmentMEMminimum endogenous mortalityMGSat least the same level of safetyMOCmanagement of changeNFPANational Fire Protection AssociationNMAUnot more than unavoidablePDCAPlan‐Do‐Check‐ActP&IDpiping and instrumentation diagramPFDprobability of failure on demandPHApreliminary hazard analysisPIFperformance‐influencing factorPPEpersonal protective equipmentPSMprocess safety managementQIQOquality in, quality outQRAquantitative risk assessmentRArisk assessmentRAGAGEPrecognized and generally accepted good engineering practiceRBDreliability block diagramRCAroot cause analysisRMrisk managementROIreturn on investmentRPNrisk priority numberRRFrisk‐reducing factorSCEsafety critical equipmentSHIPPsystem hazard identification, prediction and preventionSIFsafety instrumented functionSILsafety integrity levelSISsafety instrumented systemSLCsafety life cycleSLIMSuccess Likelihood Index MethodSMSsafety management systemSPAR‐HStandardized Plant Analysis Risk‐Human Reliability AnalysisTHERPtechnique for human error‐rate predictionTRtechnical report

Preface 1

       Riccardo Ghini

       Quality Head Italy & Malta and South Europe Cluster, Sanofi

      Risk assessment is a basic concept that has always accompanied me throughout my work and professional experience, so being able to contribute, albeit marginally, to the drafting of this monumental work fills me with pride and happiness.

      Since the time of Legislative Decree 626/94, the ability to evaluate the probability of occurrence and the possible consequences of accidents and injuries at work has been a fundamental skill for me to develop, through the study of ever‐more‐refined methods and techniques of investigation. Finding all these useful analysis tools grouped in this way, brilliantly described and accompanied by real application examples, represents for me, and for all professionals, a unique opportunity for enrichment and deepening.

      In fact, as my career continued, I soon realized how the concepts underlying this book can be effectively applied, not only in the field of work safety, but also in all areas of business activity, where words like “risk,” “scenario,” “analysis of the causes,” and “continuous improvement” have become commonly used, as they are based on the very structure of the management systems developed in accordance with the various reference standards, now completely standardized.

      Furthermore, we mustn’t fail to mention the importance assumed by the methods of analysis, assessment, and operational management of the risks associated with the predicate offenses of Legislative Decree 231/2001 (administrative liability of companies and entities), which constitute the essential element in the preparation of a Corporate Organization, Management, and Control Model that effectively prevents the occurrence of the types of offense and, at the same time, constitutes a valid exemption in the context of a possible criminal trial.

      The real cultural transition, however, takes place when the concept of risk assessment is adopted and is also applied outside the professional sphere, elevating it to a rational criterion to guide our daily choices: “do I overtake or not overtake the car that’s in front of me?, “do I subscribe to this insurance policy or not?,” “do I vaccinate my children or not?” These are all questions and situations we face every day, and for which it is very useful to identify the possible “top event,” the “consequences” that can be generated, and the “causes” that can originate it,