A Methodical System of Universal Law. Johann Gottlieb Heineccius

errs, either because the law, or because the action is not rightly represented; or because the rules of just reasoning are not observed.^†

      SECTION XL

      It is either certain or probable.

      Again, as in other reasonings, so likewise in those of conscience chiefly, it happens that an argument is sometimes taken from a certain principle, and sometimes from an hypothesis, a probable proposition, but yet merely hypothetical. Hence conscience is called certain, when it argues upon an indisputable law; and probable, when it founds upon the probable opinion of others.^* Now, because there are various degrees of probability, conscience must sometimes be more, and sometimes less probable. <27>

      SECTION XLI

      What doubtful and scrupulous conscience mean?

      Because what is probable may be true, or may be false (§40): therefore it happens that probable arguments present themselves to us on both sides of the question; now in this case we think more deliberation is required, the affair being dubious; and conscience is then said to be doubtful; but if the perplexity we are in, and cannot get totally rid of, be of smaller consequence, it is then called scrupulous.^* <28>

      SECTION XLII

      What free and less free conscience mean?

      Besides, it may happen that the mind, precipitated into vice by impetuous appetites, and as it were enslaved by evil habits, is not able to reason freely about actions; but is strongly biassed towards the side of its passions; in which servile state conscience is not a free and impartial reasoner. But the mind which hath delivered itself from such miserable bondage into a state of liberty is free. This distinction is accurately explained by Wolfius ’s Ethic. §84.^†1

      SECTION XLIII

      What sleeping, awakened and seared conscience mean?

      We know by experience that men are sometimes lulled so fast asleep by their vices, that they have no feeling of their misery, and never think upon duty, or right and wrong. Now, as we then say, conscience is in a deep lethargy; or if it is, by a long habit of vice, become quite obdurate and <29> callous, we say it is seared as with a burning iron.^* So conscience seems as it were to awake, when a person rouzed by calamity, or a sense of danger, begins to examine and ponder his actions with some attention, and to reflect and reason about their goodness or depravity.

      SECTION XLIV

      What is meant by quiet, disturbed, anxious, disquieted conscience and remorse?

      We have already remarked that every one’s conscience condemns or absolves him (§35): but because absolution must be accompanied with the highest satisfaction of mind, and condemnation with the bitterest uneasiness and disquiet; hence it follows, that a good conscience, acting upon certain evidence, is for the most part quiet and easy; an evil conscience is disturbed by racking remorse; (which torment the antients compared to the burning torches of the furies): and a dubious one is very anxious and restless, to such a degree, that it knows not to what hand to turn itself. These affections however belong more properly to the effects of conscience than to conscience itself, as every one will immediately perceive.^* <30>

      SECTION XLV

      Whether conscience be the rule of human actions?

      Whence we see what judgment we are to form of the opinion of those who assert that conscience is to be held for the internal rule of human actions. For if a rule cannot answer the end of a rule unless it be right, certain, and invariable (§5); who will admit conscience to be a rule which is sometimes erroneous (§39); sometimes only probable (§40); sometimes doubtful and wavering; (§41) and frequently overpowered by perverse appetites (§42); wherefore, tho’ he be guilty who acts contrary to conscience, whether certain or probable; yet he cannot for that reason be said to act rightly and justly, who contends that he has acted according to his conscience.^† <31>

      SECTION XLVI

      Why action ought to be suspended while conscience doubts?

      Hence we may conclude, that while conscience is uncertain, and fluctuates between contrary opinions, action ought to be suspended. This we assert in opposition to Ger. Gottl. Titus,² in his observations on Puffendorf de off. hom. & civ. l. 1. C. 1. §6. And for one to do any thing with such an obstinate obdurate mind, as to be very little concerned about knowing the divine will, and determined to do the same, even tho’ he should find it to be prohibited by God, is the heighth of perverseness.^*

      SECTION XLVII

      The weaknesses or defects of the understanding, ignorance and error.

      From what hath been laid down, it is plain that ignorance and error are the great hinderances to conscience in the application of a law to a fact. By the former is understood the mere want of knowledge; by the other is meant the disagreement of an idea, a judgment, or a reasoning to truth, or the nature of the thing. One therefore is said to be ignorant who hath no idea before his mind; and one is said to err, who hath either a false idea of the object, that is, an idea not conformable to it; an obscure, confused, or unadequate idea. For an error in the idea must of necessity infuse itself into the judgment made concerning an object, and from thence into all the reasonings about it. <32>

      SECTION XLVIII

      Whether ignorance and error of all sorts be culpable?

      But because all men are not under an obligation to find out the more abstruse truths which may be said to lie at the bottom of a deep well; and in reality the ignorance of some things is rather attended with advantage than detriment;^* (yea, as Terence observes, Hecyra.³ the ignorant and illiterate often do more good in one day, than ever the learned and knowing do;) hence it may be inferred, that ignorance and error of every kind is not evil and blameable.

      SECTION XLIX

      What kind of ignorance and what kind of error is culpable?

      Yet since the will makes no election unless it be excited to it by the understanding; and therefore the understanding concurs in producing moral actions (§30), the consequence from this is, that they are not blameless who are grosly ignorant of those truths relative to good and ill, just and unjust, which it was in their power easily to understand, or who err with regard to these matters, when error might have been avoided by due care and attention to acquire right and true knowledge.

      SECTION L

      Ignorance is either vincible or invincible, voluntary or involuntary, efficacious or concomitant.

      Hence arise various divisions or classes of ignorance and error, so far as it is or is not in our power <33> to escape ignorance, it is vincible or invincible.^* So far as one is or is not the cause of it himself, it is voluntary or involuntary. Finally, if one does any thing he would not have done had his mind not been obscured by ignorance, such ignorance is called efficacious or effectual. But if he would have done the same action tho’ he had not been in the state of ignorance in which he did it, it is called concomitant. Repentance is the mark of the former; but the latter discovers itself by the approbation given to the action done in a state of ignorance, when that ignorance no longer takes place. Now all this is equally applicable to error.

      SECTION LI

      What will is?

      We proceed now to consider the other principle of human or moral free actions, viz. the will, (§30) which <34> is that faculty of our mind by which we choose and refuse. Hence it is justly said, that truth and falshood are the objects of the understanding; but that the will is conversant about good and ill. For the will only desires truth as it is good, and is averse to falshood only as it is ill.^*

      SECTION LII

      Its nature and acts.

      From this definition we may conclude