A Methodical System of Universal Law. Johann Gottlieb Heineccius

what is exhibited to it by the understanding under the shew of good, nor turn aside from any thing but what appears to it to be ill. The greater good or ill there seems to be in any thing, the stronger in proportion is our inclination or aversion; and therefore the desire of a lesser good or a lesser evil may be overpowered by the representation of a greater good or evil. Aversion does not consist in a mere absence of desire, but hath something positive in it, which is called by Koehler, exerc. jur. nat. §167.⁴noluntas vel reclinatio, refusing or aversion.^† <35>

      SECTION LIII

      Its spontanity and liberty.

      From the same definition it is clear that man, with regard to his will, acts not only spontaneously but freely. For spontaneity being the faculty of directing one’s aim to a certain end, but liberty being the power of choosing either of two possibles one pleases; it is plain from experience, that both these faculties belong to our minds. The servile subjection one is under to his perverse appetites and affections till virtue makes him free, is not inconsistent with these properties. For these obstacles are of such a kind, as hath been observed, that they may be removed and overpowered by the representation of a greater good or evil to the understanding (§52).^* <36>

      SECTION LIV

      Do temperament or bodily constitution affect it?

      Hence it is evident, that bodily constitution, (which philosophers call temperament) does not infringe upon the liberty of human will. For tho’ the mind be variously affected by the body, so as to be rendered by it more propense to certain vices; yet that propensity hath no more of compulsion or force in it than there is in the inducement to walk out when fine weather invites one to it. But who can deny that the will is left intire, and not hindered or prevented from choosing either to walk out or not as it shall appear most reasonable, when inticed by all the charms of spring?

      SECTION LV

      Whether affections and habits encroach upon it?

      The same is true concerning all the affections and motions excited in the mind by the appearances of good and ill. For tho’ the mind, with respect to the first impression, be passive, every thing else is however intirely in its power; to resist the first impulse, not to approve it, nor to suffer it to gain too much force. And it likewise holds with regard to habits, i.e. propensions confirmed by long use and practice. For tho’ these gradually become so natural, that tho’ expelled with never so much force, they recoil, Hor. ep. 1. 10. v. 24. (si expellas furca, tamen usque recurret)⁵ yet they are not incorrigible, but may be amended, if one will but exert his liberty.^*<37>

      SECTION LVI

      What may be said of external force.

      External violence is so far from taking away the liberty of the human mind, that it affords a strong proof of our liberty. For tho’ one may be hindered by force from doing what he chooses to do; yet no force can make one will what he does not will, or not choose what he chooses.^* If the understanding represents the good attending an action as greater than the imminent evil, no external violence can force one to quit his resolution, he will remain unshaken by all the menaces of power or cruelty.

      Nec civium ardor prava jubentium

      Nec vultus instantis tyranni

      Mente quatiet solida.⁶

      SECTION LVII

      The will is divided into consequent and antecedent.

      Hence we see that the distinction between antecedent and consequent will ought not to be rejected; the former of which decides without a view of all the circumstances which may happen at the time of acting; the other suits itself to the circumstances which appear at that instant. The one therefore is not opposite to the other, tho’ they be very different. Thus it is true that God loves peace, and yet that in certain circumstances he does not disapprove war. <38>

      SECTION LVIII

      Actions are spontaneous, forced, voluntary, and mixed.

      Further, it is equally plain that those actions are spontaneous which are performed by a mind determining itself to a certain known proposed end; these are not spontaneous which do not proceed from such a determination of the mind, but are done without intention. Again, even spontaneous actions are voluntary, to perform which no external necessity compels; and such are forced, to which one is necessitated by some external urgent circumstances. We need not add mixed, because actions called such, being performed under some external necessity urging to it, coincide with those which are called forced actions.^*

      SECTION LIX

      Actions not spontaneous are involuntary. Forced actions are voluntary.

      Hence it is obvious that no action which is not spontaneous is voluntary (§58); but forced actions may be voluntary. For tho’ we would rather not act were not a very great evil set before us, yet it is the will which determines to act; whence it follows, that the antient lawyers were in the right when they affirmed, that one who is forced, wills. D. l. 21. §5. quod met. causa, “coactum etiam velle.” <39>

      REMARKS on This Chapter

      Our Author doth not enter at all into the dispute about necessity and free agency. It would have been a digression from his subject. The question is most accurately handled by Mr. Locke in the chapter of Power, in his Essay on human understanding. See likewise what I have said of it in my Introduction to the principles of moral philosophy; and in the Christian philosophy, sect. 3. prop. 4. But I think the whole matter may be dispatched in a few words. It is as much a matter of experience as any other whatever. That several things depend upon our will as to their existence or non-existence; as to sit, or stand, or walk; to write or not write: to think or leave off thinking on this or the other subject, &c. But so far as it depends in this manner on our will, or pleasure to do, or not to do, we are free, we have power, dominion, agency; or we are not passive but active beings. To say we are not free, but necessary, must be to assert either that we are not conscious, which is contrary to experience; or that we never will, which is also contrary to experience; or that our will never is effective, which is equally so, since many things depend on our will: For necessity must mean one or other of these three, or all of them together. There is no other property included in the idea of a free agent; there is no other conceivable property belonging to action or agency, besides willing with power to effect what is willed. To say that the will is not free, because it must desire good and hate ill as such, is to say freedom or activity cannot belong to a mind endued with the power of willing; since willing means complacency in good, or preferring it, and aversion to evil, or desire to avoid it, i.e. it is to say freedom means some property that can’t exist, because it implies a contradiction, viz. willing without willing. Freedom is the very idea of agency: it is that which constitutes an agent; and it signifies having a certain degree or extent of power, efficiency, or dominion by our will. And that we have a certain degree or extent of power, efficiency, or dominion by our will, is as manifest to experience as that we think: nor can a proof of it be demanded, unless at the same time a proof of thinking and consciousness be demanded.

      As for what our Author says about erroneous conscience, it will be better understood by what is said in the fourth chapter about imputation, and our remark added to that chapter. Mean time we may observe, 1. That if to acquire knowledge for the direction of our actions be not among our τὰ ἐϕ’ ἡμὶν, or within our power, the direction of our actions cannot be in our power, that is, we are not agents. If we are not accountable for our not having knowledge sufficient to direct our actions rightly, we cannot be accountable for our actions. 2. Our views, our judgments of things must be our rule; we can have no other: yet ultimately, the nature of things is the rule, because the natures of things are stubborn, and will not yield to our misapprehensions <40> of them. It is the same here as with regard to mechanicks, where no difficulty is started. The nature of mechanical powers and properties will not submit to our notions; yet we must work in mechanical arts according to our apprehensions of mechanical laws and properties. Our ideas and judgments are our immediate