A Methodical System of Universal Law. Johann Gottlieb Heineccius

CHAP. VIII. Concerning the immanent rights of majesty, and the just exercise of them, to page 184.

       CHAP. IX. Concerning the transeunt rights of majesty, to page 214.

       CHAP. X. Of the duties of subjects, to page 222.

       With a supplement concerning the duties of magistrates and subjects, to which are prefixed some observations on the study of the laws of nature and nations, to page 247.

       To all which is added a discourse on the nature and origine of moral and civil laws, in which moral and civil laws are deduced, in the experimental way, by an analysis of human nature, from our internal dispositions and principles, and our situation.

      THE LAWS OF

       NATURE and NATIONS deduced, & C.

      BOOK I

      Of the LAW of NATURE

CHAPTER I

       Concerning the origine and foundation of the LAW of NATURE and NATIONS.

      SECTION I

      What constitutes a good, and what a bad action?

      Whatever tends to preserve and perfect man is called good with respect to man: whatever hath a contrary tendency is called ill with regard to him:^* every action therefore which contributes to human preservation and perfection is a good action; and every action is evil which tends to hurt and destroy man, or to hinder his advancement to the perfection of which his nature is capable.

      SECTION II

      What Preservation and perfection mean, and what destruction and imperfection?

      Whatever conduces in any manner or degree towards our duration, or the continuance of our present state, is said to be preservative of man: whatever promotes and augments those properties, which belonging to human nature, and constituting our state and rank, admits of degrees, is called perfective of man.^* Whence it is easy to under-<2>stand what may be said to hurt, wrong, or degrade us.

      SECTION III

      Men have power to act well or ill.

      Such being the nature of human will, that it always desires good, and abhors ill;^† it cannot but like those actions which tend to our preservation and perfection, and it cannot but dislike those actions which tend to our hurt and imperfection: But because good and ill may be really what they appear to be, and on the other hand, a seeming good may be a real evil, and a seeming evil may be a real good;† it very often happens, that like Ixion in the fable, we embrace an empty cloud instead of Juno;¹i.e. we are deceived by appearances, and mistake seeming for solid good, and a false semblance of ill for real ill; and thus we may make a bad or a good choice, be right or wrong in our elections, and consequently in our actions.†

      SECTION IV

      Wherefore men stand in need of some rule by which they may direct their actions.

      Now the power of preferring one or other of two possibles, and by consequence of acting well or ill, is called liberty: this power we experience; wherefore it cannot be denied that there are, with regard to us, free actions which are good, and free actions which are bad. But since all things, which may be <3> rightly directed or perverted, stand in need of a rule by which they may be rightly directed, it follows that our free actions ought to be directed by some rule.^*

      SECTION V

      And this rule must be right or just, sure and immutable.

      By a rule here we understand an evident criterion by which good and ill may be certainly distinguished. And in order to answer that end, a rule must be true, right or just, clear, certain and constant. For suppose the rule not to be just, and that which is ruled by it will not be just or right. Suppose it not to be clear and certain, and it cannot be a sure criterion of good and evil. Finally, if we suppose it to be uncertain and variable, an action regulated by it will sometimes be good and sometimes be bad: and therefore in none of these cases would it deserve the name of a rule.^†

      SECTION VI

      It must likewise be obligatory.

      Further, a rule of action would be but of little advantage to mankind, if it were not of such a kind, <4> that it carried with it some motive (as it is called) by which human will might be impelled to make use of it, and apply it. Because man never acts without something present to his mind, by which he is excited or impelled to act; he will therefore not apply a rule, or at least he will be very indifferent whether he applies it or no, unless he be stimulated by some motive to apply it. But since we call the connection between a motive and a free action obligation, that a rule for the direction of human actions may answer its end, it must be obligatory.

      SECTION VII

      What is obligation, and how many kinds of it are there?

      Obligation is a connection between motives and free actions, (§6) and motives must consist either in the intrinsic goodness and pravity of actions themselves, or arise from the will of some Being whose authority we acknowledge, commanding and forbidding certain actions under a penalty. And therefore the former species of obligation is called internal; the latter is called external.^* The first excites to good actions, the other to just actions. But right is the correlate (as it is called in the schools) to both. For if one person be under an obligation, some other person hath a right or title to exact something from him.

      SECTION VIII

      Internal obligation is not sufficient.

      Hence it is manifest, that a rule which carries only an internal obligation with it, is not sufficient with respect to mankind: for since this obligation solely arises from the goodness of the action, (§7), and therefore only excites a person to act by this motive, viz. that his action may be good; but man is so framed by nature, that he often embraces a false appearance of good for what is really such:^* (§3). Such a rule must be uncertain, and for that reason it is not deserving of being called a rule (§5). <5>

      SECTION IX

      An external obligation either perfect or imperfect is therefore wanting.

      But if a rule only carrying an internal obligation with it, would be uncertain, there is need of one which may produce an external obligation arising from the will of some Being whose authority we acknowledge. Since therefore that Being may oblige us to the practice of virtue and honesty, either without co-action, or may command and forbid certain actions with penalties and rewards, the former species of external obligation is properly denominated imperfect, and the latter perfect. Now the will of a superior commanding and forbidding under penalty is called a law: and therefore a rule for the direction of our free actions, to conform to which we are under perfect obligation, must consist of laws, and a system of such is termed by way of eminence law.^* <6>

      SECTION X

      Of this law there can be no other author but God.

      Now, since that Being may be justly denominated our superior, upon whom our being and happiness absolutely depend, and whose authority we are obliged to acknowledge, because he has a just title to exact obedience from us, and hath power to propose penalties to us in case of our refusing to obey him; and, it appears by many most evident